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ABSTRACT 
 
MARK ELLIOT PATTERSON: Effect of Prescription Copayments on Medication 
Compliance and Hospitalizations in Commercially Insured Patients with Heart Failure 
(Under the direction of Dr. Michael Murray) 
 
While pharmaceutical copayments are effective in containing system-level 
expenditures, the increased financial burden on patients may decrease medication 
compliance.  Though many studies have focused on the effects of copayments on utilization, 
fewer have simultaneously examined copayments, compliance, and clinical outcomes, 
especially within heart failure patients.  The rising prevalence and economic burden of heart 
disease underscores the need to research copayment effects on compliance and outcomes in 
this population. 
The primary objective of this research was to estimate the effects of angiotensin 
converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor, beta-adrenergic blocker and diuretic prescription 
copayment levels on medication compliance and hospitalizations in commercially insured 
heart failure patients.  The secondary objective was to measure whether medication non-
compliance mediates the association between copayment levels and hospitalizations. 
Heart failure patients were identified from the Integrated Health Care Information 
Solutions, Inc. database, containing a sample of United States commercially insured 
individuals between 1997 and 2005.  Refill copayments were defined in categorical ranges, 
medication compliance by the Medication Possession Ratio, and hospitalizations by the 
presence of all-cause, cardiovascular specific or heart failure specific inpatient claims.
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This retrospective cohort study used ordinary least squares, random effects, and fixed 
effects regressions to estimate the effect of copayment level on compliance and logistic 
regressions to estimate the risk of hospitalizations conditional upon prescription copayment 
level.  Mediation models were used to explore causal pathways between copayment level, 
medication compliance, and hospitalization. 
Beta blocker and diuretic refills with higher copayment levels were associated with 
up to a 9% and 21% decrease in medication compliance, respectively.  In regards to clinical 
outcomes, higher diuretic copayments were associated with up to 1.4, 2.5, and 3.8 times the 
risk of all-cause, cardiovascular, or heart-failure specific hospitalization, respectively.  
Medication compliance did not mediate the association between copayment level and 
hospitalization. 
Results suggest that higher beta blocker and diuretic copayments are associated with 
decreased compliance in privately insured heart failure patients.  Furthermore, higher diuretic 
copayments are associated with increased risk of hospitalization.  Estimates need to be 
interpreted with caution given the absence of a control group.  Future studies need to be 
conducted to determine the true causal nature of these associations
 v
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW 
 
As health care and pharmaceutical expenditures escalate, health plans continue to 
adapt their formulary benefit packages in order to provide appropriate care and contain costs.  
Drug formularies incorporate cost-sharing in the form of copayments or coinsurance.  
Formularies may be quite diverse across plans.  For example, a prescription benefit plan may 
have a closed or open formulary structure, may require prior authorization for particular drug 
classes, or have a tiered pharmacy benefit structure with different copayment levels for 
generics, non-preferred or preferred drug brands.  The rationale of tiered benefit structures is 
to contain system-level expenditures by providing incentive to beneficiaries to use preferred 
brands or generics, also providing them a choice of non-preferred pharmaceuticals if they are 
willing to pay higher out-of-pocket costs. 
Cost-sharing policies have advantages and disadvantages.  First, cost-sharing policies 
have demonstrated effectiveness in decreasing pharmaceutical utilization (Foxman, Valdez et 
al. 1987; Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Motheral and Henderson 1999; Tamblyn, Laprise et 
al. 2001; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Goldman, Joyce et al. 2004; Huskamp, Deverka et 
al. 2005), increasing switching rates from non-preferred to preferred drugs (Motheral and 
Fairman 2001; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; Huskamp, 
Deverka et al. 2003; Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; Rector, Finch et al. 2003) or generic drugs 
(Motheral and Henderson 1999; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003;
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Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004; Kamal-Bahl and Briesacher 2004) or decreasing plan 
expenditures (Smith 1993; Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; Motheral and Henderson 1999; 
Motheral and Fairman 2001; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; 
Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004; Meissner, Moore et al. 2004), 
patient expenditures (Smith 1993; Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; Motheral and Henderson 
1999; Motheral and Fairman 2001; Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; 
Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004; Meissner, Moore et al. 2004), 
or overall expenditures (Nelson, Reeder et al. 1984; Leibowitz, Manning et al. 1985; 
Soumerai, Avorn et al. 1987; Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Soumerai, Ross-Degnan et al. 
1991; Soumerai, McLaughlin et al. 1994; Motheral and Henderson 1999; Motheral and 
Fairman 2001; Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; Soumerai 2004).  
Although financially beneficial, decreasing pharmaceutical utilization may result in 
unintended adverse events.  Studies examining decreased utilization as a result of restrictive 
prescribing policies have also shown these decreases to be significantly associated with 
increased rates of adverse events and emergency department visits (Soumerai, McLaughlin et 
al. 1994; Tamblyn, Laprise et al. 2001) or increased nursing home admissions (Soumerai, 
Ross-Degnan et al. 1991; Soumerai, McLaughlin et al. 1994).  These studies demonstrate the 
potential for adverse health effects due to decreased access to essential medications. 
Focusing research on associations among prescription copayments, medication 
compliance and hospitalizations within heart failure patients is important given the 
prevalence of heart failure in the United States, the number of essential medications required 
to treat heart failure patients, as well as the potentially severe clinical consequences of non-
compliance.  Though many studies have demonstrated the effects of copayments on 
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utilization, none have focused on heart-failure specific populations.  Furthermore, most 
studies finding significant effects of copayments on utilization within commercially insured 
populations have been limited to select groups of employers (Smith 1993; Motheral and 
Henderson 1999; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005), or only one 
health plan, (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Motheral and Fairman 2001; Thomas, Wallack et 
al. 2002; Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; Rector, Finch et al. 2003; 
Meissner, Moore et al. 2004), decreasing generalizability to commercially insured patients 
across the United States.  Past studies have established the following: 
• Prescription drug cost-sharing effectively decreases medication utilization and 
system-level expenditures in commercially insured populations (Harris, 
Stergachis et al. 1990; Smith 1993; Motheral and Henderson 1999; Motheral 
and Fairman 2001; Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; 
Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Nair, Wolfe et 
al. 2003; Rector, Finch et al. 2003; Goldman, Joyce et al. 2004; Meissner, 
Moore et al. 2004; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005), Medicaid populations 
(Nelson, Reeder et al. 1984; Reeder and Nelson 1985; Soumerai, Avorn et al. 
1987; Soumerai, Ross-Degnan et al. 1991; Soumerai, McLaughlin et al. 1994; 
Kamal-Bahl and Briesacher 2004; Soumerai 2004), managed Medicare 
beneficiaries (Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; 
Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004) and Canadian elderly populations 
(Tamblyn, Laprise et al. 2001). 
 
• Significantly different copayment effects have been found between drug 
classes (Reeder and Nelson 1985; Goldman, Joyce et al. 2004) in addition to 
between medications considered to have important effects on health status 
(‘essential’) versus those providing mostly symptomatic relief 
(‘discretionary’) (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Motheral and Henderson 
1999; Tamblyn, Laprise et al. 2001).  In general, it has been found that 
compared to individuals taking ‘discretionary’ medications, those taking 
‘essential’ medications are less responsive to copayment increases. 
 
• Decreased medication utilization as a result of restrictive prescribing policies 
(e.g., 3 drug per month limit) has been associated with increased nursing 
home admissions or acute mental health service utilization in Medicaid 
beneficiaries (Soumerai, Ross-Degnan et al. 1991; Soumerai, McLaughlin et 
al. 1994). 
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• Decreased compliance with heart failure medications is associated with 
increased hospitalizations and expenditures (Stroupe, Teal et al. 2004). 
 
Despite the vast number of studies examining copayment effects, fewer studies have focused 
on the following: 
• Measuring individual level medication compliance instead of broad 
medication utilization. 
 
• Exploring the causal mechanism between prescription copayment level, 
medication compliance, and clinical outcomes. 
 
More studies need to be conducted examining prescription copayments, medication 
compliance, and clinical outcomes in heart failure patients.  Although one study examined 
the effect of copayment increases on the utilization of ACE inhibitors, beta blockers and 
diuretics as well as hospital readmissions after acute myocardial infarction (Pilote, Beck et al. 
2002), and several have examined either ACE inhibitor use in commercially insured 
populations (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Kamal-Bahl and Briesacher 2004), angiotensin 
II receptor blockers (Kamal-Bahl and Briesacher 2004), cardiovascular agents or diuretics in 
Medicaid populations (Reeder and Nelson 1985), studies examining copayment effects of 
ACE inhibitors, beta blockers or diuretics on compliance and hospitalizations in 
commercially insured heart failure patients have not been forthcoming. 
This dissertation will add to the literature by:  1) being generalizable to a more 
diverse population of commercially insured beneficiaries residing in the United States, 2) 
being the first study to examine drug-specific copayment effects on compliance within a 
heart-failure specific cohort, and 3) being the first to use mediation modeling to explore 
causal pathways between prescription copayment levels, medication compliance, and heart 
failure specific clinical outcomes. 
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The primary aims are to examine: 
• Whether ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic copayment levels are 
associated with lower medication compliance. 
 
• Whether individuals experiencing higher ACE inhibitor, beta blocker or 
diuretic copayment levels are at increased risk of hospitalization. 
 
The secondary aim is to: 
• Explore the extent to which data support that increased copayments result in 
hospitalizations due to decreased medication compliance. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will review heart failure epidemiology in the United States, 
clinical recommendations for treatments of heart failure, and a detailed literature review of 
studies examining copayment effects on pharmaceutical utilization, medication compliance, 
and health outcomes. 
HEART FAILURE EPIDEMIOLOGY 
 
Heart failure affects approximately 5 million individuals in the United States (Hunt, 
Abraham et al. 2005; HFSA 2006).  While the prevalence is 1% among those under 50 years 
of age, it is 10% in individuals older than 80 (Kannel and Belanger 1991).  More than 
550,000 new heart failure cases emerge each year (Hunt, Abraham et al. 2005; HFSA 2006).  
The incidence approaches 10 per 1,000 individuals after the age of 65 (Thom, Haase et al. 
2006).  Prevalence estimates from the Rochester Epidemiology project were 214 and 327 per 
100,000 for women and men, respectively, demonstrating a higher prevalence of heart failure 
among men compared to women (Roger, Weston et al. 2004). 
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Coronary artery disease, hypertension and diabetes are risk factors for developing 
heart failure.  Coronary artery disease is a risk factor associated with worsened outcomes in 
patients with pre-existing heart failure (Dei Cas, Metra et al. 2003).  The presence of 
hypertension contributes to accelerated atherosclerosis as well as elevated stress on the left 
ventricular wall (Dei Cas, Metra et al. 2003) whereas the presence of diabetes contributes to 
increases in left ventricle mass and wall thickness (Devereux, Roman et al. 2000), all of 
which result in worsening heart failure.  Other risk factors include chronic renal insufficiency 
(Krum and Gilbert 2003), smoking (Dei Cas, Metra et al. 2003), excessive alcohol use (Dei 
Cas, Metra et al. 2003), illicit drug use (Dei Cas, Metra et al. 2003), obesity (Dei Cas, Metra 
et al. 2003), male gender (Aronow 2003), and age (Aronow 2003). 
As the population ages, heart failure will increasingly become an economic burden on 
the health care system.  Heart failure is already the most frequent reason for hospitalization in 
the United States among Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 and over (Lee, Chavez et al. 2004).  
Furthermore, 80% of those patients hospitalized with heart failure are 65 years of age and 
older (Hunt, Abraham et al. 2005).  Consequently, more Medicare funds are spent on heart 
failure than on any other diagnosis (Lee, Chavez et al. 2004).  The cost of heart failure was 
estimated in 2006 to be $29.6 billion (Thom, Haase et al. 2006).  The significant economic 
burden of heart failure underscores the need to improve treatment options and compliance in 
heart failure patients. 
CLINICAL TREATMENT GUIDELINES 
 
Clinically recommended first-line therapies for heart failure patients at all stages of 
severity include ACE inhibitors, diuretics, and beta-adrenergic antagonists (Hunt, Abraham 
et al. 2005; HFSA 2006).  Some drugs such as angiotensin II receptor blockers or isosorbide 
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dinitrate hydralazine combination therapy may be appropriate for African-Americans and 
second line therapy for others including those unable to tolerate ACE inhibitors.  
Contraindicated therapies include calcium channel blockers, some anti-arrhythmic drugs, and 
some inotropic therapies except for digoxin, which may be appropriate for more severe heart 
failure patients (Hunt, Abraham et al. 2005).  Pharmacotherapy generally commences when 
patients show clinical manifestations of heart disease such as shortness of breath or ankle 
edema.  ACE inhibitors and beta blockers have demonstrated efficacy in decreasing 
morbidity and mortality across numerous clinical trials (CONCENSUS 1987; SOLVD 1991; 
Cohn, Johnson et al. 1991; Fonarow, Chelimsky-Fallick et al. 1992; Packer, Bristow et al. 
1996; CIBIS-II 1999; MERIT-HF 1999). 
In contrast to the amount of evidence favoring the efficacy of ACE inhibitors and beta 
blockers, mixed evidence is available supporting the efficacy of diuretics in decreasing 
morbidity and mortality.  One meta-analysis of randomized clinical trials found decreased 
mortality in those using diuretics (Faris, Flather et al. 2002) and two observational studies 
found increased mortality (Domanski, Norman et al. 2003; Ahmed, Husain et al. 2006).  
Despite this mixed evidence of a mortality benefit, diuretics are very effective in decreasing 
the symptoms of heart failure, such as edema, by removing excess fluid from the body, and 
therefore are clinically recommended in treating edema in heart failure patients (Brater 
1998). 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
Over twenty studies between 1984 and 2006 have demonstrated significant 
associations between increased prescription copayments or other cost-sharing policies on 
decreased patient expenditures (Smith 1993; Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; Motheral and 
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Henderson 1999; Motheral and Fairman 2001; Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; Thomas, Wallack 
et al. 2002; Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004; Meissner, Moore 
et al. 2004), plan expenditures (Smith 1993; Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; Motheral and 
Henderson 1999; Motheral and Fairman 2001; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; Fairman, 
Motheral et al. 2003; Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004; 
Meissner, Moore et al. 2004), overall expenditures (Nelson, Reeder et al. 1984; Leibowitz, 
Manning et al. 1985; Soumerai, Avorn et al. 1987; Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Soumerai, 
Ross-Degnan et al. 1991; Soumerai, McLaughlin et al. 1994; Motheral and Henderson 1999; 
Motheral and Fairman 2001; Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; 
Soumerai 2004), pharmaceutical utilization (Foxman, Valdez et al. 1987; Harris, Stergachis 
et al. 1990; Motheral and Henderson 1999; Tamblyn, Laprise et al. 2001; Huskamp, Deverka 
et al. 2003; Goldman, Joyce et al. 2004; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005), switching from 
brand to generic (Motheral and Henderson 1999; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; Nair, Wolfe 
et al. 2003; Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004; Kamal-Bahl and Briesacher 2004), non-
preferred to preferred drugs (Motheral and Fairman 2001; Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002; 
Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Nair, Wolfe et al. 2003; 
Rector, Finch et al. 2003), prescription to over-the-counter drugs (Goldman, Joyce et al. 
2004), and retail to mail-order pharmacy utilization (Thomas, Wallack et al. 2002).  Fewer 
studies have examined the effects of copayments on medication compliance.  Of the six 
studies examining the effect of copayments on medication compliance or medication 
continuation (Motheral and Henderson 1999; Coombs, Cornish et al. 2002; Huskamp, 
Deverka et al. 2003; Dor and Encinosa 2004; Ellis, Erickson et al. 2004; Huskamp, Deverka 
et al. 2005) (Table 1.1), three studies showed that increased copayments decreased 
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compliance either to statins (Coombs, Cornish et al. 2002; Ellis, Erickson et al. 2004) or oral 
hypoglycemics (Dor and Encinosa 2004).  The other three studies showed no difference in 
chronic disease medication discontinuation rates in commercially insured patients (Motheral 
and Henderson 1999), in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder medication use in children of 
commercially insured beneficiaries (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005), or in utilization or 
discontinuation rates of ACE inhibitors, proton-pump inhibitors or statins before and after a 
copayment change (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003). 
Few studies have simultaneously examined effects of copayments on both medication 
compliance or utilization and health outcomes.  Of the eight studies that examined all three 
constructs, three used self-report surveys (Mojtabai and Olfson 2003; Heisler, Langa et al. 
2004; Piette, Wagner et al. 2004) and five used claims data (Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; 
Motheral and Fairman 2001; Pilote, Beck et al. 2002; Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003; 
Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004) (Table 1.2).  The self-report studies found significant 
associations between cost-related medication restriction and health decline within 
respondents of the Health and Retirement Survey (Mojtabai and Olfson 2003; Heisler, Langa 
et al. 2004) and diabetics seeking care at the Veterans Administration or county or university 
hospital system (Piette, Wagner et al. 2004).  The claims studies found a mixture of results.  
While some found increased copayment levels to be associated with decreased health status 
and decreased medication supply (Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997), other found higher 
copayments to be associated with increased hospitalizations and no change in compliance 
(Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004), no change in hospitalizations or compliance with the 
exception of one drug class (Motheral and Fairman 2001; Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003), or 
null results across both outcomes and medication persistence (Pilote, Beck et al. 2002). 
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Given the breadth of studies conducted, the following section categorizes the 
literature into four sections: a) copayment effects on pharmaceutical utilization, b) 
prescribing policy effects on health services utilization, c) copayment effects on medication 
compliance, and d) copayment effects on medication compliance and health outcomes. 
COPAYMENT EFFECTS ON PHARMACEUTICAL UTILIZATION 
 
It has been well established that copayments and other cost-sharing policies 
significantly reduce pharmaceutical utilization.  Of these studies, most have focused on 
medication utilization as an outcome in either Medicaid, or privately insured individuals.  
Across studies, most results have been consistent. 
Reeder and colleagues conducted one of the earlier studies examining pharmaceutical 
utilization in ten different therapeutic categories of drugs before and after a $0.50 copayment 
increase among South Carolina Medicaid beneficiaries in 1977 (Reeder and Nelson 1985).  
Using time-series analyses within the framework of a quasi-experimental design, they found 
that a $0.50 copayment increase significantly reduced pharmaceutical expenditures within 
multiple therapeutic classes, including antihistamines, anti-infective agents, cholinergic, 
adrenergic, cardiovascular agents, psychotherapeutics, diuretics, and gastrointestinal drugs.  
Compared to other drug classes studied, more significant long-term trends existed among 
cardiovascular, cholinergic, diuretic, and psychotherapeutic agents (Reeder and Nelson 
1985).  For example, compared to the control group with no copayment change, a $0.50 
copayment increase for a 30-day supply of cardiovascular or diuretic medications led to 
statistically significant decreases of $0.18 and $0.13 in member-per-month expenditures for 
cardiovascular and diuretics, respectively (Reeder and Nelson 1985).  These results suggest 
that increasing copayments decreases medication use, especially in medications essential in 
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maintaining health.  Though outdated and not generalizable to privately insured beneficiaries, 
this study provides some of the earliest evidence supporting the hypothesis that increased 
copayment levels are associated with decreased utilization of drugs indicated for heart 
failure.  Furthermore, it provides specific parameter estimates that differ between medication 
classes, suggesting differential price responses across drug classes. 
In addition to Medicaid populations, differential price responses were found across 
essential versus discretionary drug utilization in a study examining commercially insured 
populations.  Harris and colleagues conducted one of the earliest studies examining 
copayment effects within a managed care population, expanding past studies which had 
focused primarily on Medicaid beneficiaries.  Investigators measured how pharmaceutical 
utilization and costs varied by drug copayment levels within a staff model HMO by 
comparing the mean change in system-level pharmaceutical utilization and expenditures 
between cohorts of individuals from Group Health Cooperative who either experienced a 
copayment change or did not (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990).  Introducing a $1.50 copayment 
significantly reduced overall drug utilization by 10.7% in the first year, with an additional 
10.6% reduction in the second year upon introduction of a $3.00 copayment (Harris, 
Stergachis et al. 1990).  Furthermore, utilization reductions differed depending upon whether 
the drug was considered ‘essential’ or ‘discretionary’.  For example, the $1.50 increase 
significantly reduced discretionary drugs (e.g., analgesics, non-steroidal anti-inflammatories, 
cough and cold products, or skeletal muscle relaxants) by 17.3%, but did not significantly 
reduce essential drug utilization (e.g., anti-hypertensives, cardiac drugs, oral hypoglycemics, 
or thyroid medications).  Similarly, the $3.00 copayment reduced discretionary and essential 
medication utilization by 19.2% and 13%, respectively (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990).  
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These results suggest that beneficiaries are less responsive to copayment increases of 
essential medications compared to discretionary drugs, implying that individuals are willing 
to pay more out-of-pocket for drugs that have a potentially greater impact on their health.  
This was the first study examining copayment effects on utilization within a managed care 
population, demonstrating that modest copayment increases can have significant effects on 
drug utilization.  Despite this, results are generalizable only to beneficiaries enrolled in one 
staff-model HMO, limiting the external validity to more diverse commercially insured 
populations within the United States.  Numerous other claims-based studies examining the 
association between copayments and utilization similarly only center on select employers or 
single regional health plans (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Smith 1993; Motheral and 
Fairman 2001; Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003), with the exception of two recent studies 
focusing on larger samples of privately insured individuals (Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; 
Goldman, Joyce et al. 2004).  The current research therefore contributes to the literature by 
examining copayment effects within a diverse managed care population enrolled in a variety 
of HMO, PPO, and other independent health plans.  Studying copayment effects in a more 
diverse setting should obtain results more generalizable to commercially insured heart failure 
patients residing in the United States. 
Though not focusing specifically on heart failure populations, several studies have 
examined effects of pharmacy benefit structures on drug expenditures within larger cohorts 
of beneficiaries numbering between 420,000 and 520,000.  For example, Joyce et al. used 
data from a wide array of employers and benefit designs to assess the effects of copayments, 
tiered incentive-based formularies,1 and generic substitution on drug utilization and patient 
                                                 
1Drug formularies are comprehensive lists of preferred generic and brand name drugs covered under a health 
plan’s outpatient pharmaceutical benefit.  Tiered incentive-based formularies set different copayment levels on 
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out-of-pocket drug expenditures in over 420,000 beneficiaries from 25 different employers 
and 55 unique pharmacy benefit packages (Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002), while Goldman et al. 
used a dataset of 30 large employers and 528,000 beneficiaries to examine the effects of 
copayment increases on utilization of chronic disease medications, conducting subgroup 
analyses in individuals diagnosed with different chronic conditions (Goldman, Joyce et al. 
2004).  Joyce et al. found that doubling copayments resulted in a 22% and 32% decrease in 
annual average drug expenditures in 1-tier, and 2-tier benefit plans, respectively (Joyce, 
Escarce et al. 2002).  Goldman et al. found that doubling copayments resulted in significant 
reductions of days supply for eight different therapeutic classes, decreasing 45% for non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, 44% for antihistamines, 34% for antihyperlipidemics, 33% 
for antiulcerants, 32% for antiasthmatics, 26% for antihypertensives and antidepressants, and 
25% for antidiabetic agents (Goldman, Joyce et al. 2004).  Furthermore, they found lower 
price responsiveness among subgroups of individuals taking these medications for ongoing 
chronic conditions.  For example, doubling copayments was associated with a 26% decrease 
in antidepressant utilization in the full sample, including individuals with acute episodes of 
depression, but only an 8% decrease among a subgroup of chronically depressed 
beneficiaries (Goldman, Joyce et al. 2004).  These results suggest that some chronically ill 
patients are less responsive to copayment increases compared to individuals taking 
medications on a temporary basis, but are affected nonetheless. 
The Goldman et al. study is one of few conducting disease-specific subgroup analyses 
examining effects of copayment on drug utilization.  While these studies focused on 
                                                                                                                                                       
medications depending upon whether they are generic, preferred brands, or non-preferred brands.  For example, 
generic, preferred brands, and non-preferred brands are usually designated as 1st tier, 2nd tier, and 3rd tier drugs, 
respectively.  Furthermore, copayments increase with higher tiered drugs in order to encourage enrollees to use 
generic or lower cost brand name medications. 
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hypertensive or depressed patients, the current analysis will contribute to the literature by 
focusing specifically on heart failure patients.  Although heart failure is less common among 
privately insured populations compared to, for example, older Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries, the source population of over 38 million individuals should provide a sufficient 
sample of heart failure patients to examine drug-class specific effects for ACE inhibitors, 
beta blockers, and diuretics. 
A recent study examined the effects of copayment change magnitude on utilization of 
oral hypoglycemics (OH) in privately insured individuals diagnosed with type II diabetes 
(Roblin 2005).  Since average daily doses were expected to increase over time to achieve 
optimal glucose levels, investigators used interrupted time-series analyses to examine if 
copayment increases interrupted the expected trend of increases in oral OH average daily 
dose.  Results showed that compared to small copayment increases, defined as under $10 for 
a monthly supply, large copayment increases, defined as over $10, were associated with an 
immediate 3.6% decrease in monthly OH utilization within the same month of the copayment 
shift (Roblin 2005).  Refills with large copayment increases resulted in a 2.6% decrease in 
monthly utilization compared to a 2.2% increase before the copayment change, resulting in a 
significant net decrease of 0.4% (Roblin 2005).  In contrast, low copayment increases were 
not associated with decreases in monthly OH utilization trends (Roblin 2005), suggesting that 
copayment effects depend upon the magnitude of the cost shift.  These results imply that 
increased copayments for OH medications result in decreased utilization in privately insured 
beneficiaries diagnosed with type II diabetes.  Although decreased utilization of these 
essential medications may adversely affect clinical outcomes, this study did not measure this 
association.  Given the importance of measuring copayment effects on clinical outcomes in 
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chronically ill populations, the current research will contribute to the literature by measuring 
the effects of copayment levels on both compliance and outcomes in heart failure patients. 
In summary, the aforementioned studies examining effects of copayment changes on 
drug utilization and expenditures consistently show, either through quasi-experimental 
designs or interrupted time series analysis, that increased copayments are associated with 
decreased medication utilization.  Different effects across ‘essential’ versus ‘discretionary’ 
medications suggest that utilization either depends upon the perception of need or the nature 
of the chronic disease.  Considering that decreased utilization of essential drugs contributes 
to poor health status, it is reasonable to hypothesize that increased copayments may 
contribute to poor health outcomes by creating a financial barrier to optimal pharmaceutical 
care.  These studies were therefore limited by not examining the downstream health effects 
of decreased medication utilization. 
The current research in heart failure contributes to the literature by continuing to 
study privately insured beneficiaries, an important research area considering the recent 
increase in pharmaceutical coverage plans in the private sector upon the implementation of 
Medicare Part D.  Furthermore, examining a large diverse sample of beneficiaries enrolled in 
different health plan types allows sufficient sample size and variation to study ACE inhibitor, 
beta blocker, and diuretic specific effects within heart failure patients.  Additionally, 
measuring compliance instead of utilization increases the ability to examine more detailed 
individual level medication taking patterns which would otherwise be masked in more broad 
utilization metrics.  Finally, simultaneously measuring associations among copayment levels, 
medication compliance, and clinical outcomes will provide insight into how copayments 
directly affect the health of heart failure patients. 
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PRESCRIBING POLICIES AND HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION 
 
Several studies have examined the effect of limited capitation policies in Medicaid 
populations on medication utilization, in conjunction with the adverse events associated with 
this decreased use.  Cost-containment during the 1980’s by state Medicaid programs often 
imposed either copayments or monthly limits on medication use.  An example of a monthly 
limit was a 3-drug limit policy enacted by the New Hampshire Medicaid program (Soumerai, 
Ross-Degnan et al. 1991).  Given that restrictive cost-containment policies could potentially 
decrease access to essential medications, it was hypothesized that health services utilization 
such as nursing home admissions or hospitalizations, would increase due to decreased health 
status (Soumerai, Ross-Degnan et al. 1991).  Soumerai et al. used interrupted time series 
analysis to compare rates of nursing home and hospital admissions before and after the 
enactment of a 3-drug limit policy in a New Hampshire Medicaid beneficiary population 
(Soumerai, Ross-Degnan et al. 1991).  Compared to the New Jersey Medicaid beneficiary 
control group, New Hampshire beneficiaries had a 35% decrease in standardized monthly 
dosages of 26 medication classes indicated for chronic heart disease, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, asthma, diabetes, depression, migraines, ulcers, or thyroid disorders 
(Soumerai, Ross-Degnan et al. 1991).  Furthermore, compared to the control group, New 
Hampshire beneficiaries were at significantly greater risk of nursing home admission 
following implementation of the 3-drug limit policy (RR=1.8, 95% CI 1.2-2.6) (Soumerai, 
Ross-Degnan et al. 1991).  In a separate study conducted within the same source populations, 
investigators examined the effect of this 3-drug limit on the utilization of psychotropics 
within patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (Soumerai, McLaughlin et al. 1994).  
Compared to the control group, New Hampshire beneficiaries had up to a 49% decrease in 
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the utilization of either antipsychotics, antidepressants, lithium, anxiolytics or hypnotic drugs 
(Soumerai, McLaughlin et al. 1994).  These decreases in utilization were further associated 
with significant increases in outpatient mental health visits, and emergency mental health 
service use (Soumerai, McLaughlin et al. 1994).  Another study conducted within elderly 
Canadians corroborated these results, finding copayment increases to be significantly 
associated with decreased utilization of essential medications, which was further associated 
with increased rates of adverse events (Tamblyn, Laprise et al. 2001). 
Results from these three studies suggest that prescribing policies restricting access to 
essential medications contribute to adverse events.  It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize 
that copayment policies restricting access to heart failure medications may also result in 
increased hospitalization rates in privately insured populations, especially given that 
decreased compliance to heart failure medications has been found to increase risk of 
hospitalization (Stroupe, Teal et al. 2004).  Although these studies did find significant 
associations between prescribing policies and adverse events, they did not estimate the 
effects of specific copayment levels.  The current research will contribute to the literature by 
using individual level claims data to study associations between specific copayment level 
categories, medication compliance, and clinical outcomes.  Furthermore, results will be 
generalizable to privately insured populations, as opposed to Medicaid beneficiaries, the 
latter of whom may be more price responsive compared to privately insured individuals due 
to higher health risk or lower income (Motheral and Henderson 1999). 
COPAYMENT EFFECTS ON MEDICATION COMPLIANCE 
 
Few studies have examined the effect of cost-sharing on medication compliance, as 
opposed to medication utilization, especially within disease-specific groups.  Relevant 
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studies were conducted within privately insured populations examining the effects of 
copayments on 1) compliance to oral hypoglycemics (Dor and Encinosa 2004); 2) 
compliance or discontinuation of statin therapy (Ellis, Erickson et al. 2004); 3) compliance to 
statins post-acute myocardial infarction (Coombs, Cornish et al. 2002); 4) chronic medication 
continuation rates (Motheral and Henderson 1999); 5) medication continuation rates of ACE 
inhibitors, proton pump inhibitors (PPIs), or statins within six months after a policy shift 
(Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003); or 6) discontinuation of medications for attention deficit 
and hyperactivity disorder taken by children of beneficiaries (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005). 
Dor and colleagues used MarketScan® data containing over 3 million lives with 40 
different employer-based health plans between 1999 and 2000 to examine effects of both 
copayment and coinsurance levels on 90-day supply compliance levels to OH.  Investigators 
used ordered logistic regression models to estimate the probability of full compliance, partial 
compliance, or non-compliance within 90-day periods conditional upon a particular 
copayment or coinsurance level.  They found that a $6 to $10 increase in copayments 
resulted in a 6.2% increase and a 9% decrease in the number of non-compliers and fully-
compliant individuals, respectively (Dor and Encinosa 2004), implying that increased 
copayments of OH significantly decreased medication compliance in privately insured 
beneficiaries diagnosed with diabetes.  Given that decreased compliance to OH may result in 
suboptimal glycemic levels, and consequently, poorer clinical outcomes, future studies need 
to examine the clinical consequences of non-compliance due to prescription copayments.  
The current research is similar to Dor et al. in estimating the probability of non-compliance 
conditional upon copayment levels in commercially insured populations, yet contributes to 
the literature by targeting heart failure rather than type II diabetes.  Additionally, it will 
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further contribute to past studies by estimating the effects of copayments on total, 
cardiovascular-specific, and heart failure specific hospitalizations. 
Studies focusing on patient-level compliance measured it in different manners.  While 
Dor et al. measured compliance based upon percent coverage of therapy within a 90-day 
interval, Motheral et al. measured compliance as a rate of medication continuation across a 
six month period following a copayment increase (Motheral and Henderson 1999).  Using a 
comparison group that had no copayment changes, Motheral et al. examined the effect of a 
copayment increase from $15 to $20 for brand name drugs on treatment continuation within 
one large employer health plan.  Compared to the control group, medication discontinuation 
rates in the copayment change group did not significantly differ, suggesting that copayment 
increases from $15 to $20 do not result in medication discontinuation.  Despite the null 
findings, the authors suggest that the 6-month post-intervention time window was not 
sufficiently long to detect any true effects (Motheral and Henderson 1999).  For example, 
Soumerai et al. suggests a minimum of two years of follow-up time following an intervention 
in order to detect utilization changes in response to a policy shift (Soumerai et al., 1993).  
Alternatively, authors suggest null results reflect the relatively lower price responsiveness of 
healthy, employed, continuously enrolled individuals compared to lower income or high risk 
individuals (Motheral and Henderson 1999).  This implies that modest copayment increases 
may not be sufficient to change medication continuation rates of healthier, privately insured 
individuals even beyond a six month post-intervention period. 
The conflicting results between Dor et al. and Motheral et al. could be attributed to 
the measurement definitions.  For example, while copayments may be sufficient to change 90 
day supply levels as measured by Dor et al., in contrast, copayments may not be sufficient to 
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have somebody stop medications completely, as measured in Motheral et al.  The current 
research adds to literature by focusing on medication supply levels as the compliance metric 
instead of medication discontinuation.  Furthermore, given the current study’s focus on long-
term, persistent utilizers of heart failure medications, it may be more appropriate to measure 
medication supplies as opposed to discontinuation, the latter of which may be less common 
in long-term chronic utilizers.  Despite the relatively high medication persistence and 
compliance of heart failure patients, the clinical consequences of behaviors such as pill 
splitting, which can be detected in compliance metrics such as the Medication Possession 
Ratio, can be similarly detrimental to health status as abruptly stopping medications.  The 
sufficient follow-up time in the current analysis will also help detect the health effects of 
decreased medication supply levels. 
One study examined the predictors of statin non-compliance and discontinuation rates 
in 200,000 commercially insured beneficiaries taking statins for either primary or secondary 
prevention purposes using two different compliance measures (Ellis, Erickson et al. 2004).  
Compliance was first measured as a function of medication supply levels using the 
cumulative medication gap (CMG), a metric previously cited by Steiner et al. (Steiner, 
Koepsell et al. 1988) that indicates the proportion of missed therapy days across a pre-
determined time interval.  Compliance was also measured using therapy discontinuation, 
defined as time to discontinuation within the context of Cox proportional hazard analysis 
(Ellis, Erickson et al. 2004).  Compared to those with a $10 average monthly copayment 
level for statins, individuals with average monthly copayment between $10 and $20, and 
above $20, were 45% more likely (OR=1.45, 95% CI 1.25-1.69), and 300% more likely 
(OR=3.23, 95% CI 2.55 – 4.10) to be non-adherent (CMG>10%) (Ellis, Erickson et al. 
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2004).  Furthermore, medication discontinuation rates differed depending upon copayment 
levels.  Compared to those with $10 copayment levels, individuals with copayment between 
$10 and $20, and above $20 were 39% more likely (HR=1.39, 95% CI 1.19 – 1.63) and 
430% more likely (HR=4.30,. 3.39 – 5.44) to discontinue statin therapy during follow-up 
(Ellis, Erickson et al. 2004).  These results suggest that compared to statins with lower 
copayment levels, those at higher copayment levels increase the probability of non-adherence 
as well as the probability of treatment discontinuation.  Since statins have established 
efficacy in decreasing the risk of coronary events, higher copayment levels may also 
contribute to adverse outcomes via medication non-compliance.  In contrast to this study 
which did not measure clinical outcomes, the current analysis contributes to the literature by 
estimating the effects of ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic copayments on 
hospitalizations. 
Another study measured predictors of compliance to statins, yet in this case focused 
on commercially insured beneficiaries already having experienced either an acute myocardial 
infarction or other atherosclerotic event (Coombs, Cornish et al. 2002).  Coombs et al. used 
regression analysis to measure predictors of statin non-compliance using the continuous 
multiple-interval availability metric (CMA), validated by Steiner et al (Steiner, Koepsell et 
al. 1988).  CMA, mathematically equivalent to the Medication Possession Ratio (MPR), 
captures the percentage of medication acquisition over a particular refill interval.  Linear 
regressions found that for each $1.00 copayment increment, statin CMA decreased 
significantly by an average of 0.009 units (Coombs, Cornish et al. 2002), equivalent to a $10 
increase in statin copayment level resulting in an average 0.09 decrease in CMA units.  These 
results imply that for every $10 increase in copayment, medication supply levels will 
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decrease by 9%.  Given the possible clinical consequences of poor adherence to chronic 
disease pharmacotherapy, more studies need to examine disease-specific outcomes resulting 
from such decreased adherence.  The current research is similar to past studies in focusing on 
associations between copayment levels and medication supply levels but adds to the literature 
by also measuring how these affect the risk of hospitalization. 
In contrast to studying the effects of specific copayment levels on medication 
compliance, Huskamp et al. focused on measuring the copayment effects of a policy 
implementation on medication discontinuation.  Investigators measured the effect of moving 
from a single tier to either a 2-tier or 3-tier formulary on utilization, switching, or 
discontinuation of ACE inhibitors, statins, or PPIs within two employer-based health plans 
(Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003).  Compared to the control group, employer health plans 
replacing a 1-tier with a 2-tier formulary had a 24%, 34%, and 24% decrease in the 
probability of ACE inhibitor, PPI, and statin utilization, respectively (Huskamp, Deverka et 
al. 2003).  In contrast, compared to the control group, employer health plans replacing a 2-
tier with a 3-tier formulary had no significant decreases in the probability of use.  
Investigators also estimated the effects of copayment policy shifts on medication 
discontinuation 6 months after the policy shift.  Compared to the control group, employer 
plans replacing a 1-tier with a 3-tier formulary had approximately 10% higher 
discontinuation rates of ACE inhibitors, PPIs, and statins.  In contrast, employers replacing a 
2-tier with a 3-tier formulary did not have significant differences in discontinuation rates of 
PPIs or statins (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003).  These results suggest that modest 
copayment increases occurring upon movement from a 2-tier to a 3-tier formulary are not 
sufficient in changing utilization patterns.  In contrast, larger copayment increases occurring 
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upon movement from a 1-tier to a 3-tier are sufficient in decreasing medication use.  If health 
plans are trying to achieve optimal essential medication utilization, adopting more modest 
copayment increases as opposed to higher copayment increases may sufficiently contain 
system level costs while minimizing the risk of medication discontinuation. 
Potential adverse events associated with medication discontinuation motivate the 
need to measure the effects of copayment levels on clinical outcomes.  The current research 
contributes to the literature by examining copayment effects on heart failure specific 
hospitalizations.  Since ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic copayment effects have not 
been previously studied in heart failure specific populations, results from this analysis will 
provide insight into how copayment policies have the potential to directly affect medication 
compliance and clinical outcomes in individuals with heart failure.  The fact that more 
Medicare dollars are spent for the diagnosis and treatment of heart failure than any other 
diagnosis (Massie and Shah 1997) emphasizes the clinical and policy importance of 
examining the effects of prescription copayment levels on clinical outcomes in this high risk 
population. 
Another study by Huskamp et al. measured the effect of implementing a 3-tier 
formulary structure on the utilization and continuation of medications indicated for attention 
deficit and hyperactivity disorder in children of beneficiaries enrolled in a managed care plan 
(Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005).  Using a quasi-experimental design, difference-in-difference 
estimates showed that compared to individuals in the control group, children of beneficiaries 
exposed to the 3-tier benefit shift had a decreased probability of medication utilization for 
attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder.  In contrast, medication discontinuation rates 6 
months after the policy shift were not significantly different (Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2005).  
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These results suggest that although increased copayments may decrease overall utilization in 
ADHD medications, those same increases may not sufficient to increase discontinuation 
rates. 
In summary, most of the aforementioned studies found inverse associations between 
increased copayment levels and either medication compliance or medication discontinuation.  
Though all studies did focus on either medications indicated for chronic diseases, such as 
ACE inhibitors, oral hypoglycemics, or statins, no analysis focused specifically on heart 
failure patients.  The null results found in individuals diagnosed with a previous myocardial 
infarction or atherosclerotic event suggests that the severity of the illness or the perceived 
essential nature of the medication may contribute to less price sensitivity.  Furthermore, the 
null results found in the study using only a 6-month time window suggests more time may 
need to elapse after a policy shift before changes in medication taking behavior can be 
observed.  The current study contributes to the literature by building upon past studies 
examining the effects of copayments on compliance, yet adds to the literature by estimating 
class specific copayment effects specifically in a cohort of heart failure patients.  
Furthermore, using the MPR instead of medication discontinuation rates as the compliance 
measure will increase the ability to detect levels of partial non-compliance which may not 
otherwise be captured in medication discontinuation measures.  Drawing upon a very large 
sample of 
 Table 1.1: Studies examining effect of prescription copayments or policy shifts on chronic disease medication discontinuation or non-
compliance 
Study Population Sample Size Copayment 
predictor 
Compliance 
outcome 
Null Results Significant results Study 
design 
Drug class 
(Ellis, Erickson et 
al. 2004) 
Commercially 
insured adult 
beneficiaries 
taking statins for 
primary or 
secondary 
prevention 
purposes 
2,258 (primary 
prevention) 
 
2,544 (secondary 
prevention) 
Average 30-day 
copayment level 
1) Medication 
adherence using 
Continuous 
Medication Gap 
(CMG>10%); 2) 
time to treatment 
discontinuation 
 Increased 
copayments 
associated with 
non-compliance 
and 
discontinuation of 
therapy 
Retrospective 
cohort with claims 
data 
statins 
(Dor and Encinosa 
2004) 
Commercially 
insured adult 
beneficiaries 
diagnosed with 
Type II diabetes 
20,494 (copay 
cohort) 
 
6,563 (coinsurance 
cohort) 
Copayment and 
coinsurance levels 
Non-compliance, 
partial compliance, 
full compliance 
within 90-day 
supply intervals 
 Increased 
copayments and 
coinsurance levels 
associated with 
increased 
probability of 
partial or non-
compliance 
Retrospective 
cohort with claims 
data 
Oral 
hypoglycemics 
(Coombs, Cornish 
et al. 2002) 
Commercially 
insured adult 
beneficiaries 
within 1 health 
plan with a history 
of acute 
myocardial 
infarction 
216 Copayment level Cumulative 
Medication 
Acquisition 
(CMA) 
 Copayment level 
inversely 
associated with 
medication 
compliance; $1 
copayment levels 
associated with 
0.009 unit decrease 
in CMA 
Retrospective 
cohort with claim 
data 
statins 
(Motheral and 
Henderson 1999) 
Commercially 
insured adult 
beneficiaries 
enrolled in one of 
2 employer health 
plans 
1,112 (copay 
changers) 
 
1,112 (matched) 
Copay change 
from $10 to $15 
for brand name 
drugs 
Medication 
continuation rate 
Increase in 
copayment not 
associated with 
decreased 
medication 
continuation rate 
 Retrospective 
cohort with quasi-
experimental 
design 
Prescriptions for 
chronic disease 
(Huskamp, 
Deverka et al. 
2003) 
Beneficiaries 
enrolled in 
employer-based 
health plans; one 
implementing a 1 
to 3 tier shift, the 
other a 2 to 3 tier 
shift. 
55,000 (control)  
56,000(treat) 
(employer 1) 
 
11,000(control) 
27,000(treat) 
(employer 2) 
 
 
Copayment shifts 
associated with 
moving from a) 2-
tier to 3 tier; b) 1 
tier to 3-tier 
formulary benefit 
structure 
Discontinuation of 
medications 6 
months post policy 
shift  
No significant 
differences in 
medication 
discontinuation in 
PPIs or statins 
moving from 2-tier 
to 3-tier benefit 
structure 
Moving from 1-tier 
to 3-tier was 
significantly 
associated with 
increased 
discontinuation 
rates of ACE 
inhibitors, PPIs, 
and statins 
Retrospective 
cohort with quasi-
experimental 
design 
ACE inhibitors, 
PPIs, and statins 
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 Table 1.1: Studies examining effect of prescription copayments or policy shifts on chronic disease medication discontinuation or non-
compliance (continued) 
 
Study Population Sample Size Copayment 
predictor 
Compliance 
outcome 
Null Results Significant results Study 
design 
Drug class 
(Huskamp, 
Deverka et al. 
2005). 
Children of 
beneficiaries 
enrolled in large 
employer with 
PPO and PPS 
plans using 
medication for 
ADHD 
20,326 
(intervention) 
 
15,776 (control) 
Copayment change Medication 
continuation 
Movement to a 3-
tier benefit 
formulary plan 
does not result in 
decreased 
continuation of 
ADHD 
medications in 
children 
 Retrospective 
cohort with quasi-
experimental 
design 
Medications for 
ADHD 
 
40
 41
commercially insured individuals, this analysis also has sufficient follow-up time to measure 
the clinical effects of both copayment levels and medication non-compliance. 
 
COPAYMENT EFFECTS ON MEDICATION COMPLIANCE AND HEALTH 
OUTCOMES 
 
Studies simultaneously measuring associations among copayment changes, 
medication compliance and health outcomes have varied in their methodological approaches 
as well as their results.  Out of the eight studies reviewed, five used claims data (Johnson, 
Goodman et al. 1997; Motheral and Fairman 2001; Pilote, Beck et al. 2002; Fairman, 
Motheral et al. 2003; Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004) while three used self-report 
survey designs (Mojtabai and Olfson 2003; Heisler, Langa et al. 2004; Piette, Wagner et al. 
2004).  Pilote et al. measured the effect of a copayment increase on the utilization of cardiac 
medications, outpatient visits, emergency room use, and mortality among an elderly 
Canadian population (Pilote, Beck et al. 2002).  This retrospective cohort study used hospital 
discharge claims to examine if the implementation of a 5% coinsurance policy affected the 
utilization, persistence, and compliance of ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, lipid-lowering 
drugs, and aspirin after being discharged from the hospital following an acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI).  Compared to the control group, the group exposed to the policy change 
had a similar proportion of patients receiving ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, lipid-lowering 
drugs, or aspirin within 30 days of discharge for AMI and similar medication persistence 
rates 1 year after discharge or until death.  Furthermore, cardiac-related hospital readmission 
rates, outpatient visit rates, and emergency room visit rates did not significantly differ 
between pre and post-periods (Pilote, Beck et al. 2002).  Results suggest that copayment 
changes are not associated with decreased utilization or persistence of ACE inhibitors, beta 
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blockers, lipid-lowering medications, or aspirin within 30 days of discharge in elderly 
Canadians experiencing AMI.  Additionally, policy shifts did not cause increased rates of 
adverse events. 
Although the null associations between copayments and health services utilization are 
inconsistent with another past study finding copayment increase policies associated with 
increased rates of adverse events in another Canadian population (Tamblyn, Laprise et al. 
2001), authors propose the null results may be due to individuals’ lower price sensitivity after 
a recent serious health event (Pilote, Beck et al. 2002).  For example, compared to an 
individual who experienced an AMI several years in the past, an individual recently 
experiencing an AMI may be less sensitive to beta blocker copayments due to the immediate 
need to treat the condition.  This explanation is consistent with past studies finding 
individuals less sensitive to copayment increases in essential compared to discretionary 
medications (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Tamblyn, Laprise et al. 2001). 
Although the Pilote study does provide insight into ACE inhibitor and beta blocker 
copayment effects on clinical outcomes, the absence of a control group limits the ability to 
infer causality.  Furthermore, results cannot be generalized to commercially insured heart 
failure patients.  The current research will contribute to the literature by studying copayment 
effects of ACE inhibitors and beta blockers within heart failure patients.  Although it is 
hypothesized that higher copayments will result in decreased compliance, null findings may 
occur since individuals could be insensitive to copayment increases given the severity of 
their illness. 
Unlike the Pilote study which did not employ a comparison group, a study by 
Motheral et al. used a quasi-experimental design to examine the effect of replacing a 2-tier 
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with a 3-tier benefit structure on the utilization and discontinuation of estrogen, oral 
contraceptives, antihypertensives, and antihyperlipidemics and on outpatient, inpatient, and 
emergency room rates 1 year after policy implementation in a cohort of PPO beneficiaries 
(Motheral and Fairman 2001).  Compared to beneficiaries remaining in a 2-tier copayment 
design, those moving to a 3-tier system had significantly greater medication discontinuation 
of estrogens at 6 and 11 months after policy implementation.  In contrast, no significant 
differences were found in inpatient, outpatient, or emergency room visit rates, or 
discontinuation of the other three drug classes (Motheral and Fairman 2001).  Results suggest 
that copayment increases associated with moving from 2-tier to 3-tier formularies are not 
sufficient in causing medication discontinuation with exception of more discretionary drugs 
such as estrogen.  Furthermore, the null associations found between the policy shifts and 
adverse events suggest that moving from a 2-tier to a 3-tier policy is not sufficient to cause 
increased inpatient, outpatient, or emergency room rates within the same year of policy 
implementation. 
Since investigators only examined copayment effects within drug classes which had 
sufficient sample size to detect significant differences, more studies are needed to measure 
class-specific copayment effects within commercially insured populations.  Furthermore, 
since this analysis only focused on PPO beneficiaries, results may not be generalizable across 
all managed care plan types.  The current study adds to the already large body of literature 
examining copayment effects in commercially insured populations, but uniquely contributes 
by having sufficient power to examine ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic specific 
copayment effects among heart failure beneficiaries enrolled across different health plan 
types. 
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While Motheral et al. measured health outcomes conditional upon copayment policy 
shifts after one year and found null associations, Fairman et al. conducted a follow-up study 
to examine whether lengthening the follow-up time improved detecting changes in health 
status.  Fairman et al. used a quasi-experimental design to measure the effect of moving from 
a 2-tier to a 3-tier benefit structure on utilization and discontinuation of estrogens, oral 
contraceptives, anti-hypertensives, and antihyperlipidemics, as well as inpatient, outpatient, 
and emergency room visits at 6, 12, 18, 24, and 28 months post policy implementation 
(Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003).  Compared to the control group, beneficiaries moving from 
the 2-tier to the 3-tier had modest decreases in medication utilization, but no significant 
decreases in medication discontinuation at month 12, 18, 24, or 28 with the exception of oral 
contraceptives at month six.  Additionally, groups did not differ in terms of office visits, 
emergency room visits, or hospitalizations (Fairman, Motheral et al. 2003).  These results 
suggest that replacing a 2-tier with a 3-tier benefit formulary does not result in increased 
medication discontinuation or adverse event rates, even after 30 months of observation.  
Although the current research does not have the ability to measure the effects of copayment 
changes because of data limitations, the analysis still follows individuals for a minimum of 
three years, increasing the probability of detecting hospitalization effects if they indeed exist. 
Related to previous studies examining the effects of implementation of different 
tiered benefit policies, Christian-Herman et al. examined the effect of implementing a 
generic-only drug benefit on pharmaceutical utilization, compliance and hospitalization in a 
group of California HMO Medicare beneficiaries.  Using a quasi-experimental design to 
measure changes, the study also conducted subgroup analyses among five chronic diseases: 
chronic heart failure, coronary artery disease, epilepsy, diabetes, and depression (Christian-
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Herman, Emons et al. 2004).  Compared to the control group who had equal access to both 
brand and generic products, beneficiaries exposed to the generic only policy had similar 
levels of medication compliance before and after the benefit change.  In contrast, the 
subgroup analyses found that compared to heart failure patients in the control group, those 
with heart failure in the generic-only policy group had a decreased mean number of months 
of utilization of ACE inhibitors (Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004). 
Similar to heart failure subgroup analyses, generic-only cases with cardiovascular 
disease had significantly decreased utilization of both ACE and statins, diabetics had 
significantly less utilization of insulin or oral hypoglycemics, and those diagnosed with 
depression had significantly less utilization of anti-depressants (Christian-Herman, Emons et 
al. 2004).  Results suggest that implementing generic only substitution results in decreased 
utilization of essential medications for these high risk populations.  Investigators also found 
that compared to individuals accessing both generics and brand name drugs, those in the 
generic only group had a significantly higher likelihood of hospitalization during the first 
year after policy implementation (Christian-Herman, Emons et al. 2004).  These results 
suggest that restricting access to brand name drugs may increase the risk of hospitalization.  
If generics are in fact associated with higher hospitalization rates, the lower copayments may 
result in a negative association between copayment level and hospitalization, opposite of the 
hypothesized direction.  While most studies theorize that higher copayments result in adverse 
events via restriction to essential medications, the use of lower copayment medications may 
result in adverse events via suboptimal efficacy, therefore suggesting an alternative causal 
pathway between copayments and adverse events.  The current study contributes to the 
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literature by using mediation modeling to further explore the causal pathways among 
copayment levels, non-compliance and hospitalizations in heart failure patients. 
While the aforementioned studies examining effects of copayment shifts on 
medication compliance and outcomes all used medical claims, a few studies have examined 
these associations using patient surveys.  Mojtabai et al., for example, used data from the 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine the association between self-reported 
medication restriction due to copayments and health status.  Compared to respondents who 
did not report medication restriction due to cost, those who did report this had an increased 
likelihood of also reporting worsening health status (OR=1.75, p<0.001), worsening physical 
symptoms (β=0.82, p<0.001), and increased hospitalizations within the past 2 years 
(OR=1.49, p<0.001) (Mojtabai and Olfson 2003).  Within HRS respondents being treated for 
heart disease, cost-related poor adherence was also significantly associated with worsening 
heart disease (OR=1.81, p<0.001) (Mojtabai and Olfson 2003).  Results suggest that 
decreased compliance directly attributable to increased drug costs is associated with 
decreased health status.  Despite these significant associations, the cross-sectional design 
limits the ability to infer causality between self-reported medication restriction due to cost 
and health status.  The current study will contribute to the literature by using claims data to 
measure associations between copayment levels, non-compliance, and hospitalization.  
Although retrospective claims studies cannot attribute medication non-compliance to cost as 
well as a survey question, they do have advantages of increasing the ability to detect changes 
over time. 
Heisler et al. also used data from the HRS to measure the effect of self-reported 
medication restriction due to cost on health outcomes, yet improved the previous study by 
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examining health outcomes for up to 2 to 3 years after baseline.  Compared to respondents 
who did not report cost-related medication restriction, those who did report this had greater 
health status decline (OR=1.76, 95% CI 1.27 – 2.44) (Heisler, Langa et al. 2004).  
Furthermore, within the cohort of respondents reporting cardiovascular disease, those who 
did report medication restriction due to cost had higher self-reported rates of angina 
(OR=1.50, 95% CI 1.09 – 2.07) or non-fatal heart attacks or strokes (OR=1.51, 95% CI 1.02, 
2.25) (Heisler, Langa et al. 2004).  These results provide evidence that decreased medication 
compliance due to increased cost causes health decline.  Despite the ability of this study to 
couple non-adherence with cost via a survey question and to measure trends over time, it still 
did not capture the magnitude of changes in either copayment levels or compliance.  For 
example, individuals reporting cost-related non-adherence may have had a copayment 
threshold level at which this behavior change occurred.  The current study contributes to the 
literature by examining the effects of specific copayment level ranges on both medication 
compliance and clinical outcomes.  The use of claims data instead of self-report will also 
strengthen the validity of the outcome measures. 
Another study used a combination of data from self-reported surveys and medical 
claims to examine associations between self-reported cost-related medication restriction and 
diabetes-specific health status among cohorts of Veterans Affairs, county clinic, and 
university clinic patients diagnosed with type II diabetes (Piette, Wagner et al. 2004).  In 
addition to measuring self-reported diabetes and non-diabetes symptom levels and mental 
and physical composite scores of the SF-12, the study captured glycemic control by using 
glycosolated hemoglobin levels (A1C) from medical claims.  The use of a diabetes-specific 
marker created an optimal, objective health status metric.  Compared to individuals who did 
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not report cost-related medication restriction, those reporting it had significantly lower 
glycemic control, indicated by the 0.6% absolute increase in A1C levels (p=0.0005) (Piette, 
Wagner et al. 2004).  Cost-related medication restriction was also significantly associated 
with increased symptoms and decreased scores on the SF-12.  Compared to diabetics who did 
not report cost-related medication restriction, those reporting it had an average increase of 
1.8 self-reported diabetes symptoms, as well as a 4.5 and 2.6 point decline in the physical and 
mental health scores, respectively, on the SF-12 (Piette, Wagner et al. 2004).  These results 
suggest that decreased compliance due to cost is significantly associated with diabetes-
related health decline as measured by A1C levels, self-reported symptoms, and the SF-12.  
Despite the strengths of using an objective marker of diabetes control, the cross-sectional 
design limits the ability to infer causality between cost-related medication non-compliance 
and diabetes-specific outcomes.  The current study adds to the literature by using claims data 
to measure associations between copayment levels, compliance, and outcomes within a 
longitudinal setting.  Instead of diabetes, this study focuses on heart failure, an equally 
important chronic disease contributing to rising health care costs in the United States. 
While the aforementioned studies examined copayment effects on compliance and 
outcomes using either longitudinal or cross-sectional surveys, Johnson et al. used claims data 
to measure the impact of increased copayments on the utilization and health status of elderly 
individuals enrolled in a large Medicare HMO (Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997).  
Investigators used a series of quasi-experimental study designs to compare changes in mean 
utilization and health status as a function of copayment changes occurring within a Social 
HMO (S-HMO) or the Medicare Plus population, both subsidiary plans of Kaiser Permanente 
Northwest (Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997).  Health status was measured using a per capita 
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index created by combining Chronic Disease Scores with Diagnostic Cost Groups.  During 
one analysis period, compared to S-HMO beneficiaries experiencing no cost-sharing 
increases, Medicare Plus beneficiaries moving from a 50% to 70% coinsurance rate had 
significantly less total days of cardiac and diuretic agent utilization (Johnson, Goodman et al. 
1997).  During a second analysis period, compared to the Medicare Plus cohort experiencing 
a constant 50% coinsurance rate, S-HMO beneficiaries experiencing a copayment increase 
from $1 to $3 had significantly lower health status as indicated by the per-capita index score 
(Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997).  Results of this study suggest that increased copayments or 
coinsurance results in decreased utilization of essential medications indicated for heart 
disease within an elderly group of Medicare HMO beneficiaries.  Furthermore, those 
experiencing copayment increases have significantly lower health status, implying that 
copayment increases have a negative affect on health status. 
Although being one of the few retrospective claims studies simultaneously measuring 
copayment change, utilization, and health status, inconsistent associations between cost-
sharing changes and per-capita health status limited the ability to infer causality between 
decreased utilization and individual level health status.  For example, in comparing two 
different analysis periods both having either a copayment or coinsurance change, one had 
significant effects on decreased health status while the other did not (Johnson, Goodman et 
al. 1997).  These inconclusive findings motivate the need to conduct further research using 
pharmaceutical claims to estimate copayment effects on health status.  The current analysis 
contributes to the literature by using individual level inpatient events as opposed to a per-
capita disease index to measure health status.  Furthermore, this remains the first claims-
based study using individual level pharmaceutical and hospital claims to simultaneously 
 Table 1.2: Studies examining effect of prescription copayments or policy shifts on medication utilization or adherence and health 
outcomes. 
Study Population Sample Size Copayment 
Predictor 
Compliance 
Outcome 
Health 
Outcome 
Null Results Significant 
Results 
Study Design Drug classes of 
interest 
(Heisler, Langa 
et al. 2004) 
Respondents of 
Health 
Retirement 
Survey with 
self-reported 
heart disease 
 7,991 Self-reported 
medication 
restriction due 
to drug cost 
Self-reported 
medication 
restriction due 
to drug cost 
Self-reported 
health status;  
angina; stroke; 
non-fatal MI 
  CV specific 
health decline 
associated with 
cost-related 
medication 
restriction 
Longitudinal Any 
medications 
(Mojtabai and 
Olfson 2003) 
Respondents of 
Health 
Retirement 
Survey with 
self-reported 
heart disease 
 10,413 Self-reported 
medication 
restriction due 
to drug cost 
Self-reported 
medication 
restriction due 
to drug cost 
Self-reported 
health decline; 
physical and 
mental scores 
 Worsening 
CHD and 
physical 
symptoms 
associated with 
cost-related 
medication 
restriction 
Cross sectional Any 
medications 
(Piette, Wagner 
et al. 2004) 
Veteran 
Administration 
beneficiaries 
with diabetes 
766 Self-reported 
medication 
restriction due 
to drug cost 
Self-reported 
medication 
restriction due 
to drug cost 
Hemoglobin 
levels (A1C); 
diabetes 
symptoms; SF-
12 QOL 
 Increased A1C 
levels; more 
symptoms, and 
lower SF-12 
scores 
associated with 
cost-related 
medication 
restriction 
Cross sectional Any 
medications 
(Johnson, 
Goodman et al. 
1997) 
HMO Medicare 
beneficiaries of 
Kaiser 
Permanente 
Northwest 
6,704 
7,472 
7,962 
7,646 
(4 cohorts) 
Presence of 
copayment 
increase 
Drug utilization; 
day supply 
Per-capita 
health index 
using 
CDS/DCG 
algorithm 
Copayment 
increase 
associated with 
decreasing 
trends in health 
status 
Copayment 
increase 
associated with 
reduced day 
supply of 
cardiac and 
diuretic drugs. 
Retrospective 
cohort with 
quasi-
experimental 
design 
(pre/post) 
Cardiac drugs 
 
Diuretics 
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 Table 1.2: Studies examining effect of prescription copayments or policy shifts on medication utilization or adherence and health 
outcomes (continued) 
 
Study Population Sample Size Copayment 
Predictor 
Compliance 
Outcome 
Health 
Outcome 
Null Results Significant 
Results 
Study Design Drug classes of 
interest 
(Pilote, Beck et 
al. 2002) 
Elderly 
Canadians 
admitted to 
hospital for 
acute 
myocardial 
infarction 
22,066 Movement from 
a $0 copayment 
or $2 copayment 
for welfare/low 
income, and all 
elderly, 
respectively to a 
25% 
coinsurance 
rate. 
1) Percentage of 
days covered by 
medication 1 
year after 
hospital 
discharge 
1) cardiac-
related hospital 
readmissions. 
2) Outpatient 
visits.  
3) ER visits 
4) mortality 
rates 
No significant 
differences in 
medication 
utilization, 
medication 
persistence, 
readmissions, 
OP, ER, or 
mortality before 
and after copay 
change  
 Retrospective 
cohort with 
claims data 
1) ACE 
inhibitors 
2)beta blockers; 
3)lipid lowering 
drugs;  
4)aspirin 
(Motheral and 
Fairman 2001) 
Commercially 
insured 
beneficiaries of 
1 Midwestern 
PPO 
6,881 
(intervention) 
 
13,279 
(control) 
Movement from 
a 2-tier to 3-tier 
formulary 
1) Medication 
discontinuation 
1)Office visits, 
2) inpatient 
visits 
3) ER visits 
Implementation 
of policy was 
not associated 
with increased 
rates of office 
visits, inpatient 
visits, or ER 
visits within 1 
year post-policy 
Intervention 
group had 
significantly 
higher 
discontinuation 
of estrogens at 
month 6, 11 
post-policy 
Retrospective 
cohort with 
claims data; 
quasi 
experimental 
design with 
valid 
comparison 
group 
1) estrogens 
2) oral 
contraceptives 
3) 
antihypertensive 
4) 
antihyperlipide
mics 
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 Table 1.2: Studies examining effect of prescription copayments or policy shifts on medication utilization or adherence and health 
outcomes (continued) 
 
Study Population Sample Size Copayment 
Predictor 
Compliance 
Outcome 
Health 
Outcome 
Null Results Significant 
Results 
Study Design Drug classes of 
interest 
(Christian-
Herman, Emons 
et al. 2004) 
California 
Medicare HMO 
beneficiaries 
310,132 (case: 
yr1) 
210,299 (case: 
yr2)  
 
238,639  
(ctrl: yr1) 
198,430 
(ctrl: yr2) 
Movement from 
standard tiered 
benefit 
formulary to 
generic only 
formulary 
1) Physician 
adherence: 
class-specific 
utilization of 
clinically 
recommended 
medications for 
select chronic 
diseases Mean 
number of 
months with at 
least 1 day 
supply of a 
clinically 
recommended 
medications 
2) patient 
adherence: 
mean % of days 
supply 
1) total 
hospitalizations 
Policy not 
associated with 
decreased 
patient 
adherence to 
class-specific 
drugs.  
 
Policy not 
associated with 
increased 
hospitalizations 
within chronic 
disease 
subgroups. 
Policy 
associated with 
increased 
likelihood of 
any 
hospitalization 
with 1 year in 
overall sample. 
 
 
Policy 
associated with 
decreased 
physician 
adherence, or 
the utilization of  
Medications 
indicated for 
CHF, CAD, 
diabetes, and 
depression 
subgroups. 
Retrospective 
cohort with 
quasi-
experimental 
design, pre/post 
with valid 
comparison 
group. 
Various 
medications 
indicated for:  
a) CHF 
b) CAD 
c) diabetes 
d) epilepsy 
e) depression 
 
(Fairman, 
Motheral et al. 
2003) 
Commercially 
insured 
beneficiaries of 
1 Midwestern 
PPO  
4,132: control 
group 
 
3,577:interventi
on group 
Movement from 
a 2-tier to 3-tier 
formulary 
Medication 
discontinuation 
1)Office visits, 
2) inpatient 
visits 
3) ER visit s 
Implementation 
of policy was 
not associated 
with increased 
rates of office 
visits, inpatient 
visits, or ER 
visits 
 
Implementation 
of policy not 
associated with 
medication 
discontinuation 
rates at 12, 18, 
24, or 28 
months 
Implementation 
of policy 
associated with 
discontinuation 
of oral 
contraceptives 6 
months after 
policy 
implementation. 
Retrospective 
cohort with 
claims data; 
quasi 
experimental 
design with 
valid 
comparison 
group 
1) estrogens 
2) oral 
contraceptives 
3) 
antihypertensive 
4) anti-
hyperlipidemics 
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measure associations between ACE, beta blocker, and diuretic copayments, medication 
compliance, and clinical outcomes in commercially insured heart failure patients. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Though increasing prescription copayments may benefit health plans by containing 
system-level expenditures, copayment increases may create financial barriers that increase 
the probability of medication non-compliance in heart failure patients.  Since decreased 
medication supplies have been associated with increased risk of hospitalization in heart 
failure patients, non-compliance to ACE inhibitors, beta blocker, and diuretics is especially 
dangerous for heart failure patients.  The current research will contribute to the literature by 
simultaneously measuring associations among ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic 
copayment levels on medication compliance and hospitalizations.  Though past studies have 
created a strong foundation of literature demonstrating the effects of copayment changes on 
decreased pharmaceutical utilization, fewer studies have focused on the effects of copayment 
levels on both medication compliance and health outcomes in privately insured individuals.  
The large study population and long follow-up time of the current analysis will provide 
sufficient power to measure drug class specific effects within a relatively low prevalence 
disease among privately insured populations.  Results from this study will be relevant for 
clinicians and insurance payers interested in how copayments may affect the medication 
taking behavior or health of heart failure patients. 
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AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
PRIMARY AIMS 
 
• To determine the effects of ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic prescription 
copayment levels on medication compliance in commercially insured patients with 
heart failure. 
 
• To determine the association between ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic 
prescription copayment levels and risk of hospitalization in commercially insured 
patients with heart failure. 
 
Given the most recent recommendations of the Heart Failure Society for America 
(HFSA) as well as the American College of Cardiologists / American Heart Association 
(ACC/AHA) clinical guidelines for heart failure pharmacotherapy (Hunt, Abraham et al. 
2005; HFSA 2006), analyses will focus on ACE inhibitors, beta-adrenergic blockers, and 
diuretics.  Because copayment levels are potential barriers to access to clinically 
recommended pharmacotherapy, it is hypothesized that increased copayment levels will be 
associated with decreased medication compliance within each respective medication class.  
Since decreased access to clinical recommended medications may result in adverse events, it 
is hypothesized that increased copayments will be associated with increased rates of all-
cause, heart disease-specific, and heart failure-specific hospitalizations across all medication 
classes. 
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SECONDARY AIM 
 
• Explore the extent to which medication compliance mediates the association between 
copayment levels and hospitalizations. 
 
Medication non-compliance may be largely responsible for the association between 
increased copayments and increased hospitalizations.  It is hypothesized that non-compliance 
will partially mediate the association between copayment levels and hospitalizations.  The 
presence of mediation would imply a causal pathway between copayments, compliance, and 
hospitalizations.
 CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
OVERVIEW 
 
Measuring associations among heart failure medication copayments, compliance, 
and hospitalizations requires incorporating conceptual and clinical frameworks to ensure 
adequate inputs for empirical models.  It is hypothesized that copayments are a primary 
determinant of access to medications, creating a barrier to optimal heart failure 
medication compliance.  Medication undersupplies can exacerbate symptoms, increase 
the risk of adverse events, and increase the use of emergency department visits in heart 
failure patients (Stroupe, Teal et al. 2004).  Since current ACC/AHA and HFSA 
guidelines recommend that all heart failure patients take ACE inhibitors, beta-adrenergic 
antagonists and diuretics (Hunt, Abraham et al. 2005; HFSA 2006), decreased 
compliance to these medications could therefore increase the risk of hospitalization in 
heart failure patients. 
Other individual, health system, and regional level factors associated with 
prescription copayments could also be associated with medication compliance or 
hospitalization.  Omitting these variables from the empirical models would result in 
biased estimates.  Consequently, the proposed conceptual framework identifies 
competing factors present in the claims dataset apart from prescription copayment levels 
that may contribute to variation in medication compliance or hospitalizations (Figure 
2.1).  Controlling for these potential confounders or effect modifiers will help isolate the 
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total effects of prescription copayments on either medication compliance or hospitalization. 
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual pathways between prescription copayments, medication compliance, 
and hospitalization with potentially competing individual, system, and regional level factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CLINICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Clinically recommended therapies for heart failure patients at most stages of severity 
include ACE inhibitors, diuretics, and beta blockers.  Numerous clinical trials have 
demonstrated the efficacy of ACE inhibitors in reducing morbidity and mortality in heart 
failure patients of all severity levels (CONSENSUS 1987; SOLVD 1991; Cohn, Johnson et 
al. 1991; Fonarow, Chelimsky-Fallick et al. 1992) while also improving symptoms, quality of 
life, and increasing exercise tolerance (Andrews and Cowley 1995; Hunt, Abraham et al. 
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2005).  Beta blockers have also demonstrated efficacy in decreasing hospitalizations, 
improving symptoms, and decreasing mortality in heart failure patients (Packer, Bristow et 
al. 1996; CIBIS-II 1999; MERIT-HF 1999).  Diuretics are effective in decreasing symptoms 
of heart failure such as edema, but evidence is mixed in regards to mortality benefits. 
Additional pharmacotherapy may be appropriate for treatment of heart failure.  For 
example, aldosterone antagonists such as spironolactone indicated for class III / IV heart 
failure and eplerenone indicated for post-AMI left ventricular dysfunction have shown 
efficacy in improving survival rates in heart failure patients already taking ACE inhibitors 
(Pitt, Zannad et al. 1999; Hunt, Abraham et al. 2005).  As a result, low doses of these 
medications in addition to ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, and diuretics are recommended to 
heart failure patients with New York Heart Association (NYHA) severity level III or IV 
(Hunt, Abraham et al. 2005; HFSA 2006).  In the absence of detailed clinical information in 
the administrative claims data, it will be assumed that ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, and 
diuretics are clinically appropriate for all heart failure patients in the cohort regardless of 
severity level. 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL PATHWAYS 
 
Individual level determinants such as age, gender, health status, or concomitant drug 
utilization may influence either physician prescribing patterns or the patient preference of a 
particular drug brand, therefore creating associations between these individual determinants 
and copayment levels.  These factors may additionally influence medication compliance 
levels or hospitalizations, hence confounding the associations.  As a result, these individual 
factors need to be included in the empirical models in order to prevent biased estimates. 
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DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Although associations between age, gender and medication compliance in the elderly 
have been inconsistent across numerous studies (Balkrishnan 1998), some disease specific 
analyses have found age and gender to be significantly associated with medication 
compliance.  For example, Morris et al. found in a cross sectional analysis of baseline clinical 
trial data that increased age was associated with increased antihypertensive medication 
compliance (Morris, Li et al. 2006).  Furthermore, Monane et al. found in a retrospective 
cohort analysis of New Jersey Medicaid beneficiaries diagnosed with heart failure that 
increased age, female gender and concomitant utilization of other medications indicated for 
heart failure were associated with higher medication compliance to digoxin (Monane, Bohn 
et al. 1994).  Results from these studies imply that age and gender influence medication 
compliance in either hypertensive or heart failure patients. 
In addition to age and gender being associated with medication compliance, they are 
also associated with heart failure risk.  In a population cohort study affiliated with the 
Rochester Epidemiology Project in Olmstead County, Minnesota, results showed that 
compared to women, men had a higher risk of mortality during a four year follow-up period 
after heart failure onset (RR=1.33, 95% CI 1.24 – 1.43) (Roger, Weston et al. 2004).  These 
results are further corroborated by the latest statistics compiled by the American Heart 
Association, showing that the rates of new and recurrent heart failure events increase with 
age, and are on average higher for men compared to women.  More specifically, annual rates 
of new and recurrent heart failure events for non-black males is 21.5%, 43.3%, and 73.1% for 
the age categories 65-74, 75-84, and 85 and over.  These rates are lower for non-black 
women, corresponding to annual rates of 11.2%, 26.3%, and 64.9% (Thom, Haase et al. 
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2006).  These differences suggest that hospitalization rates increase with age, and are lower 
for women compared to men. 
If age or gender is additionally associated with prescription copayment levels, 
omitting them from empirical models could result in biased estimates.  For example, if older 
individuals, who are hypothetically more compliant compared to younger individuals, also 
select less expensive medications, omitting age from the models could result in 
overestimating (positively bias) the effects of copayments on compliance. Additionally, if 
older heart failure patients, who are hypothetically at higher risk of hospitalization compared 
to younger heart failure patients, also select less expensive medications, omitting age from 
the models could underestimate (negatively bias) the effect of copayments on 
hospitalizations.  If gender differences also influence prescribing patterns, this same logic 
could extend to gender.  Therefore, controlling for both age and gender in the empirical 
models will help attenuate possible bias due to confounding. 
HEALTH STATUS 
Although studies have found mixed results in terms of associations between number 
of co-morbidities and medication compliance (Balkrishnan 1998), the number of 
comorbidities is significantly associated with health outcomes.  For example, hypertension 
and diabetes are significantly related to heart failure health outcomes.  The Framingham 
study found that hypertension accounted for 39% and 49% of the risk of heart failure events 
in men and women, respectively.  Additionally, diabetes increased the risk of heart failure 2-
fold and 8-fold in men and women, respectively (Kannel and Belanger 1991).  These results 
suggest that comorbidities present in heart failure patients may increase the risk of 
hospitalizations. 
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While health status determines the risk of hospitalization, the relationship between 
copayment level and health status is less clear.  For example, if physicians selectively 
prescribe more expensive efficacious medications to more severe heart failure cases 
compared to mild cases, health status would determine copayment level.  In contrast, if more 
expensive efficacious medications aid in decreasing heart failure severity more so than 
cheaper medications, copayment levels may help determine health status.  These examples 
suggest that both prescription copayment levels and health status are endogenous, or can both 
determine or be determined by other variables already present in the empirical models.  
Because health status variables are conceptually associated with hospitalizations and 
copayment levels, they will be included in the empirical models. 
UTILIZATION 
 
Although the medication compliance literature consistently finds increased numbers 
of medications to be associated with poorer medication compliance (Balkrishnan 1998), one 
study examining compliance rates in heart failure patients initiating digoxin therapy found 
that compared to individuals taking fewer heart failure medications, those taking more heart 
failure medications had higher digoxin compliance rates (Monane, Bohn et al. 1994).  In a 
separate study, Sharkness et al. conducted a survey to assess veterans’ understanding of 
hypertension and pharmacy refills.  Compared to those using one hypertensive drug, those 
using more than one hypertensive drug had greater overall compliance to hypertensive 
therapy (Sharkness and Snow 1992).  Authors suggest that compared to patients taking only 
one medication for a particular chronic condition, patients taking more medications to treat 
one condition may have a greater perception of need to treat their condition, hence 
motivating them to comply better with their medications (Sharkness and Snow 1992).  
 62
Results of these studies imply that compared to heart failure patients taking only one required 
medication, such as ACE inhibitors, heart failure patients taking beta blockers and diuretics 
in addition to ACE inhibitors may be better compliers due to greater perception of need to 
treat their heart failure. 
In addition to improving compliance, concomitant utilization of other heart failure 
medications improves health outcomes.  As demonstrated in several landmark randomized 
clinical trials demonstrating the efficacy of beta blockers, the MERIT-HF, COPERNICUS, 
and CIBIS-II trials found that compared to individuals taking only diuretics and ACE 
inhibitors, those taking beta blockers in addition to these two medications had improved 
survival (1999; 1999; Fowler 2004) and reduced number of days spent in the hospital for any 
cause and for heart failure (1999; 1999; Fowler 2004).  These results suggest that 
concomitant use of other heart failure medications may result in increased compliance as 
well as decreased hospitalizations.  If concomitant utilization is also associated with the 
selection of less expensive medications, which could occur given the cumulative financial 
burden of three prescription copayments, omitting concomitant use from empirical models 
would bias parameter estimates. 
Beyond concomitant use of other heart failure classes, medication selection within a 
class may also affect clinical outcomes.  For example, although beta blockers as a whole are 
efficacious in improving morbidity and mortality among heart failure patients, only 
carvedilol, bisoprolol, and metoprolol succinate have had favorable effects in randomized 
clinical trials (Metra, Cas et al. 2004).  Furthermore, in the COMET trial, carvedilol had 
greater efficacy in reducing mortality compared to metoprolol tartrate (Poole-Wilson, 
Swedberg et al. 2003).  These results suggest that heart failure patients will have different 
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outcomes based upon the product.  Since beta blockers also have different copayment levels, 
failing to control for drug product may contribute to spurious estimates of the association 
between copayment levels and hospitalizations. 
The heterogeneity present in beta blockers is also present in the diuretics class, 
especially given that loop diuretics compared to thiazides have decreased effectiveness over 
time because of tolerance (Brater 1998).  Furthermore, health outcomes may differ even 
between two types of loop diuretics.  In a study examining hospitalization costs in heart 
failure patients, compared to those taking furosemide, those taking torsemide had 
significantly lower heart failure and cardiovascular specific hospitalization costs (Stroupe, 
Forthofer et al. 2000). 
Results from both these studies suggest that intra-class differences in the efficacy of 
either beta blockers or diuretics may result in variation in hospitalizations, apart from the 
copayment level.  Furthermore, if drug products also have different side effect profiles, 
compliance rates may also differ.  The pooling of heterogeneous medications within the same 
class may be problematic in measuring effects of copayments on hospitalization.  In order to 
capture these sources of bias, drug product fixed effects will be included in the empirical 
models. 
In addition to the number of or the characteristics of heart failure medications 
affecting compliance, the total number of overall medications may also be associated with 
compliance, as established by the literature in this area (Balkrishnan 1998).  In order to 
capture these potential effects, empirical models will also include measures for total unique 
medications as well as total out-of-pocket medication costs for all other medications beyond 
those indicated for heart failure. 
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SYSTEM LEVEL PATHWAYS 
 
In addition to individual level factors, the type of health plan may have a direct 
impact on medication utilization.  For example, a survey conducted among elderly 
beneficiaries within a single health plan found differences in the probability of medication 
non-compliance based upon health plan type.  Compared to PPO enrollees, more than twice 
as many Medicare enrollees reported occasionally or always skipping medications due to 
drug cost (Taira, Iwane et al. 2003).  These results suggest that compared to beneficiaries 
enrolled in PPOs, those enrolled in Medicare managed care may be more sensitive to 
copayment increases.  If faced with the same copayment level increase, Medicare managed 
care beneficiaries may be less compliant compared to PPO beneficiaries. 
Although individual level case-mix partially explains the differences in prescription 
utilization in managed Medicare versus PPO beneficiaries, differing physician 
reimbursement incentives could also contribute to variation in prescription utilization.  In a 
retrospective cohort study estimating the effect of prescription copayments on drug 
utilization and expenditures, Hillman et al. found that higher pharmacy copayments were 
associated with lower prescription drug spending in independent practice association (IPA) 
plans but with no change in prescription drug spending in staff HMO plans (Hillman, Pauly 
et al. 1999).  These results suggest that the effect of prescription copayments on drug 
utilization depends upon health plan type.  As proposed by the authors, these utilization 
differences may be due to physician reimbursement structures.  For example, physicians 
under a staff-model HMO share less risk than those under an IPA HMO (Cangialose, Cary et 
al. 1997), implying that physicians bearing more risk in the care of their patient will prescribe 
less medications. 
 65
These results imply that increased financial risk is associated with decreased overall 
prescribing rates, and if these risk profiles differ between health plans, failing to measure 
system level differences may bias the true effects of copayments on medication use, 
especially if prescription copayment levels differ between health plan types.  While 
controlling for health plan type within the empirical model may not capture differences in 
physician reimbursement incentives, it will at least capture some of the health plan level 
heterogeneity contributing to variation in prescription drug utilization.  Furthermore, since 
health plans also have differing copayments, such as Medicaid versus commercial insurance, 
omitting plan type could result in spurious associations between copayment levels and 
medication compliance. 
While type of managed care health plan may significantly affect prescribing rates via 
different physician reimbursement strategies, the associations between health plan type and 
clinical outcomes is less clear.  Most of the literature in this area has examined these 
associations between managed care and fee-for-service plans.  According to a systematic 
review article written in 1997 examining the impact of managed care on the quality of health 
care, although managed care plans often have lesser utilization rates compared to fee-for-
service plans due to capitation, no systematic differences in clinical outcomes were found 
between fee-for-service plans and managed care plans (Cangialose, Cary et al. 1997). 
Because these results only compare managed care versus fee-for-service, it is difficult 
to predict the impact of different subtypes of managed care on clinical outcomes.  Similar to 
fee-for-service versus managed care plans, subtypes of managed care plans also have 
different risk-sharing structures.  The amount of risk that the managed care organization 
bears depends upon the type of physician contract.  In general, MCOs accept the least risk 
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with PPOs, and the most risk with staff-model HMOs (Cangialose, Cary et al. 1997).  These 
contractual differences could translate into different physician practice styles due to financial 
incentives.  For example, physicians employed by a staff-model HMO may be more 
encouraged to contain costs, given the increased risk to the insurer.  In contrast, physicians 
under a PPO, most similar to the fee-for-service contractual agreement, assume more risk, 
and hence, may have be more liberal in their prescribing or ordering of services compared to 
their HMO counterparts. 
These examples suggest that if reimbursement styles affect heart failure treatment, 
that plan type may affect heart failure medication prescribing rates, or even clinical outcomes 
depending upon how likely the physician will withhold or provide care as a function of 
financial incentives.  Because differences in managed care plans may therefore affect the 
prescribing and quality of care received by heart failure patients, including health plan type 
in the empirical models will help control for these unobserved sources of heterogeneity. 
REGIONAL LEVEL PATHWAYS 
 
Geographical areas across the United States differ in their availability or quality of 
health resources.  Access to quality heart failure management, for example, may be 
suboptimal in rural settings compared to urban settings, resulting in poorer outcomes and 
decreased adherence to clinically recommended medications.  One study estimated 
differences in demographics, clinical severity, ACE inhibitor and beta blocker prescribing 
rates, and 1-year mortality rates in individuals discharged from rural versus urban health 
centers.  Compared to individuals discharged alive from an urban health center, those 
discharged alive from a rural community health center had significantly higher NYHA 
severity levels, lower ACE inhibitor and beta blocker prescribing rates, and higher 1-year 
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mortality rates after discharge (Taubert, Bergmeier et al. 2001).  This suggests rural 
disparities in the standard of care for heart failure patients could significantly contribute to 
the variation in compliance to heart failure medications and hospitalization.  As a result, 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects will be included in empirical models to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity associated with geographical location. 
While individuals’ access to care potentially affects health outcomes, the market 
share of managed care services within a particular region may also affect health outcomes.  
One study measuring the associations between county-level managed market share levels and 
the utilization rates of beta blockers in elderly fee-for-service patients with myocardial 
infarction used managed market share levels as a proxy for managed care activity 
(Heidenreich, McClellan et al. 2002).  Results showed that compared to areas with low 
managed care activity, areas with higher managed care activity had increased utilization of 
beta blockers and aspirin at discharge among fee-for-service elderly experiencing myocardial 
infarction.  These results suggest that heart failure patients living in areas with high managed 
care activity may have a better standard of care. 
In addition to differences in regional managed care activity, regional differences in 
heart failure specific standard of care may contribute to differences in prescribing patterns or 
hospitalization rates.  In a study examining variation in heart failure care across US hospitals 
participating in the Acute Decompensated Heart Failure National Registry (ADHERE) 
(Fonarow, Yancy et al. 2005), 24%, 86%, 72%, and 43% of hospitals gave patients discharge 
instructions, assessed left ventricular function, prescribed ACE inhibitors, or gave smoking 
cessation counseling, respectively.  Furthermore, the conformity of these four quality 
measures developed by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
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(JCAHO) across hospitals was widely variable, ranging from 0% to 100%, with statistically 
significant differences occurring between academic and non-academic hospitals.  
Furthermore, the in-patient hospital mortality ranged between 0% and 11% (Fonarow, Yancy 
et al. 2005).  These results suggest that significant differences in quality of heart failure care 
at the hospital level varies across geographical regions contribute to differences in ACE 
inhibitor prescribing patterns or hospitalization rates. 
In addition to prescribing patterns and hospitalization rates, prescription copayment 
levels could also vary across geographic region.  Since employers help determine cost-
sharing levels during contract negotiations with health insurance providers, obtaining optimal 
copayments may also depend upon the ability of employers to effectively negotiate for the 
best health care premiums.  Membership within employer health coalitions, for example, may 
help unite multiple employers into one purchasing alliance in order to negotiate one HMO 
rate for employees across all companies (Bodenheimer and Sullivan 1998).  For example, 
one of the most influential employer health coalitions,  Pacific Business Group on Health 
(PBGH), used a collective business strategy with great success in 1989 (Bodenheimer and 
Sullivan 1998).  Regional differences in copayment levels could therefore be driven by 
certain MSAs having either a higher density of large employers or the presence of a health 
care coalition to help leverage more competitive premiums from health insurance companies. 
If regional differences occur in prescription copayments, medication compliance, and 
hospitalizations, failing to control for region in the empirical models would result in biased 
estimates.  Including MSA fixed effects or census region in the empirical models should 
capture the unmeasured heterogeneity contributing to regional variation in prescription 
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copayments, heart failure hospitalizations, or prescribing patterns, helping isolate the effects 
of copayment on medication compliance and hospitalizations. 
PREDICTORS AND OUTCOMES 
 
Health plans incur cost-sharing in the form of copayments in order to encourage 
individuals to select either preferred medications or less expensive medications on the 
formulary.  Based upon economic theory, increased cost should result in decreased demand 
(Folland, Goodman et al. 2000), consistent with past literature demonstrating inverse 
relationships between copayment levels and medication utilization or medication compliance.  
If this decreased medication utilization is detrimental to health status, increased copayments 
may also be associated with increased hospitalizations or poor health status. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The various individual, system, and regional level factors driven by clinical 
frameworks, behavioral theories, and consumer and market forces potentially confound 
associations among copayment levels, medication compliance, and hospitalizations.  
Accounting for these sources of variation should theoretically isolate the total copayment 
effects.  The use of individual-level and regional-level fixed effects discussed more 
thoroughly in the methods chapter should additionally account for unobserved heterogeneity 
that would otherwise bias estimates found in traditional ordinary least squares empirical 
models.
 CHAPTER III: METHODS 
DATA SOURCE 
 
Data originate from the Integrated Health Care Information Systems, Inc. (IHCIS) 
proprietary claims database containing de-identified inpatient, outpatient, and pharmacy 
claims representative of the United States commercial insurance carrying population.  Claims 
are pooled from 30 different health plans in eight geographical census regions, are a balanced 
mixture of HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans, and contain over 38 million unique lives between 
December 1996 and May 2005 (IHCIS, 2005). 
STUDY SAMPLE 
 
Heart failure patients selected were those with either one inpatient claim or two 
outpatient claims with a primary diagnosis of chronic heart failure (ICD-9 code 428.x) in 
addition to at least one prescription claim of an ACE inhibitor, a beta adrenergic blocker 
(beta blocker) or a diuretic (Table 3.1).  This combined disease and medication algorithm is a 
variation of one previously validated by Rector et al., finding a sensitivity of 49% and a 
specificity of 94% by using at least two heart failure claims (ICD-9 code 428.x) (Table 3.2) 
in addition to one beta blocker claim (e.g., carvedilol, metoprolol, or bisoprolol) over a 2-
year follow-up period in order to identify heart failure cases (Rector, Wickstrom et al. 2004).  
Although Rector et al. found that adding pharmaceuticals indicated for other diseases 
increased the sensitivity of the algorithm (at the expense of decreasing the specificity)
 71
(Rector, Wickstrom et al. 2004), the current analysis also included ACE inhibitors and 
diuretics in addition to beta blockers in the algorithm since all three medications are 
clinically recommended for heart failure. 
Heart failure patients were 50 years of age or older and had three years of continuous 
prescription coverage and health insurance eligibility, the latter being defined as zero days 
between enrollment periods for a minimum of three years.  Only individuals 50 years of age 
and above were included since chronic heart failure is most prevalent in older populations.  
This exclusion criterion was similarly applied to another study examining drug utilization in 
heart failure patients (Stroupe, Teal et al. 2004).  Eligible heart failure patients were then 
divided into three non-mutually exclusive cohorts representing long-term ACE inhibitor, beta 
blocker, or diuretic utilizers.  Long-term use was defined as individuals having used the 
medication for a minimum of three years from the date of the initial index drug prescription 
to either medication discontinuation or the last observed claim, whichever occurred first. 
Medication discontinuation was defined as the date a prescription had a therapy gap 
greater than three times the days’ supply; an adaptation of an algorithm used by Hamilton et 
al. defining a therapy gap as equivalent to two times the day supply (Hamilton and Briceland 
1992).  Re-defining therapy gaps with longer periods of time ensures that individuals have 
indeed discontinued therapy.  For example, using the Hamilton et al. algorithm, individuals 
filling a 30-day supply of ACE inhibitors on July 1, 2002 and waiting until September 10, 
2002 (more than 60 days later) for a subsequent prescription would be defined as 
discontinued on July 1, 2002.  Though if temporary inter-class switching occurs, for example 
between ACE inhibitors and angiotensin receptor blockers, sixty days may be too soon to 
classify an individual as discontinued, especially if they temporarily shift out of the dataset to 
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use angiotensin receptor blockers (ARBs).  Hence, extending the therapy gap requirement to 
90 days in this case decreases the likelihood of mistakenly classifying non-discontinuers as 
discontinuers. 
SAMPLE SIZE 
 
The source population contained 38,373,738 individuals, 151,051 (0.4%) of whom 
had at least one inpatient or two outpatient claims with a primary diagnosis of heart failure 
occurring during any health insurance enrollment period between 1997 and 2005.  Of these 
151,051 individuals with heart failure diagnoses, 87,808 (58%) had at least one prescription 
claim for an ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, or diuretic (Table 3.3).  These 87,808 (0.2%) 
individuals represent the prevalent heart failure cases in the IHCIS using the adapted 
algorithm by Rector et al. (Rector, Wickstrom et al. 2004). 
Heart failure cases were further reduced to 77,098 after restricting to individuals aged 
50 years and older with continuous pharmacy benefit throughout all enrollment periods.  
Only 11,944 (15%) of these 77,098 individuals, had three years of continuous health care 
coverage defined as zero days between eligibility periods for 1,095 consecutive days (e.g., 3 
years). 
This cohort of 11,944 continuously eligible heart failure patients were then divided 
into three non-mutually exclusive cohorts of 2,190, 4,409, and 5,918 (50%) ACE inhibitor, 
beta blocker, and diuretic utilizers, respectively, representing individuals having at least three 
years elapse between the index prescription date and the last observed drug-class specific 
claim.  After excluding individuals with significant therapy gaps within this three year 
period, the final cohort was comprised of 1,172, 2,676, and 3,212 ACE inhibitor, beta 
blocker, and diuretic utilizers (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: ACE inhibitors, beta adrenergic blockers and diuretics indicated for chronic heart 
failure 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Heart failure diagnoses included in (428.xx) (Adams, Fonarow et al. 2005) 
ICD-9 Code Disease Description 
428.00 Heart failure, unspecified 
428.10 Heart failure; left heart failure 
428.90 Heart failure; unspecified 
428.20 unspecified systolic heart failure 
428.21 Acute systolic heart failure 
428.22 Chronic systolic heart failure 
428.23 Acute on chronic systolic heart failure 
428.30 unspecified diastolic heart failure 
428.31 Acute diastolic heart failure 
428.32 Chronic diastolic heart failure 
428.33 Acute on chronic diastolic heart failure 
428.4 unspecified combined systolic and diastolic heart failure 
428.41 Acute combined systolic and diastolic heart failure 
428.42 Chronic combined systolic and diastolic heart failure 
428.43 Acute on chronic combined systolic and diastolic heart failure 
ACE Inhibitors Beta adrenergic blockers Diuretics 
• Accupril®, quinipril 
• aceon 
• Ramipril®, altace 
• Capoten®, captopril,  
• Vasotec®, enalapril 
• Monopril®, fosinopril,  
• Lexxel® 
• Prinivil®, Zestril® 
lisinopril 
• Lotensin®, benazepril 
• Lotrel® 
• Mavik®, trandolapril 
• Tarka® 
• Univasc® 
• Tenormin®, atenolol 
• Zebeta®, bisoprolol 
• Coreg®, carvedilol 
• Lopressor® Toprol®. 
Metoprolol 
• Aldactazide®, 
spironolactone+HCTZ 
• Aldactone®, 
spironolactone 
• Bumex®, bumetanide,  
• Demadex®, torsemide 
• Lasix®, furosemide,  
• Hydrochlorothiazide 
(HCTZ), Microzide®, 
Hydrodiuril®, Esidrix®, 
Oretic® 
• Zaroxolyn®, metolozone 
 74
The final cohorts therefore represent select samples of continuously enrolled heart failure 
patients prescribed ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, or diuretic pharmacotherapy for at least 
three years. 
Complete case analysis was performed in the final dataset, dropping an additional 
11% of individuals from each of the cohorts due to missing information on Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA).  The final analytic samples contained 1,026, 2,345 and 2,812 
individuals for the ACE, beta blocker, and diuretic analysis, respectively.  Datasets 
contained 34,921, 77,571, and 96,588 refill observations for ACE, beta, and diuretics 
respectively, averaging approximately 33 refills of various day supply amounts per 
individual over an average of four years of follow-up.  Individuals were followed for an 
average of 4 years including the baseline year. 
DESIGN 
 
A retrospective cohort was conducted to measure associations between 
prescription copayment levels and medication compliance at the refill and person-year 
level, as well as associations between copayment levels and hospitalizations at the 
person-year level.  For the copayment and compliance regressions, the refill level design 
measured compliance levels associated with each unique prescription refill.  In contrast, 
the person-year design averaged copayment levels and medication compliance over 
multiple refills at the annual level.  For the copayment and hospitalization regressions, 
individuals were identified as having a hospitalization, a cardiovascular disease-specific 
(ICD-9 code 410.xx – 414.xx; 428.xx) or a heart failure specific hospitalization (ICD-9 
code 428.x) anytime during a particular follow-up year, and prescription refill copayment 
medians were aggregated at the follow-up year level. 
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Three non-mutually exclusive cohorts were constructed, corresponding to each of 
the three heart failure classes examined: ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, and diuretics.  
Cohort datasets contained a minimum of three years of ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, or 
diuretic refills for each individual.  Because individuals were often taking more than one 
heart failure medication, the cohorts were not mutually exclusive. 
The date of heart failure diagnosis was defined as the date of the first heart failure 
prescription drug claim subsequent to the accumulation of either one inpatient or two 
outpatient heart.  Each respective cohort defined the beginning of follow-up as the index 
prescription date following the heart failure diagnosis and the end of follow-up as the last 
index claim contained in the claims data or the last prescription before a significant 
therapy discontinuation gap.  Given the staggered index dates for each individual, unique 
annual and monthly time periods were constructed to match control variables to the 
relative months and years following the index date.  For example, all the claims occurring 
between February 15, 2003 and February 15, 2004 for an individual in the ACE inhibitor 
cohort with an index date of February 15, 2003 were considered baseline year level 
claims.  Similarly, any claims occurring between February 15, 2004, and February 15, 
2005 were considered the second year claims.  This same logic was used in assigning 
monthly time periods.  For example, any claims occurring between March 15, 2003 and 
April 15, 2003 were marked as month 2.  Applying these time periods to inpatient, 
outpatient, and prescription claims allowed control variables to be merged into the 
appropriate person-year or person-month observation. 
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Table 3.3: Resulting sample sizes after applying exclusion criteria 
Criteria Sample size (N) 
  
IHCIS source population 38,373,738 
  
1 inpatient or 2 outpatient primary diagnoses for 
CHF (428.x) 
151,051 
  
1 heart failure drug claim (ACE inhibitor, beta 
blocker, or diuretic) subsequent to CHF diagnosis 
code accumulation 
87,808 
  
Continuous prescription drug coverage 86,409 
  
Age 50 years and above 77,098 
  
3 years of continuous enrollment in health plans 11,944 
  
3 years between index drug and last observed claim 2,190 (ACE inhibitors) 
4,409 (Beta blockers) 
5,918 (Diuretics) 
  
3 years between index drug and either 
discontinuation gap or last observed claim 
1,172 (ACE inhibitors) 
2,676 (Beta blockers) 
3,212 (Diuretics) 
  
No missing information on Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA) 
1,026 (ACE inhibitors) 
2,345 (Beta blockers) 
2,812 (Diuretics) 
  
Total refill observations1 34,921 refills (ACE inhibitors) 
77,571 refills (Beta blockers) 
96,588 refills (Diuretics) 
1: Before excluding refills with MPR outliers  
MEASUREMENTS 
COPAYMENT LEVELS 
 
The original copayment code in the database corresponded to ten copayment 
classifications, reflecting the total patient out-of-pocket expenses for a prescription refill 
(Table 3.4).  The prescription claims also have a range of values for days supply.  In 
addition to standard 30-day multiples, refills also had supply levels under 30 and over 90 
days.  In order to create comparable copayment levels between refills across individuals, 
copayment levels were standardized to 30-day supply amounts.  Because the copayment 
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in IHCIS was a categorical variable defining a particular range of copayment amounts, 
each refill was assigned the median copayment amount before transformation (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4:  Copayment level categories  
Copayment Level Range Median Copayment 
A $0 $0 
B $1 - $5 $3 
C $6 - $10 $8 
D $11 - $15 $13 
E $16 - $20 $18 
F $21 - $25 $23 
G $26 - $30 $28 
H $31 - $35 $33 
I $36 - $50 $38 
J $50 + $50* 
*Assigned to the lower boundary given no information on upper boundary 
 
A conversion factor was computed by dividing 30 by the observed refill day supply 
amount (Eq. 3.1). 
Equation 3.1: 
Conversion Factor = 30 / prescription refill day supply 
 
The assigned copayment median was then multiplied by the conversion factor to obtain a 
standardized 30-day supply copayment amount (Eq. 3.2). 
Equation 3.2: 
Standardized 30-day copayment = conversion factor * copayment median 
 
This calculation assumes a 90-day supply of medications to be three times as expensive 
as a 30-day supply, or a 10-day supply of medications to be one-third as expensive as a 
30-day supply.  Since these newly converted copayment values were not integers, they 
were reassigned to copayment categories based upon the original dataset, resulting in 
eight mutually exclusive categories after collapsing the highest three categories into one 
(Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5: Newly converted copayment level categories 
Newly assigned copayment category Standardized 30-day copayment levels 
A $0 
B $1 - $5 
C $6 - $10 
D $11 - $15 
E $16 - $20 
F $21 - $25 
G $26 - $30 
H I J $31 + 
 
MEDICATION COMPLIANCE 
 
The Medication Possession Ratio (MPR) was used to capture ACE inhibitor, beta 
blocker, and diuretic medication compliance.  The MPR captures the percentage of 
medication supply coverage within a defined interval of time, based upon the day supply 
of medication and the amount of calendar days elapsing between two refills.  It is 
computed by dividing the total day supply of medications by the total number of days 
that elapse before an individual returns to the pharmacy for the next prescription refill 
(Eq. 3.3).  This computation as well as other variations have been described and validated 
using managed care administrative claims data (Steiner, Koepsell et al. 1988). 
 
Equation 3.3: 
MPR = total days supply within interval A / calendar days elapsing during interval A 
 
The MPR theoretically ranges from 0 to 1.  For example, individuals filling a 30-
day supply of ACE inhibitors on May 1, 2005 and picking up a subsequent refill on June 
1, 2005 will have an MPR of 1, reflecting 100% compliance.  In contrast, individuals 
filling a 30-day supply on June 1, 2005 and picking up a subsequent refill on August 1, 
2005 will have an MPR of 0.5, reflecting 50% compliance.  In practice, the MPR can be 
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above 1, reflecting an oversupply of medication.  For example, individuals filling a 30- 
day supply on June 1, 2005, and picking up a subsequent refill on June 16, 2005, will 
have an MPR of 2, reflecting an over-consumption of 30 days of medication within 15 
days.  More extreme MPR values, though, are more likely to reflect intentional, clinically 
appropriate medication switching rather than over-consumption.  For example, 
individuals filling a 90-day supply of hydrochlorothiazide on February 1st may switch 
doses on February 3rd, reflected as an MPR of 45.  Since these extreme outliers probably 
are more reflective of switching rather than non-compliance, refills with associated MPR 
values over three standard deviations above the overall MPR mean were not included in 
the final analytic dataset. 
The MPR was calculated at both the refill and the person-year level.  At the refill 
level, the MPR was computed by dividing the days supply for refill r by the number of 
calendar days elapsing between the r th and the (r+1) th refill (Eq. 3.4).  This required 
eliminating the final observed refill for each individual since subsequent refills are 
needed in order to compute the MPR. 
Equation 3.4: 
MPR (refill r) = total days supply (refill r) / [# of calendar days between (refill r) & (refill r+1)] 
 
While measuring medication compliance at the refill level maximizes the degrees 
of freedom as well as the variability of the outcome, single interval compliance measures 
such as those computed over a 30-day period may be less reflective of true medication 
adherence compared to multiple interval measures computed over 90-day periods.  In a 
study examining compliance to anti-hypertensive therapy, Christensen et al. found that 
observation periods less than 60 days may have introduced unobservable sources of bias, 
while measuring compliance over 90-day intervals or more was preferred (Christensen, 
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Williams et al. 1997).  Therefore, to complement refill level analyses, medication 
compliance was also measured at the person-year level by averaging refill MPR over 12-
month periods (Eq. 3.5). 
Equation 3.5: 
MPR (person-year) = Sum [MPR (refill) (person-year level) / N (refills) (person-year level)] 
 
HOSPITALIZATIONS 
 
In the analyses measuring associations between copayment levels and 
hospitalizations, hospitalizations were defined as annual level binary indicator variables, 
capturing whether individuals did or did not have an inpatient claim during any particular 
follow-up year.  In models estimating probabilities of all-cause hospitalizations, any 
inpatient encounter was considered a hospitalization.  For models estimating probabilities 
of disease-specific hospitalizations, individuals having hospitalizations coded with a 
primary diagnosis (ICD-9 code 410.xx – 414.xx, 428.xx) or (ICD-9 code 428.xx) were 
considered hospitalized for cardiovascular disease and heart failure disease, respectively. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
OVERVIEW 
 
Five sets of control variables were constructed depending upon the outcome, the 
unit of analysis, or the requirements for testing mediation (Table 3.6).  Common control 
variables constructed similarly across all five sets included demographic variables such 
as age, gender, and health plan type.  Regional area effects were captured by using 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and census region fixed effects for refill level and 
person-year level analyses, respectively.  Health status variables included total number of 
annual comorbidities and total number of all-cause hospitalizations in the previous year, 
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the latter a proxy for heart failure severity in the absence of more detailed clinical 
information in administrative claims data.  All refill-level analyses controlled for drug 
product brand within each analysis in order to capture brand-level effects.  Other control 
variables included history of medication compliance, constructed as a continuous variable 
in compliance models.  The mediation models, which test whether non-compliance 
(MPR<0.80) significantly contributes to the association between copayment level and 
hospitalizations, captured non-compliance as a binary indicator variable in select 
hospitalization outcome models.  Heart failure specific medication use variables, total 
out-of-pocket prescription costs, and total number of unique drugs were constructed as 
monthly or annual binary indicator variables depending upon the unit of analysis.  Time 
variables included total time of follow-up in addition to calendar year fixed effects. 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Age, gender, and health plan type were constructed the same way for all models.  
Age was captured by subtracting the year of the prescription claim from the birth date 
year provided in plan eligibility file.  Gender was a categorical variable present in the 
eligibility files.  Health insurance type was captured during baseline year in two ways: 
one variable indicated whether the managed care plan was administered by the 
government or by a commercial entity, a second variable indicated the physician 
reimbursement type.  The former was classified as a three level categorical variable of 
either commercial, Medicare, or Medicaid managed care, the latter classified as a five 
level categorical variables of HMO, PPO, POS, independent, or other health plan types.  
 Table 3.6: Control variable definitions within empirical models 
 E(MPR)=f (copay) Pr(MPR<0.8) = 
f(copay) 
Pr(Hosp) = f(copay) 
 Refill Level Person-Year 
Level 
Person-Year 
Level 
Person-Year Level 
  Direct Effect1 Total Effect2 
Demographics      
Age X X X X X 
Gender X X X X X 
Insurance Payer X X X X X 
Health Insurance plan type X X X X X 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) X . . . . 
US Census Region . X X X X 
      
Health Status      
Charlson comorbidity index X X X X X 
Total number of hospitalizations in previous year X X X X X 
      
Medication Utilization      
Monthly non-index CHF drug utilization (yes/no) X . . . . 
Annual non-index CHF drug utilization (yes/no) . X X X X 
Monthly aldosterone antagonist utilization (yes/no) X . . . . 
Annual aldosterone antagonist utilization (yes/no) . X X X X 
Monthly sum of non-index prescription copayments X . . . . 
Annual average of monthly sum of non-index prescription copayments . X X X X 
Monthly count of non-index prescriptions X . . . . 
Annual average: monthly count of non-index prescriptions  X X X X 
Average annual index drug MPR during previous year  X X X . . 
Annual average compliance level in current year (MPR<0.8)3 . . . X . 
Drug product indicator X . . . . 
      
Time indicators      
Total number of follow-up days X X X X X 
Calendar year fixed effects X X X X X 
1)Direct effect models include potential mediator (MPR<0.80) as a control variable 
2) Total effect models omit potential mediator as control variable 
3) Potential mediator 
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Geographical region was defined as metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or census 
region in refill and person-year analysis, respectively.  MSAs are defined as the regions 
corresponding to the first three digits of a United States postal code.  Given the sufficient 
number of observations in the refill analyses, unique dummy variables for each MSA were 
included in the refill-level models in order to capture regional-level unobserved 
heterogeneity.  The person-year level analyses used census region information, dividing the 
United States into Northeast/Atlantic, South, Midwest, West, and National, the latter 
category referring to individuals purposely censored from census classification by the data 
vendor given the presence a rare disease or procedure which could increase the probability of 
patient de-identification. 
 
HEALTH STATUS 
 
The number of co-morbidities was constructed using the Charlson comorbidity index 
(Charlson, Pompei et al. 1987) adapted to the most current ICD-9 CM codes based upon a 
study by Sundararajan et al (Table 3.7) (Sundararajan, Henderson et al. 2004).  The Charlson 
index is comprised of fifteen categories of diagnoses ranging from diabetes to metastatic 
cancer, each contributing weight to the final index based upon the severity of the disease.  In 
the current analysis, an individual was defined as having a diagnosis during baseline year 
based upon having at least one inpatient or outpatient claim with an ICD-9 code for a 
particular disease category.  A summary index number was assigned to each individual based 
upon claims during the baseline year.  In the absence of heart failure severity level 
information, total number of hospitalizations at baseline was used as a proxy for heart failure 
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severity by summing the total number of unique admissions dates per person per follow with 
a one-year lag. 
UTILIZATION 
 
Concomitant heart failure drug utilization was captured at the monthly and annual 
levels for the refill and person-year analysis, respectively, using binary indicator variables for 
the non-index drugs.  This vector included either monthly or annual indicators of the other 
two classes of drugs required for heart failure.  For example, models measuring the effect of 
ACE refill copayment level on ACE inhibitor refill compliance had a separate monthly 
binary indicator variables for beta blocker and diuretic utilization.  These concomitant 
utilization indicators were aggregated to the annual level for person-year level analyses.  An 
additional monthly or annual indicator variable for aldosterone antagonists was also included 
in the models. 
Table 3.7: Charlson Comorbidity Index Disease Categories (Sundararajan, Henderson et al. 
2004) 
Condition ICD-9 Codes Weight 
   
Acute myocardial infarction 410.x, 412.x 1 
   
Congestive heart failure 428.x 1 
   
Peripheral vascular disease 441.x, 443.9, 785.4, V434 1 
   
Cerebral vascular accident 430.x - 438.x 1 
   
Dementia 290.x 1 
   
Pulmonary disease 490 - 496; 500 -505 1 
   
Peptic ulcer 531 – 534 1 
   
Liver disease 571.2, 571.4, 571.5, 571.6 1 
   
Diabetes 250.0, 250.1, 250.2, 250.3, 
250.7 
1 
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Table 3.7: Charlson Comorbidity Index Disease Categories (continued) 
 
In addition to class-specific utilization variables, out-of-pocket prescription expenses 
as well as total number of unique drugs across all prescriptions besides the index drug of 
interest were captured as monthly average continuous variables.  For the refill level analysis, 
total out-of-pocket prescription copayments were constructed at the monthly level by 
summing the medians of the copayment ranges of all non-index prescription within each 
respective month of follow-up.  These sums were averaged at the annual level for the person-
year analyses.  In conjunction with total out-of-pocket expenses, the total number of unique 
non-index concomitant medications was constructed at the monthly level by summing the 
number of unique National Drug Codes (NDC) contained within each month of follow-up.  
These sums were averaged at the annual level for the person-year analyses.  Since history of 
medication compliance is a significant predictor of future medication compliance, all models 
accounted for history of drug compliance at the refill and person-year analyses.  This was 
constructed by averaging all refill MPRs at the person-year level and lagging this measure by 
one year.  An additional binary indicator for non-compliance (MPR<0.8) was included as the 
Condition ICD-9 Codes Weight 
Diabetes complications 250.4, 250.5, 250.6 2 
   
Paraplegia 342, 244.1 2 
   
Renal disease 582, 583.0, 583.1, 583.2, 
583.4, 583.5, 583.6, 583.7, 
585.x, 586.x, 588.x 
2 
   
Cancer 140.x, 150.x, 160.x, 170.x, 
171-172, 174-176, 179-
180, 190-195 
2 
   
Metastatic cancer 196, 197, 198, 199.0, 
199.1 
3 
   
Severe liver disease 572.2, 572.3, 572.4, 572.8 3 
   
HIV 0.42, 0.43, 0.44 6 
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potential mediator in the logistic regressions estimating the probability of hospitalization 
conditional upon copayment level.  Drug product fixed effects were captured by creating 
dummy variables for the drug product brand in the refill-level analyses in order to account 
for intra-class differences.  In addition to medication utilization variables, total follow-up 
time was captured as the number of days elapsing since the index date, while annual trends 
were captured using calendar year fixed effects. 
 
ANALYSIS 
ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUES DISCUSSION 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators using multivariate linear regression result in 
the best linear unbiased estimates if a) a linear relationship exists between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable; b) observations included in the analysis are a random 
sample from the source population; c) observations are independent; d) the error has an 
expected value of zero; e) there are no exact linear relationships among the independent 
variables, minimizing the presence of multicollinearity; and f) the variance of the error term 
is constant over all values of the outcome (resulting in homoskedastic errors) (Wooldridge 
2003). 
Since the current analysis uses a panel dataset consisting of multiple outpatient and 
inpatient encounters and prescription refills collected over time for the same individuals, it 
violates the assumption of independent observations.  This violation is inevitable especially 
within panel because observations are not independently distributed over time (Wooldridge 
2003).  This non-independence occurs because of unobserved time-varying factors that affect 
the values of the outcome in both time periods.  For example, unobserved income levels 
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affecting ACE inhibitor compliance in 1997 could also affect ACE inhibitor compliance in 
1998, creating correlations between the outcome and the error term.  Since OLS estimators in 
the context of panel data most likely result in biased estimates given this routine violation of 
non-independent observations, more advanced models such as fixed effects or random effects 
estimators must be used. 
One of the main limitations of the OLS estimator is the creation of a common slope 
and intercept for all observations.  This may be appropriate for cross-sectional data, but could 
limit the ability to account for inter-individual differences for longitudinal data (Ward and 
Leigh 1993).  Similar to the OLS models, the FE model creates a common slope, but in 
contrast to OLS models, creates separate intercepts for each individual which helps account 
for idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals (Ward and Leigh 1993).  Separate fixed effect 
intercepts therefore allow models to account for individual level differences otherwise lost in 
a single OLS intercept. 
Fixed effects estimators divide the composite error (νit) into unobserved time-varying 
factors (μit) and unobserved time-invariant factors (ai), the latter of which are referred to as 
the fixed effects (Eq. 3.6).  Examples of time-invariant factors at the individual level may be 
race, educational background, or genetic predisposition to cardiovascular risk factors.  The 
fixed effects estimator uses a differencing technique to eliminate the unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity (ai), (Wooldridge 2003) which would otherwise lead to biased OLS 
estimators.  More specifically, fixed effects estimators subtract the overall group mean of a 
variable (yi) from each individual observation (yit) creating a ‘time-demeaned’ data point (Ÿit) 
(Wooldridge 2003) (Eq 3.7). 
Equation 3.6: 
νit= (ai + μit ) 
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Equation 3.7:  
Ÿit= yit – yi 
 
Differencing values as well as errors across time periods within individuals eliminates 
the heterogeneity of the time invariant unobserved variables (ai).  If these unobserved factors 
(ai) are indeed time-invariant, and are hypothetically correlated with the predictor (Xit), the 
fixed effects differencing technique successfully eliminates these factors as sources of bias 
(Wooldridge 2003).  For example, since race is unobserved and time-invariant, the variation 
it contributes to copayment levels during 1999 and 2000 is also constant.  The process of 
differencing will not only subtract group means from individual observations (Eq. 3.6) 
between the years 1999 and 2000 for observed variables, it will also difference the errors.  If 
time-invariant latent constructs such as race do not change between two particular years, the 
differencing process rids the model of the unobserved heterogeneity due to race as well as 
any other time-invariant omitted variable.  Furthermore, if race is correlated with prescription 
copayment levels, fixed effects models would in theory provide unbiased estimates when all 
the other assumptions of linear models are met. 
In certain cases, time-invariant unobservables may not be correlated with the 
predictor, a scenario motivating the use of the more efficient alternative, the random effects 
estimator.  If time-invariant unobservables (ai) are uncorrelated with the predictor (Xit), the 
latent constructs contained within (ai) become part of the random error term, and do not need 
to be differenced in order to obtain unbiased estimates. Given this orthogonal relationship 
between the time-invariant error (ai) and the predictor (Xit), using the OLS estimator would 
seem like a viable option since OLS assumes no correlations between regressors and the error 
term.  Yet, because the panel data structure inherently creates serially correlated errors 
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through multiple observations per person, this violates the OLS assumptions of non-
independent errors, and thus creates biased standard errors (Wooldridge 2003).  To correct 
this, the RE estimator uses sophisticated matrix algebra to remove the effects of serially 
correlated errors, in essence creating a more efficient version of the OLS estimate 
(Wooldridge 2003).  The efficiency advantage of RE over OLS is contingent upon the 
assumptions of the error structure, including homoskedastic errors, no autocorrelation within 
an individual, and no correlation across groups (Greene 2003).  In summary, FE estimation 
techniques take advantage of repeated observations to adjust for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity that would have otherwise led to biased estimates in standard OLS models.  In 
situations where time invariant unobservables are orthogonal to the predictor, usually 
motivating the use of OLS estimators in cross-sectional analyses, the RE estimator can be 
used to obtain a more efficient version of the OLS estimator contingent upon the error 
structure satisfying strict assumptions. 
Applying these concepts to an example, one may hypothesize that an individual’s 
income level, an unobserved construct in the current analysis, is correlated with copayment 
level.  If income is time-invariant, likely if elderly heart failure patients have fixed income 
levels, income becomes part of the time-invariant unobservable portion (ai) of the composite 
error (ε it), creating a correlation between the predictor and the error.  Compared to 
individuals with low income, individuals with higher income may have an increased 
probability of selecting into a brand name drug over a generic, hypothetically creating a 
positive correlation between copayment level (X) and the time-invariant portion (ai) of the 
error term (ε it).  If income truly varies systematically with copayment levels, creating a 
positive correlation between copayment (X) and the time-invariant portion of the error term 
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[(X, ai) ≠ 0], FE would be an appropriate model.  In contrast, if income varies randomly 
across different copayment levels, creating an orthogonal relationship between the 
copayment and (ai), [(X, μit) = 0], RE would be the more appropriate model. 
Under either of these scenarios, OLS would have biased standard errors given the 
presence of serial correlation between repeated observations.  Additionally, if time-invariant 
factors were correlated with the predictors, OLS would have biased parameter estimates in 
addition to biased standard errors compared to FE estimates.  In all situations, if the 
unobserved income levels vary across time and were correlated with both copayment levels, 
all models would produce biased estimates. 
Given the different error assumptions of OLS, FE, and RE, formal specification tests 
were performed in order to choose the best estimator.  To test between the OLS and RE 
models, the Bruesch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (Bruesch and Pagan 1979) was used to 
test the null hypothesis that refills within an individual are independent.  This was equivalent 
to testing the null that refills are not clustered within an individual.  Rejecting the null 
hypothesis would favor the RE model over the OLS models, implying that refills are not 
independent observations within the individual, suggesting clustering of refills at the 
individual level.  An example of a cluster may be a series of refills with high MPR values 
grouped within an individual because of an unobservable factor, such as titration of a new 
medication.  If this requires a series of early refills, manifested as high MPR values in the 
datasets, this cluster of refills would be correlated with medication titration, a part of the 
error term.  In summary, conducting the Bruesch Pagan test helps identify the presence of 
clustering, which gone undetected, would result in choosing an inappropriate estimator with 
biased standard errors. 
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To test between the FE and RE models, the Hausman test (Hausman 1978) was used 
to test the null hypothesis that the slopes of the RE and the FE do not differ significantly.  
When conducting the Hausman, one of the estimators must be used as a comparator.  For 
example, it must be assumed that one estimator is always consistent (unbiased) yet may be 
inefficient, while another estimator maybe efficient yet inconsistent (biased).  Under these 
circumstances, the FE would always be consistent, but may be inefficient compared to the 
RE model given the extra degrees of freedom needed to create ‘time-demeaned’ data points 
(Wooldridge 2003).  In contrast, the RE would be more efficient compared to the FE, but 
may be inconsistent due to the presence of correlation between time-invariant unobservables 
and the predictor of interest.  Rejecting the null hypothesis would favor the FE model over 
the RE model, implying that time-invariant unobservables are correlated with the regressors.  
This would most likely occur if race, education, or income influenced the choice of brands 
over generics, creating a correlation between the error term and copayment levels. 
To test between OLS and FE models, an F-test was used to test the null that the fixed 
effect intercepts are equal to zero.  Rejecting the null hypothesis would favor the FE model, 
implying that the fixed effects are significantly contributing to the fit of the model, and OLS 
or RE models would produce biased parameter estimates.  This would provide evidence that 
separate intercepts for all observations, although using extra degrees of freedom, are helpful 
in capturing individual level unobserved heterogeneity. 
In summary, standard linear regression of panel data can result in inefficient standard 
errors due to non-independent observations clustered within units of analyses.  Using FE 
models may be advantageous in accounting for individual level differences as well as 
unobserved time-invariant factors.  Using RE models may be advantageous in accounting for 
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serial correlation or clustering which would otherwise result in biased OLS standard errors.  
Though the structure of panel data allows for adjusting time-invariant errors in the FE 
models, these methodologies are not immune from omitting time-varying variables.  For 
example, if modifiable heart failure risk factors such as smoking status are correlated with 
copayment levels, associations between copayments and hospitalizations would be biased. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
within the context of panel data were considered in estimating the expected value of MPR 
conditional upon copayment level for ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, and diuretics.  Because 
OLS, RE, and FE each have their own set of error distribution assumptions, specification 
tests were performed to compare and choose the most efficient and unbiased parameter 
estimates.  Ordinary least squares, random effects, and fixed effects models may be more or 
less appropriate depending upon the structure of the errors.  Due to this, the Bruesch-Pagan, 
Hausman and F-tests were conducted to motivate the best estimator. 
 
 
 
 
PRESCRIPTION COPAYMENTS AND MEDICATION COMPLIANCE 
 
Ordinary least squares, individual random effects, and individual level fixed effect 
models were used to assess the effect of copayment level on compliance at the refill and 
person-year level, controlling for demographics, health status, drug utilization, time and 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA).  Analyses conducted at the refill level measure 
associations between the copayment refill level and the refill’s subsequent MPR.  The short 
latency between the ‘exposure’ (the refill copayment) and the ‘outcome’ (the compliance 
level associated with that refill) may facilitate the ability to infer causality between 
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copayment levels and medication supply levels.  Although the refill level analysis was 
helpful in determining the effects of copayment levels on the most proximal medication 
supply levels, the person-year analyses was helpful in aggregating refill-level MPR values, 
smoothing out relatively noisy single MPR measures which may not reflect true individual 
level compliance levels. 
The final analytic dataset contained a minimum of two years of follow-up for each 
individual, using the observations in first year as baseline measurement for health status and 
medication compliance history.  In the equations illustrated below (Eq. 3.10; 3.11) the vector 
Copayment includes dummy variables for the seven different copayment level categories, 
utilizing the $0 category as the reference: $1 to $5, $6 to $10, $11 to $15, $16 to $20, $21 to 
$25, $26 to $30, and $31 and above.  These copayment categories corresponded to individual 
refills and annual averages across refills for the refill analysis, and person-year analyses, 
respectively.  Given the low frequency of more expensive beta blockers and diuretics that 
resulted in small sample sizes and unstable estimates, upper copayment observations were 
collapsed.  For example, the beta blocker analysis collapsed the upper two levels to create a 
copayment category of $26 and above, and the diuretic analysis collapsed the upper five 
levels to create a copayment category of $11 and above. 
The vector Demographics includes individual age, health plan types, and gender.  
The vector Health includes the Charlson comorbidity score and total hospitalizations at 
baseline, the latter health status variable serving as a proxy for heart failure severity.  The 
vector Utilization for the refill level analysis includes monthly utilization binary indicators 
for non-index heart failure medications (e.g., binary indicators for ACE inhibitors and 
diuretics for the beta blocker model; binary indicators for beta blockers and diuretics for the 
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ACE inhibitor model, etc), monthly count of unique non-index prescriptions, total monthly 
out-of-pocket prescription copayments for non-index prescriptions, and history of index-drug 
compliance captured by annual average MPR values in the previous year.  In addition, the 
ACE, beta blocker, and diuretic refill analyses contain 15, 8, and 11-level drug product 
dummy variables respectively, each level corresponding to a different drug product contained 
within each medication class.  For the person-year analysis, the utilization vector was 
collapsed to the person-year level, containing binary indicators for annual utilization of non-
index chronic heart failure drugs, annual average monthly counts of unique drugs, and annual 
average monthly out-of-pocket copayments for non-index drugs.  Drug product fixed effects 
were not included in these models given the frequent drug product switching. 
Refill level models capture geographic fixed effects by including N-1 dummy 
variables for N metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), designed to capture sources of 
copayment level and hospitalization rate variation at the metropolitan area.  To preserve 
degrees of freedom, individual-level models captured geographic fixed effects using census 
regions instead of MSA regions.  All models controlled for annual trends with calendar time 
fixed effects, constructing a dummy variable for each respective year of follow-up, as well as 
a variable capturing total study follow-up time. 
Notations for the empirical models include subscripts referring to the level of 
variation of the variable (Eq. 3.10, 3.11).  For example, baseline year demographics vary 
between individuals only, not across time, as indicated by subscript i.  In refill analyses, 
MPR values vary by refill, individual, and time, indicated by the subscripts r, i, and t.  In 
contrast, MPR varies only by individual and time in person-year analysis, indicated by 
subscripts i and t, given that individual refill observations are collapsed to the person-year 
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level.  The errors are depicted as either (ε(r, i, t)) or (ε(i, t)) in the OLS refill and person-year 
level analysis, respectively.  The RE and FE models divide the error into individual level 
time-invariant unobserved error (a (i)) and random error, (v (r, i, t)) and (v (i, t)) for the refill and 
person-year level analysis. 
 
Equation 3.10: OLS, RE, and FE refill level analyses measuring associations between 
prescription copayment levels and medication compliance using MPR. 
 
OLS: 
E(MPR)(r,i,t) = β0+ β1 Copayment (r,i,t) + β2 Demographics(i)+ β3 Health (i)+ β4 Utilization(i,t)  
+ β5 MSA(i) + β6 Calendar_year(t) + β7 Follow_up_time(i)  + ε (r,i,t) 
 
FE and RE: 
E(MPR)(r,i,t) = β0+ β1 Copayment (r,i,t) + β2 Demographics(i)+ β3 Health (i)+ β4 Utilization(i,t)  
+ β5 MSA(i) + β6 Calendar_year(t) + β7 Follow_up_time(i)  + a(i) + v(r,i,t) 
 
 
Equation 3.11: OLS, RE, and FE person-year analysis of annual average prescription 
copayment levels and annual average medication compliance. 
 
OLS: 
E(Annual MPR)(i,t) = β0+ β1 Copayment (i,t) + β2 Demographics(i)+ β3 Health (i) 
+ β4 Utilization(i,t)+ β5 Census(i) + β6 Calendar_year(t) + β7 Follow_up_time(i)+ ε (i,t) 
 
RE or FE: 
E(Annual MPR)(i,t) = β0+ β1 Copayment (i,t) + β2 Demographics(i)+ β3 Health (i) 
+ β4 Utilization(i,t)+ β5 Region(i) + β6 Calendar_year(t) + β7 Follow_up_time(i)  + a(i) + v(i,t) 
 
SPECIFICATION TESTS 
 
Specification tests were performed between OLS, FE, and RE estimators to determine 
the best fit for the ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic models.  These included the 
Bruesch-Pagan test, used to test the presence of clustered errors in OLS models; the 
Hausman test, used to test the differences between the slopes of the RE and FE models, and 
the F-test, used to test the joint significance of fixed effect intercepts. 
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Bruesch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test 
 
The Bruesch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier specification test tests the null hypothesis 
that the variance of the error is zero (Var (μ) = 0).  Failing to reject the null would imply that 
refill observations are independent within the individual, motivating the use of the more 
efficient OLS model in the absence of individual level heterogeneity.  Rejecting the null 
would imply the presence of clustering, motivating the use of RE given that clustering 
inflates the standard errors of OLS models.  The null hypotheses across all medication class 
analyses were rejected, implying the presence of refill clusters at the individual level (Table 
3.8).  Under these circumstances, the RE is most appropriate contingent upon the error 
structures following the assumptions of the RE estimator. 
Hausman Test 
The Hausman test was performed to test the appropriateness of the RE versus the FE 
model.  In order to conduct the Hausman, one must assume that one model has an unbiased, 
yet possibly inefficient estimator (in this case the FE) and the second model has an efficient, 
yet possibly biased estimator (in this case the RE).  The null hypothesis assumes that the 
slope coefficients between the models do not differ significantly, implying that both models 
yield unbiased estimates.  Failing to reject the null hypothesis would imply that unobserved 
heterogeneity (ai) is randomly distributed among different copayment levels.  Choosing the 
more efficient model would therefore be most appropriate.  In contrast, rejecting the null 
hypothesis would favor the fixed effects model, implying that unobserved heterogeneity (ai) 
is significantly correlated with copayment levels.  The null hypothesis was rejected across all 
medication class analyses, favoring the FE over the RE, and implying that individual-level 
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unobserved heterogeneity (ai) is significantly correlated with copayment level in all of the 
models (Table 3.8). 
F-Test 
F-tests were performed between the OLS and FE models to test the joint significance 
of the fixed effect intercepts, testing the null hypothesis that all G-1 fixed effect intercepts (g 
= number of individuals) are zero.  The F-test creates a ratio comparing the explained 
variation in the restricted model (OLS) versus the unrestricted model (FE).  Rejecting the 
null hypothesis implies that the fixed effects intercepts contained in the unrestricted model 
explain a significant amount of variation in the outcome compared to the restricted model 
(OLS).  The null hypothesis was rejected across all models, implying that the fixed effect 
intercepts significantly contributed to the fit of the model compared to OLS (Table 3.8).  This 
also suggests the presence of individual level heterogeneity which would otherwise bias OLS 
models only containing one intercept for all individuals.  The results of the F-test in 
conjunction with the Hausman suggest that individual level fixed effects models are the most 
appropriate models to estimate the effect of copayment level on compliance using linear 
regression. 
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Table 3.8: Results of the specification tests performed between OLS, RE, and FE estimators 
 F-Test 
(OLS vs. FE) 
Bruesch-Pagan 
(OLS vs. RE) 
Hausman 
(FE vs. RE) 
Overall 
Choice 
 F-statistic Favors χ2 Favors χ2 Favors  
Refill        
ACE F(1037, 
23806)=2.95; 
p<0.001 
FE 875.23; 
p<0.001 
RE 147.74; 
p<0.001 
FE FE 
Beta F(2359, 
53273)=4.04; 
p<0.001 
FE 8272.57; 
p<0.001 
RE 525.29; 
p<0.001 
FE FE 
Diuretic F(2840, 
67433)=3.48; 
p<0.001 
FE 7498.2; 
p<0.001 
RE 803.73; 
p<0.001 
FE FE 
        
Person-
Year 
       
ACE F(1035, 
2204)=2.23; 
p<0.001 
FE 294.93; 
p<0.001 
RE 92.53; 
p<0.001 
FE FE 
Beta F(2359, 
5307)=2.33; 
p<0.001 
FE 605.19; 
p<0.001 
RE 433.09; 
p<0.001 
FE FE 
Diuretic F(2840, 
6444)=2.45; 
p<0.001 
FE 604.65; 
p<0.001 
RE 546.28; 
p<0.001 
FE FE 
 
PRESCRIPTION COPAYMENTS, MEDICATION COMPLIANCE, AND 
HOSPITALIZATIONS 
 
Person-year level logistic regressions were used to model the probability of annual 
hospitalizations (e.g., all-cause, cardiovascular-specific, or heart failure specific) conditional 
upon annual average copayment levels within each of the three drug class categories (Eq. C).  
Additional logistic models were constructed to test the mediating properties of medication 
non-compliance.  The first equation (Path A) measures the probability of non-compliance 
conditional upon medication copayment level. 
Conceptually similar to the OLS models measuring the effect of copayment level on 
MPR levels, this adapts the linear models by dichotomizing the MPR outcome to above or 
below 0.8, a clinical meaningful threshold used in previous studies (Stroupe, Teal et al. 
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2004).  Though the OLS models provide insight on the effects of copayment categories on 
medication supply units, the logistic models provided more insight on the effect of 
copayment on compliance using a previously validated threshold. 
The second equation (Path B) measures the probability of hospitalizations conditional 
upon medication non-compliance (MPR<0.8).  The third and fourth models (Path C, D) 
measure the probability of hospitalization conditional upon copayment levels, the former 
measuring the direct effect by including non-compliance in the empirical model, the latter 
measuring the total effect by omitting non-compliance. 
 
Equation A: Pr (MPR<0.8) = f (copayment level) 
Equation B: Pr (hosp=1) = f (MPR<0.8) 
Equation C: Pr (hosp =1) = f (copayment level, MPR<0.8) 
Equation D: Pr (hosp = 1) = f (copayment level) 
 
It is hypothesized that medication non-compliance partially explains the proportion of 
the variation between copayments and hospitalizations, suggesting that higher copayment 
levels contribute to higher risk of hospitalization partially due to medication non-compliance.  
The objective of the mediation analysis was to test the extent to which non-compliance 
mediated the association between copayment levels and hospitalizations.  Baron and Kenny 
(Baron and Kenny 1986) introduce a step-by-step approach to investigating the role of 
intervening variables, a very common approach in the psychology literature (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood et al. 2002).  In this approach, hypothesis tests are applied to the collection of 
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empirical frameworks outlined in Equations A through D above in order to test the presence 
of mediation.  More specifically, four conditions must apply for mediation to be supported: 
1) Copayment levels must be associated with medication non-adherence (Eq. A). 
2) Medication non-adherence must be associated with hospitalization (Eq. B). 
3) Copayment levels must be associated with hospitalizations in the absence of 
medication non-adherence (Eq. D) (total effect). 
4) The effect of copayment on hospitalization (Eq. D) (total effect) must be attenuated 
when the mediator non-compliance is added to the model (Eq. C) (the direct effect). 
 
The pathway proposed in Equation D, or the probability of hospitalization conditional 
upon copayment level, is referred to as the total effect of copayment levels on hospitalization, 
while Equation C is referred to as the direct effect of copayment on hospitalization, 
controlling for medication non-adherence (Preacher and Hayes 2004).  According to the 
Baron and Kenny definition, if the direct effect (Eq. C) drops to zero while the total effect 
(Eq. D) remains statistically significant, non-compliance would be considered a perfect 
mediator, in theory suggesting higher copayments result in hospitalizations solely because of 
non-compliance.  In practice, perfect mediation does not occur due to many unobservable 
variables possibly contributing to the causal pathway.  Given this, the attenuation of the 
direct effect (Equation C) in comparison to the total effect (Equation D) would be sufficient 
to conclude the presence of partial mediation (Preacher and Hayes 2004). 
Figure 3.1: Proposed Mediation Pathways: 
 
 
 
 
 
COPAY LEVEL HOSPITALIZATION
NON-
COMPLIANCE
COPAY LEVEL HOSPITALIZATION
PATH D 
(TOTAL EFFECT)
PATH C 
(DIRECT EFFECT)
PATH BPATH A 
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An alternative approach to testing mediation is to use the Sobel test, which tests the 
null hypothesis that the indirect effect (mediation effect) of copayment on hospitalization is 
zero.  Mathematically, the indirect effect is calculated by multiplying parameters A*B, which 
is theoretically equivalent to subtracting the direct effect from the total effect (Eq. 3.12).  
Equation 3.12: 
AB = (D-C) 
 
The standard error of the indirect effect is calculated with the following formula (Sobel 1982) 
(Eq. 3.13). 
Equation 3.13: 
sab=√ [(B2 * sa2+A2* sb2+ sa2*sb2)] 
The Sobel tests the null hypothesis that AB = 0. The quotient AB / (sab) renders the critical 
value which is then compared to the normal distribution (Preacher and Hayes 2004).  
Rejecting the null hypothesis implies the presence of an indirect effect or that the intervening 
variable is a mediator. 
 
MEDIATION MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The regressions outlined below were conducted for each medication class cohort, for 
three different health outcomes: a) total hospitalizations; b) cardiovascular; and c) heart 
failure hospitalizations.  The direct effect (γ2 ) (Path C) and total effect (δ1 ) (Path D) of 
copayment on the probability of hospitalizations were estimated using Equation C and D, 
respectively, removing the potential mediator, non-compliance, in the latter model.  The 
effect of non-compliance on probability of hospitalization (γ1 ) (Path B) was estimated in 
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Equation C, while the effect of copayment on the probability of non-compliance (β1 ) (Path A) 
was estimated in Equation A. 
Equation A: 
Pr (MPR<0.8) = α0 + β1Copayment(i,t) + β2Demographics(i) + β3Health(i,t) + β4Utilization(i,t) 
+ β5Census(i) + β6Calendar_year(t) + β7Follow_up_time(i) + ε(i,t) 
 
Equation C (Direct Effect): 
Pr(hosp=1) = α0 + γ1(MPR<0.8)(i,t) + γ2Copayment(i,t) + γ3Demographics(i) + γ4Health(i,t) + γ5Utilization(i,t) + 
γ6Census(i) + γ7 Calendar_year(t) + γ7Follow_up_time(i) + ε(i,t) 
 
Equation D (Total Effect): 
Pr(hosp=1) = α0 + δ1Copayment(i,t) + δ2Demographics(i) + δ3Health(i,t) + δ4Utilization(i,t) + 
+ δ5Census(i) + δ6Calendar_year(t) + δ7Follow_up_time(i) + ε(i,t) 
 
 
In the equations illustrated above, the vector Copayment includes dummy variables 
for the seven different average annual copayment level categories, using $0 as the reference 
category: $1 to $5, $6 to $10, $11 to $15, $16 to $20, $21 to $25, $26 to $30, and $31 and 
above.  Given the low frequency of more expensive beta blockers and diuretics that resulted 
in small sample sizes and unstable estimates, upper copayment observations were collapsed.  
For example, the beta blocker analysis collapsed the upper two levels to create a copayment 
category of $26 and above, and the diuretic analysis collapsed the upper five levels to create 
a copayment category of $11 and above. 
The vector Demographics contain age, gender, health plan at baseline.  The vector 
Health includes the Charlson comorbidity score and total all-cause hospitalization count 
during the baseline year, the latter serving as a proxy for heart failure severity.  The vector 
Utilization contains binary indicators for annual utilization of non-index chronic heart failure 
drugs, annual average monthly counts of unique non-index drugs, and annual average 
monthly out-of-pocket copayments for non-index drugs measured at the person-year level.  
The vector Census represents the dummy variables indicating Northeast/Atlantic, South, 
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Midwest, West, and National.  A vector of calendar year fixed effects was included in all 
analyses, as well as a variable indicating the total number of follow-up days. 
SUMMARY 
 
This retrospective cohort study used refill level and person-year level ordinary least 
squares (OLS), individual level fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models to 
measure the associations between copayment levels and medication compliance.  The 
specification tests comparing OLS, FE, and RE estimators found that the individual level 
fixed effects were the most appropriate models, suggesting the presence of unobserved 
individual level heterogeneity which would otherwise contribute to biased estimates in 
standard OLS models. 
Person-year level logistic regressions were conducted to measure the probability of 
total, cardiovascular-specific and heart failure specific hospitalizations conditional upon 
annual average copayment levels.  These models, technically measuring the direct effects of 
copayments on hospitalizations, were used in conjunction with models measuring the total 
effects in order to explore the role of non-compliance as a mediator.  Sobel tests were used to 
test whether indirect effects were statistically significant, which would suggest medication 
non-adherence as a mediator.
 CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
OVERVIEW 
 
The chapter begins by reviewing descriptive statistics for ACE inhibitors, beta 
blocker, and diuretic refills, providing an overview of average copayment levels and 
distributions of brand versus generic products.  Baseline descriptive statistics are presented 
for individuals within each of the drug cohorts, followed by results of the multivariate linear 
models measuring the associations between a) refill copayments and medication compliance; 
b) annual average copayment levels and annual average medication compliance; c) annual 
average copayment levels and annual hospitalizations.  The chapter ends by reviewing results 
of the mediation models. 
REFILL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The average MPR for all ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, or diuretic refills during 
follow-up was 0.98, 0.99, and 1.07, respectively, indicating an average 2% undersupply, 1% 
undersupply, and 7% oversupply of these medications during any one particular refill 
interval.  After standardizing all ACE copayment levels to 30-day supply amounts, 
approximately 7%, 21%, 28%, and 16% fell into copayment categories $0, $1 to $5, $6 to 
$10, and $11 to $15, respectively (Table 4.1) (Figure 4.1), equivalent to an overall 
copayment median of $11.53 across all ACE inhibitor products.  Compared to ACE 
inhibitors, beta blockers had a higher frequency of refills in the lower copayment category 
resulting in an overall copayment median of $7.42 across all products.  For 
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example, approximately 19%, 37%, 15%, and 14% fell into copayment categories $0, $1 to 
$5, $6 to $10, and $11 to $15, respectively (Table 4.1) (Figure 4.2).  Of the three drug classes 
examined, diuretics were the least expensive.  Having an overall copayment median of $2.56 
across all products, the distribution was heavily skewed to the lowest payment category with 
46%, 42%, 9%, and 4% of the refills falling into the copayment categories $0, $1 to $5, $6 to 
$10, and $11 plus, respectively (Table 4.1) (Figure 4.3). The differences in average 
copayment levels across the drug classes parallel the differences in the proportion of brand to 
generics.  For example, compared to ACE inhibitors having 63% brand name refills, beta 
blockers and diuretics had 48% and 8% brand name refill prescriptions (Table 4.1). 
In addition to differences in brand versus generic, drug classes differed in the number 
of available products.  For example, beta blocker refills were distributed approximately 
equally between four products, ranging between 23% and 28% for each (Figure 4.5).  In 
contrast, diuretics were heavily distributed toward one generic product that dominated over 
80% of the refills (Figure 4.6).  Compared to beta blockers, ACE inhibitors have more 
product variety, although one brand still dominated almost one third of the refills (Figure 
4.4). 
REFILL COPAYMENT LEVELS AND MEDICATION COMPLIANCE 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS), individual level fixed effects (FE), and individual level 
random effects (RE) models were used to measure associations between refill copayment 
levels and refill compliance.  Models right censored refill observations having a Medication 
Possession Ratio (MPR) exceeding 3 standard deviations above the mean MPR of all index 
prescription refills.  Of the original 34,921, 77,571, and 96,588 refills 
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Table 4.1: ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic prescription refill characteristics 
  ACE Inhibitors Beta Blockers Diuretics 
  (N=34,765) (N=77,185) (N=95,691) 
    
Refill MPR 0.98 (sd=0.31) 0.99 (sd=0.39) 1.07 (sd=0.71) 
30-day median copayment ($) 11.53 (sd=9.21) 7.42 (sd=8.11) 2.56 (sd=4.45) 
30-day refill copayment level    
 $0  7.0% 19.3% 45.8% 
 $1 to $5 21.4% 36.8% 41.5% 
 $6 to $10 28.3% 14.8% 8.7% 
 $11 to $151 16.1% 13.7% 4% 
 $16 to $20 9.9% 8.1%  
 $21 to $25 8.5% 5.0%  
 $26 to $302 3.8% 2.3%  
 $30 and above 5.1%   
Brand Name 63.3% 47.5% 7.9% 
1: $11 plus for diuretics 
2: $26 plus for beta blockers 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution of 30-day supply copayment levels of ACE inhibitor 
prescription refills during follow-up period (N=34,765)
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Figure 4.2: Frequency distribution of 30-day supply copayment levels of beta blocker 
prescription refills during follow-up period (N=77,185) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution of 30-day supply copayment levels of diuretic prescription 
refills during follow-up period (N=95,691) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
$0
 
$1
 to
 $5
$6
 to
 $1
0
$1
1 t
o $
15
$1
6 t
o $
20
$2
1 t
o $
25
$2
6 p
lus
Refill Copayment Level
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 R
ef
ill
s 
(%
)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
$0
 
$1
 to
 $5
$6
 to
 $1
0
$1
1 p
lus
Refill Copayment Level
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 R
ef
ill
s 
(%
)
 108
Figure 4.4: Frequency distribution of pharmaceutical products comprising ACE inhibitor 
refills during follow-up period (N=34,765) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Frequency distribution of pharmaceutical products comprising beta blocker refills 
during follow-up period (N=77,185)
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Figure 4.6: Frequency distribution of pharmaceutical products comprising diuretic refills 
during follow-up period (N=95,691) 
 
 
 
 
contained within the ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic cohort, respectively, 0.45%, 
0.5% and 0.9% of the ACE, beta blocker, and diuretic refills were considered outliers, 
resulting in final samples of 34,765, 77,185, and 95,691 refills for ACE inhibitor, beta 
blocker, and diuretic refill cohorts respectively.  The mean MPR of the outlier observations 
were 16.8, 16.8, and 22.8 for ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, and diuretics, respectively, the 
minimum values being 5.6, 6.2 and 10, and the maximum being 90 for all three drug classes.  
Since extreme MPR values probably reflect switching as opposed to medication over-
compliance, these were removed from the analysis, resulting in normally distributed MPR 
values for all three cohorts.  Since analytic models used the first year of observations as 
baseline control variables, the analytic datasets contained 24,877, 56,109, and 70,299 refill 
observations for the ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic models, respectively. 
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After performing specification tests to investigate whether OLS, FE, or RE models 
were favored in the refill level analyses, the collective results of the Bruesch-Pagan test, the 
Hausman test, and the F-test motivated the use of the individual fixed effects model (Table 
3.8).  As such, fixed effects parameter estimates were reported as the main results, yet all 
three parameter estimate types are presented in the result tables.  Compared to ACE inhibitor 
refills with copayment levels of $0, ACE inhibitor refills having copayments between $26 
and $30 were associated with an average 0.042 unit increase in the MPR during any 
particular refill interval (Table 4.2) (Figure 4.7). 
In contrast to the ACE inhibitor analyses, beta blocker analyses produced results 
more consistent with the study hypotheses.  Compared to beta blocker refills with copayment 
levels of $0, those refills with copayment levels between $1 and $5, $6 and $10, $11 to $15, 
$16 and $20, $21 and $26, and $26 and up were significantly associated with an average 
0.02, 0.04, 0.03, 0.06, 0.04, and 0.09 unit decrease in MPR, respectively, in medication 
supply during any particular refill interval (Table 4.3) (Figure 4.8).  Given that 0.5 MPR 
units reflect a 50% medication supply levels, these results correspond to a 2%, 4%, 3%, 6%, 
4%, and 9% decrease in medication supply levels during any one refill interval. 
Similar to beta blockers, diuretics had significant associations between copayment 
levels and medication supply levels.  Compared to diuretic refills with copayments levels of 
$0, diuretics with copayment levels between $1 and $5, $6 and $10, and $11 plus were 
associated with a 9%, 21%, and 21% decrease respectively in medication supply levels 
(Table 4.4) (Figure 4.9). 
In summary, beta blocker and diuretic refills with higher copayment levels were 
associated with decreased medication supply levels for the subsequent refill interval.  In 
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contrast, ACE inhibitor refills with copayment levels between $26 and $30 were associated 
with increased medication supply levels.  Because of the possible non-linear relationship 
between MPR and copayment levels, sensitivity analyses were conducted measuring the 
probability of non-compliance (MPR<0.8) as a function of copayment level.  Results were 
consistent with FE estimates for beta blocker and diuretic refills, showing higher 
probabilities of non-compliance associated with higher levels of copayment levels (Table 
4.5).  Null associations found in the FE ACE inhibitor models were significant in the logistic 
models.  Compared to ACE inhibitor refills costing $0, those refills costing $31 and over had 
a 55% increase in the probability of non-compliance (Table 4.5). 
BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS OF HEART FAILURE PATIENTS 
 
Average annual MPR values during baseline were 0.99, 0.98, and 1.03 for ACE 
inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic utilizers, reflecting an average undersupply of 1% and 
2% for ACE inhibitors and beta blockers, and a 3% oversupply for diuretics (Table 4.6).  
Individuals had average annual copayments of $10, $6, and $2 for ACE inhibitors, beta 
blockers, and diuretics, respectively.  Approximately 40% of each of the three drug cohorts 
was female, while average age at baseline was 67 years.  Most individuals resided in the 
Northeastern or Mid-Atlantic regions of the United States.  Between 21% and 27% of the 
individuals classified as ‘National’ had missing census region information due to procedures 
taken by the data vendor to protect patient confidentiality.  In terms of government versus 
commercially sponsored managed care plans, between 62% and 70% were enrolled in 
commercial plans, the lowest percentage (62%) and highest percentage (70%) being in 
diuretic and beta blocker users, respectively (Table 4.6).  In contrast, a greater percentage of 
diuretic users were enrolled in managed Medicare (37%) compared to beta blocker users 
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(30%).  Enrollment in managed Medicaid ranged between 0.6% and 1.3% (Table 4.6).  
Compared to POS, PPO, independent and other unclassified plans, between 47% and 51% of 
ACE users, beta blocker users and diuretic users were enrolled in HMO plans.  A majority of 
the remaining half of each sample were enrolled in either PPO or independent plans, while 
between 2% and 5% were enrolled in either POS or unclassified plans (Table 4.6). 
Approximately 44%, 41% and 33% of ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic 
cohorts, respectively, had a Charlson comorbidity index score ranging from 0 to 1.  The 
proportion of individuals experiencing any hospitalization during the baseline was 25%, 
31%, and 34% for ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic utilizers, respectively.  
Proportions of those experiencing any cardiovascular disease hospitalizations during baseline 
was 8%, 12%, and 13%, and experiencing any heart failure hospitalizations was 5%, 7%, and 
8%, for ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic utilizers, respectively (Table 4.6).  The 
average prescription out-of-pocket costs for non-index drugs was $43, $46, and $50 per 
month for ACE, beta blocker, and diuretic utilizers respectively, corresponding to an average 
of five unique monthly medications in addition to the index drug (Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.2: Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
measuring associations between ACE inhibitor refill copayment levels and refill compliance 
in heart failure patients (N=24,877) 
  OLS RE FE 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Refill Copayment Level1       
 $1 to $5 0.008 (0.02) 0.006 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) 
 $6 to $10 -0.019 (0.02) -0.017 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
 $11 to $15 -0.028  (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
 $16 to $20 -0.038** (0.02) -0.019 (0.01) -0.003 (0.02) 
 $21 to $25 -0.040** (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.009 (0.02) 
 $26 to $30 -0.006 (0.02) 0.022 (0.02) 0.042** (0.02) 
 $31 and up -0.069* (0.02) -0.042* (0.02) -0.023 (0.02) 
Age 0.001** (0.0005)  0.001 (0.0003) -0.002 (0.003) 
Female 0.005 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) . . 
Health Plan Level 12       
 Medicaid -0.008 (0.04) 0.045 (0.07) . . 
 Medicare -0.050* (0.01) -0.057* (0.02) . . 
Health Plan Level 23       
 Independent -0.007 (0.01) 0.002 (0.02) . . 
 PPO -0.018 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01) . . 
 POS or Other 0.002 (0.02) 0.003 (0.03) . . 
Charlson Index4       
 1 -0.009 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) . . 
 2 -0.006 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) . . 
 3 -0.02 (0.01) -0.014 (0.02) . . 
 4 and over -0.024  (0.01) -0.019 (0.02) . . 
Number of hospitalizations in previous 
year 
0.002 (0.003) 0.004 (0.001) 0.005  (0.003) 
Average ACE inhibitor MPR in previous 
year 
0.028* (0.01) 0.009* (0.0001) -0.002 (0.004) 
Concomitant Monthly Drug Utilization       
 Beta blockers 0.008 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) . . 
 Diuretics -0.002 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) . . 
 Aldosterone Antagonists -0.018 (0.01) -0.011 (0.01) . . 
Monthly drug count -0.001 (0.002) -0.037 (0.04) -0.004** (0.002) 
Monthly total OOP Rx ($) 0.0003* (0.0001)  -0.013 (0.02) 0.0003* (0.0001) 
Number of follow-up days -0.00001 (0.00001) -0.009 (0.02) . . 
Drug Product5       
 Aceon 0.112 (0.08) 0.001 (0.07) -0.244** (0.11) 
 Altace 0.017 (0.01) 0.024  (0.01) 0.070** (0.03) 
 Capoten -0.017 (0.06) -0.065 (0.10) -0.149 (0.17) 
 Captopril -0.062* (0.02) -0.033** (0.02) 0.048 (0.04) 
 Enalapril -0.019 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) 0.058** (0.03) 
 Lisinopril -0.038* (0.01) -0.009 (0.01) 0.108* (0.03) 
 Lotensin -0.027 (0.03) -0.086* (0.03) -0.186* (0.07) 
 Lotrel -0.017 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.070  (0.04) 
 Mavik 0.008 (0.02) 0.028 (0.03) 0.114** (0.05) 
 Monopril -0.011 (0.02) 0.003 (0.02) 0.116* (0.04) 
 Prinivil -0.024 (0.02) 0.001 (0.02) 0.115* (0.04) 
 Univasc -0.043 (0.03) 0.001 (0.07) 0.035 (0.10) 
 Vasotec -0.006 (0.02) 0.024  (0.01) 0.026 (0.03) 
 Zestril -0.009 (0.02) -0.065 (0.10) 0.083* (0.03) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Reference groups: 1: $0; 2: commercial; 3: HMO; 4: 0; 5: Accupril 
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Table 4.3: Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
measuring associations between beta blocker refill copayment levels on refill compliance in 
heart failure patients (N=56,109) 
  OLS RE FE 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Refill Copayment Level1       
 $1 to $5 0.009 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) -0.023* (0.01) 
 $6 to $10 -0.001 (0.01) -0.028* (0.01) -0.043* (0.01) 
 $11 to $15 -0.014 (0.01) -0.025* (0.01) -0.029* (0.01) 
 $16 to $20 -0.030** (0.01) -0.055* (0.01) -0.061* (0.01) 
 $21 to $25 -0.049* (0.02) -0.050* (0.01) -0.042* (0.01) 
 $26 to $30 -0.072* (0.02) -0.088* (0.02) -0.089* (0.02) 
Age 0.0001 (0.0005) 10x10e-6 (0.0005)  0.008 (0.04) 
Female -0.001 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) . . 
Health Plan Level 12       
 Medicaid -0.046 (0.05) -0.074 (0.06) . . 
 Medicare -0.030* (0.01) -0.034* (0.01) . . 
Health Plan Level 23       
 Independent 0.002 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) . . 
 PPO -0.015 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) . . 
 POS or Other -0.030  (0.02) -0.023 (0.02) . . 
Charlson Index4       
 1 0.005 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) . . 
 2 0.009 (0.01) 0.017 (0.01) . . 
 3 -0.002 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) . . 
 4 and over -0.01 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) . . 
Number of hospitalizations in previous 
year 
-0.002 (0.00) 0.00005 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
Average beta blocker MPR in previous 
year 
0.087* (0.02) 0.027* (0.003) -0.002 (0.004) 
Concomitant Monthly Drug Utilization       
 ACE inhibitors 0.007 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 
 Diuretics 0.007 (0.01) 0.007  (0.004) 0.005 (0.01) 
 Aldosterone Antagonists 0.001 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Monthly drug count 0.003  (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Monthly total OOP Rx ($) 0.0003* (0.0001) 0.0003* (0.0001) 0.0003* (0.0001) 
Number of follow-up days -0.00002 9x10e-6 0.00002 (0.00001) . . 
Drug Product5       
 Bisoprolol -0.023 (0.04) -0.02 (0.05) 0.018 (0.08) 
 Coreg 0.032* (0.01) 0.027* (0.01) 0.038** (0.02) 
 Lopressor -0.014 (0.03) -0.001 (0.03) 0.071  (0.04) 
 Metoprolol -0.014** (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) 0.065* (0.02) 
 Tenormin 0.041 (0.10) 0.126 (0.14) 0.503** (0.24) 
 Toprol 0.032* (0.01) 0.040* (0.01) 0.099* (0.02) 
 Zebeta -0.190  (0.10) -0.107 (0.09) 0.025 (0.12) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Reference groups: 1: $0; 2: commercial; 3: HMO; 4: 0; 5; Atenolol 
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Table 4.4: Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
measuring associations between diuretic refill copayment levels on refill compliance in heart 
failure patients (N=70,299) 
  OLS RE FE 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Refill Copayment Level1       
 $1 to $5 -0.002 (0.01) -0.035* (0.01) -0.093* (0.01) 
 $6 to $10 -0.066* (0.02) -0.129* (0.01) -0.211* (0.02) 
 $11 and up -0.036 (0.05) -0.124* (0.02) -0.206* (0.02) 
Age -0.001 (0.001) -0.002** (0.00) 0.007 (0.06) 
Female -0.004 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) . . 
Health Plan Level 12       
 Medicaid -0.104 (0.06) -0.103 (0.07) . . 
 Medicare -0.028 (0.02) -0.038** (0.02) . . 
Health Plan Level 23       
 Independent 0.036 (0.02) 0.023 (0.02) . . 
 PPO 0.014 (0.02) 0.015 (0.02) . . 
 POS or Other 0.008 (0.03) 0.025 (0.03) . . 
Charlson Index4       
 1 -0.037 (0.02) -0.025 (0.02) . . 
 2 -0.005 (0.02) 0.004 (0.02) . . 
 3 -0.028 (0.03) -0.011 (0.02) . . 
 4 and over 0.024 (0.03) 0.049** (0.02) . . 
Number of hospitalizations in previous 
year 0.013* (0.004) 0.008* (0.003) 
0.001 (0.003) 
Average diuretics MPR in previous year 0.091* (0.01) 0.034* (0.003) -0.008** (0.004) 
Concomitant Monthly Drug Utilization       
 ACE inhibitors -0.023** (0.01) -0.027* (0.01) -0.022** (0.01) 
 Beta blockers -0.033* (0.01) -0.027* (0.01) -0.011 (0.01) 
 Aldosterone Antagonists -0.024 (0.02) -0.020 (0.01) -0.025 (0.01) 
Monthly drug count 0.011* (0.002) 0.007* (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 
Monthly total OOP Rx ($) 0.002 (0.0001) 0.0004* (0.0001) 0.000* (0.0001) 
Number of follow-up days -0.00002 (0.00001) 1x10e-6 (0.00001) . . 
Drug Product5       
 Aldactone 0.388 (0.35) 0.405** (0.17) 0.651* (0.24) 
 Bumetanide -0.083 (0.25) -0.054 (0.16) 0.177 (0.24) 
 Bumex -0.158 (0.27) -0.047 (0.17) 0.276 (0.25) 
 Demadex -0.156 (0.25) -0.089 (0.16) 0.168 (0.24) 
 Furosemide -0.164 (0.25) -0.128 (0.16) 0.14 (0.24) 
 Hydrochlorothiazide -0.057 (0.25) -0.032 (0.16) 0.248 (0.24) 
 Lasix -0.069 (0.25) -0.037 (0.16) 0.226 (0.24) 
 Microzide . .   . . 
 Torsemide -0.133 (0.25) -0.06 (0.16) 0.211 (0.24) 
 Zaroxolyn 0.409 (0.25) 0.352** (0.16) 0.542** (0.23) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Ref groups: 1: $0; 2: commercial; 3: HMO; 4: 0; 5: Aldactazide 
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Figure 4.7: Fixed effects (FE) parameter estimates measuring associations between ACE 
inhibitor refill copayment levels and refill compliance. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Fixed effects (FE) parameter estimates measuring associations between beta 
blocker refill copayment levels and refill compliance
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Figure 4.9: Fixed effects (FE) parameter estimates measuring associations between diuretic 
inhibitor copayment levels and refill compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Probability of refill non-compliance conditional upon ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, 
or diuretic refill copayment levels 
  ACE Beta Blockers Diuretics 
 Parameter 
(β) 
SE Parameter 
(β) 
SE Parameter 
(β) 
SE 
Refill Copayment Level1       
 $1 to $5 0.149 (0.17) 0.200* (0.06) 0.299* (0.06) 
 $6 to $10 0.322** (0.16) 0.282* (0.08) 0.685* (0.08) 
 $11 to $152 0.304 (0.18) 0.199** (0.10) 0.714* (0.10) 
 $16 to $20 0.219 (0.20) 0.299* (0.11)   
 $21 to $25 0.171 (0.22) 0.451* (0.14)   
 $26 to $303 -0.017 (0.27) 0.922* (0.16)   
 $31 plus 0.548** (0.23)     
1: $0 reference group 
2: $11 plus for diuretics 
3: $26 plus for beta blockers 
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Table 4.6: Baseline characteristics of commercially insured heart failure patients regularly 
using ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, or diuretics 
  ACE Users Beta Blockers Diuretics 
  (N=1,026) (N=2,345) (N=2,812) 
Annual MPR 0.99 (sd=0.18) 0.98 (sd=0.21) 1.03 (sd=0.34) 
Annual Refill Copayment Median    
 $0 3.1% 14.9% 44.2% 
 $1 to $5 29.9% 49.4% 48.3% 
 $6 to $10 28.1% 15.5% 5.3% 
 $11 to $151 17.2% 11.8% 2.2% 
 $16 to $20 9.3% 5.3%  
 $21 to $25 8.3% 2.1%  
 $26 to $302 2.4% 1.1%  
 $31 and up 1.8%   
Mean Annual Copayment ($) 10.4 (sd=7.7) 5.9 (sd=6.3) 2.1 (sd=3.2) 
Age 66.8 (sd=8.6) 67.0 (sd=8.5) 68.3 (sd=8.3) 
Gender    
 Male 59.8% 59.6% 52.8% 
 Female 40.2% 40.4% 47.2% 
Census    
 Northeast/Mid-Atlantic 70.6% 64.3% 65.9% 
 South 2.1% 2.5% 2.2% 
 Midwest 3.7% 2.9% 3.4% 
 Pacific/Mountain 2.9% 3.4% 3.6% 
 National3 20.8% 27.0% 24.9% 
Health Plan Level 1    
 Commercial 64.4% 69.9% 61.6% 
 Medicare 34.4% 29.5% 37.2% 
 Medicaid 1.3% 0.6% 1.3% 
Health Plan Level 2    
 HMO 48.8% 46.6% 51.5% 
 Independent 15.8% 21.7% 21.4% 
 PPO 30.3% 25.1% 20.7% 
 POS 2.9% 4.5% 3.9% 
 Other 2.1% 2.1% 2.5% 
Charlson Comorbidity Index    
 0 10.9% 10.4% 5.4% 
 1 33.2% 30.6% 28.0% 
 2 27.6% 24.9% 27.7% 
 3 13.3% 13.8% 16.3% 
 Over 3 15% 20.3% 22.7% 
Any hospitalizations    
 All-type 25.2% 31.3% 33.7% 
 CAD-specific 8.4% 12.3% 12.9% 
 CHF-specific 4.7% 6.6% 8.4% 
Any concomitant drug utilization    
 ACE inhibitors  43.8% 44.3% 
 Beta blockers 55.5%  55.9% 
 Diuretics 72.9% 72.8% . 
 Aldosterone antagonists 11.1% 13.1% 14.8% 
Number of monthly non-index prescriptions 4.7 (sd=2.4) 4.9 (sd=2.2) 5.1 (sd=2.3) 
Monthly out-of-pocket non-index drug 
expenses ($) 
42.5 (sd=33.2) 46.4 (sd=33.4) 50.2 (sd=37.58) 
Total number of days during follow-up 1455 (sd=305) 1524 (sd=329) 1550 (sd=351) 
Censored at medication discontinuation4 9.0% 7.2% 8.2% 
1:$11 plus for diuretics 
2:$26 plus for beta blockers 
3:Missing census region information to preserve patient confidentiality 
4:After a minimum of 3 years follow-up 
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Average total follow-up times including baseline year were similar across drug 
cohorts, averaging 1455 days (3.9 years), 1524 days (4.1 years), and 1550 days (4.2  
years) for ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic cohorts respectively.  Approximately 9%, 
7% and 8% of the ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic cohort were right censored due to 
a significant gap of therapy at least three years after the beginning of follow-up, implying 
that over 90% of the final cohorts were followed until the last prescription claim record. 
PATIENT COPAYMENT LEVELS AND MEDICATION COMPLIANCE 
 
Individual fixed effects models were favored over the OLS and RE in the person-year 
level analyses measuring associations between average annual copayment levels and average 
medication supply levels (Table 3.8).  Average annual copayment levels for ACE inhibitors 
were not significantly associated with annual average medication supply levels (Table 4.7).  
In contrast, significant associations were found in beta blocker and diuretic cohorts.  
Compared to individuals filling prescriptions for beta blockers having annual average annual 
copayments under $1, those with annual copayments $26 and above had an average 0.098 
unit decrease in MPR, reflecting an average 9.8% decrease in annual beta blocker medication 
supply levels for beta blockers (Table 4.8), similar to the 8.9% decrease in the refill level 
analysis (Table 4.3).  While annual compliance and annual copayments were negatively 
associated in beta blockers, they were positively associated in the diuretic users.  Compared 
to individuals with annual diuretic copayments under $1, those with copayments $11 and up 
had a 0.10 unit increase in annual average MPR, reflecting an average 10% increase in 
medication supply level (Table 4.9).  Person-year logistic models estimating the probability 
of annual non-compliance (annual average 
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Table 4.7: Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
measuring associations between annual average ACE inhibitor copayment levels on annual 
average compliance in heart failure patients (N=3,259 person-years) 
  OLS RE FE 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Annual Refill Copayment Median1       
 $1 to $5 0.046** (0.02) 0.042  (0.02) 0.041 (0.03) 
 $6 to $10 0.026 (0.02) 0.027 (0.03) 0.037 (0.03) 
 $11 to $15 0.03 (0.03) 0.031 (0.03) 0.041 (0.04) 
 $16 to $20 0.031 (0.03) 0.032 (0.03) 0.045 (0.04) 
 $21 to $25 0.024 (0.03) 0.033 (0.03) 0.065  (0.04) 
 $26 to $30 0.034 (0.03) 0.036 (0.03) 0.057 (0.04) 
 $31 plus -0.017 (0.03) -0.012 (0.03) 0.017 (0.04) 
Age 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.004) 
Female -0.005 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) . . 
Census2       
 South 0.052** (0.03) 0.059** (0.03) . . 
 Midwest -0.038  (0.02) -0.039  (0.02) . . 
 West 0.014 (0.02) 0.015 (0.03) . . 
 National Mix 0.003 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) . . 
Health Plan Level 13       
 Medicaid 0.06 (0.04) 0.061 (0.05) . . 
 Medicare -0.043* (0.01) -0.047* (0.01) . . 
Health Plan Level 24       
 Independent 0.01 (0.02) 0.011 (0.02) . . 
 PPO 0.003 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) . . 
 POS and other -0.011 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) . . 
Charlson Comorbidity Index5       
 1 -0.001 (0.01) 0 (0.01) . . 
 2 0.01 (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) . . 
 3 -0.007 (0.02) -0.007 (0.02) . . 
 4 plus -0.011 (0.02) -0.012 (0.02) . . 
Number of hospitalizations in previous 
year 0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 
Average ACE inhibitor MPR in previous 
year 0.033* (0.01) 0.020* (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 
Any concomitant drug utilization       
 Beta blockers 0.00003 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) 
 Diuretics -0.006 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) -0.013 (0.02) 
 Aldosterone antagonists -0.011 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 
Average monthly unique drug utilization 0.0003 (0.002) -0.0001 (0.002) -0.006 (0.004) 
Average monthly OOP Rx ($) 0.0003* (0.0001) 0.0003** (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0002)  
Number of follow-up days -0.00001 (0.00001) -0.00002 (0.00001) . . 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Ref groups: 1: $0 - $1; 2: Northeast/Atlantic; 3: commercial; 4: HMO; 5: 0 
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Table 4.8: Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
measuring associations between annual average beta blocker copayment levels on annual 
average compliance in heart failure patients (N=7,686 person-years) 
  OLS RE FE 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Annual Refill Copayment Median1       
 $1 to $5 0.019** (0.01) 0.013 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) 
 $6 to $10 0.035* (0.01) 0.030** (0.01) 0.019 (0.02) 
 $11 to $15 0.01 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 0.019 (0.02) 
 $16 to $20 0.015 (0.02) 0.008 (0.02) 0.006 (0.02) 
 $21 to $25 -0.029 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.018 (0.03) 
 $26 plus -0.067* (0.02) -0.078* (0.02) -0.094** (0.04) 
Age -0.0001 (0.0005) -0.0001 (0.0005) 0.063 (0.04) 
Female 0.008 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01) . . 
Census2       
 South 0.026 (0.03) 0.032 (0.02) . . 
 Midwest -0.029 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) . . 
 West -0.024 (0.02) -0.025 (0.02) . . 
 National Mix -0.011 (0.01) -0.011 (0.01) . . 
Health Plan Level 13       
 Medicaid 0.003 (0.04) -0.006 (0.05) . . 
 Medicare -0.037* (0.01) -0.039* (0.01) . . 
Health Plan Level 24       
 Independent 0.017 (0.01) 0.019 (0.01) . . 
 PPO -0.007 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01) . . 
 POS and other -0.035  (0.02) -0.032  (0.02) . . 
Charlson Comorbidity Index5       
 1 0.005 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) . . 
 2 0.001 (0.01) 0 (0.01) . . 
 3 -0.002 (0.02) -0.004 (0.02) . . 
 4 plus -0.016 (0.02) -0.018 (0.01) . . 
Number of hospitalizations in previous 
year -0.004 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 
Average beta blocker MPR in previous 
year 0.048** (0.02) 0.023* (0.004) -0.011* (0.004) 
Any concomitant drug utilization       
 ACE Inhibitors 0.011 (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 
 Diuretics 0.008 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) 
 Aldosterone antagonists 0.006 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 0.033** (0.02) 
Average monthly unique drug utilization 0.004** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 0.006  (0.003) 
Average monthly OOP Rx ($) 0.0004* (0.0001)  0.0004* (0.0001)  0.0004** (0.0002)  
Number of follow-up days 0.00001 (0.00001) 0.00001 (0.00001)  . . 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Ref groups: 1: $0 - $1; 2: Northeast/Atlantic; 3: commercial; 4: HMO; 5: 0 
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Table 4.9: Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
measuring associations between annual average diuretic copayment levels on annual average 
compliance in heart failure patients (N=9,301 person-years) 
  OLS RE FE 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Annual Refill Copayment Median1       
 $1 to $5 0.047* (0.01) 0.033* (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
 $6 to $10 0.060* (0.02) 0.049* (0.02) -0.023 (0.02) 
 $11 plus 0.182* (0.05) 0.173* (0.03) 0.099* (0.04) 
Age 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) -0.018 (0.06) 
Female -0.006 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) 0 0.00  
Census2       
 South 0.015 (0.04) 0.019 (0.04) 0 0.00  
 Midwest -0.009 (0.03) -0.014 (0.03) 0 0.00  
 West 0.002 (0.04) 0.009 (0.03) 0 0.00  
 National Mix 0.023  (0.01) 0.029** (0.01) 0 0.00  
Health Insurance Type3       
 Medicaid 0.023 (0.06) 0.017 (0.06) 0 0.00  
 Medicare -0.027  (0.02) -0.032  (0.02) 0 0.00  
Plan type4       
 Independent 0.022 (0.02) 0.021 (0.02) 0 0.00  
 PPO 0.004 (0.02) 0.004 (0.02) 0 0.00  
 POS and other -0.004 (0.02) -0.001 (0.03) 0 0.00  
Charlson Comorbidity index5       
 1 -0.063* (0.02) -0.062* (0.02) 0 0.00  
 2 -0.032 (0.02) -0.029 (0.02) 0 0.00  
 3 -0.066* (0.02) -0.064** (0.03) 0 0.00  
 4 plus -0.015 (0.03) -0.009 (0.03) 0 0.00  
Number of hospitalizations in previous year 0.005 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) 
Average diuretics MPR in previous year 0.060* (0.01) 0.029* (0.00) -0.013* (0.00) 
Any concomitant drug utilization       
 ACE Inhibitors -0.006 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 
 Beta Blockers -0.014 (0.01) -0.015 (0.01) -0.011 (0.02) 
 Aldosterone antagonists 0.01 (0.02) 0.009 (0.01) -0.002 (0.02) 
Average monthly unique drug utilization 0.015* (0.00) 0.014* (0.00) 0.010** (0.00) 
Average monthly OOP Rx ($) 0 0.00  0 0.00  0 0.00  
Number of follow-up months 0 0.00  0 0.00  0 0.00  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Ref groups: 1: $0 - $1; 2: Northeast/Atlantic; 3: commercial; 4: HMO; 5: 0 
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Figure 4.10: Fixed effects (FE) parameter estimates measuring associations between annual 
average beta blocker copayment levels and annual average compliance. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Fixed effects (FE) parameter estimates measuring associations between annual 
average diuretic copayment levels and annual average compliance
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 Table 4.10: Probability of non-compliance (MPR<0.8) conditional upon annual average copayment levels in ACE inhibitor, beta 
blocker, and diuretic utilizers with heart failure. 
  ACE Inhibitors (N=3,256) Beta Blockers (N=7,690) Diuretics (N=9,305) 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Annual Refill Copayment Median1       
 $1 to $5 0.972 (0.316 - 2.984) 1.01 (0.792 - 1.288) 1.251* (1.070 - 1.463) 
 $6 to $10 0.921 (0.293 - 2.891) 0.999 (0.747 - 1.338) 2.098* (1.668 - 2.639) 
 $11 to $15 0.962 (0.299 - 3.089) 0.994 (0.722 - 1.368) 1.933* (1.297 - 2.881) 
 $16 to $20 0.773 (0.237 - 2.515) 1.055 (0.725 - 1.533)   
 $21 to $25 0.764 (0.226 - 2.590) 1.644** (1.117 - 2.420)   
 $26 to $30 0.745 (0.196 - 2.828) 2.539* (1.611 - 4.003)   
 $31 plus 1.909 (0.523 - 6.976)     
Age 0.987 (0.968 - 1.008) 0.999 (0.987 - 1.011) 0.996 (0.985 - 1.007) 
Female 1.082 (0.818 - 1.432) 0.956 (0.814 - 1.123) 0.967 (0.836 - 1.120) 
Census2       
 South 0.176+ (0.027 - 1.153) 1.13 (0.709 - 1.800) 1.022 (0.597 - 1.747) 
 Midwest 2.182** (1.151 - 4.137) 1.274 (0.811 - 1.999) 0.91 (0.595 - 1.391) 
 West 0.647 (0.266 - 1.577) 1.138 (0.745 - 1.738) 1.082 (0.678 - 1.729) 
 National Mix 1.036 (0.717 - 1.497) 1.094 (0.904 - 1.324) 0.929 (0.774 - 1.114) 
Health Plan Level3       
 Medicaid 1.378 (0.242 - 7.836) 0.532 (0.182 - 1.552) 0.907 (0.349 - 2.355) 
 Medicare 1.806** (1.056 - 3.086) 1.371** (1.051 - 1.787) 1.270+ (0.989 - 1.632) 
Health Plan Level4       
 Independent 1.148 (0.627 - 2.099) 1.049 (0.790 - 1.392) 1.063 (0.815 - 1.386) 
 PPO 1.436 (0.900 - 2.292) 1.173 (0.918 - 1.500) 1.173 (0.911 - 1.509) 
 POS and other 1.017 (0.461 - 2.246) 1.632* (1.156 - 2.304) 0.879 (0.589 - 1.312) 
Charlson Comorbidity index5       
 1 1.101 (0.668 - 1.812) 0.977 (0.737 - 1.295) 1.09 (0.765 - 1.553) 
 2 1.055 (0.634 - 1.757) 1.099 (0.819 - 1.475) 1.059 (0.741 - 1.514) 
 3 1.333 (0.743 - 2.389) 1.004 (0.729 - 1.381) 1.346 (0.921 - 1.966) 
 4 plus 1.487 (0.851 - 2.601) 1.311+ (0.960 - 1.791) 1.275 (0.884 - 1.838) 
Number of hospitalizations in previous year 1.06 (0.929 - 1.209) 1.103* (1.037 - 1.173) 1.068** (1.014 - 1.125) 
Average  index drug MPR in previous year  0.013* (0.001 - 0.129) 0.017* (0.006 - 0.046) 0.351* (0.182 - 0.678) 
(continued)
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 Table 4.10: Probability of non-compliance (MPR<0.8) conditional upon annual average copayment levels in ACE inhibitor, beta 
blocker, and diuretic utilizers with heart failure (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ACE Inhibitors (N=3,256) Beta Blockers (N=7,690) Diuretics (N=9,305) 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Annual Concomitant Drug Use (yes/no)       
 ACE inhibitors . . 0.940 (0.806 – 1.097) 1.028 (0.894 – 1.183) 
 Beta blockers 1.023 (0.781 - 1.338) . . 0.971 (0.843 - 1.120) 
 Diuretics 1.429** (1.054 - 1.936) 1.003 (0.848 - 1.185) . . 
 Aldosterone antagonists 0.88 (0.579 - 1.337) 0.988 (0.792 - 1.231) 1.066 (0.878 - 1.293) 
Average monthly unique drug utilization 0.94 (0.864 - 1.023) 0.950** (0.909 - 0.993) 0.920* (0.883 - 0.958) 
Average monthly OOP Rx ($) 0.999 (0.994 - 1.003) 0.997** (0.994 - 0.999) 0.998** (0.995 - 1.000) 
Number of follow-up months (ACE) 1 (1.000 - 1.000) . . . . 
Number of follow-up months (Beta blockers) . . 1 (1.000 - 1.000) . . 
Number of follow-up months (Diuretics) . . . . 1 (1.000 - 1.000) 
Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Ref groups: 1: $0 - $1; 2: Northeast/Atlantic; 3: commercial; 4: HMO; 5: 0 
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MPR<0.80) as a function of copayment level were conducted for mediation models, and 
found consistent results (Table 4.10). 
COPAYMENT LEVELS AND HOSPITALIZATIONS 
 
In ACE inhibitor users, annual average copayment levels were not associated with 
increased probability of total hospitalizations, cardiovascular hospitalizations, or heart failure 
hospitalizations (Table 4.11).  In beta blocker users, compared to those individuals with 
average annual copayments between $0 and $1, those averaging between $16 and $20 had a 
decreased probability of hospitalization, or a 30% decreased odds in having any 
hospitalization during the year (OR = 0.73, 95% CI 0.55 – 0.98) (Table 4.12). 
In contrast, higher copayments were associated with increased hospitalizations in 
diuretic users.  Compared to individuals with average annual diuretic copayments between $0 
and $1, those with average annual copayments between $1 and $5, $6 and $10, and $11 plus 
had 1.2, 1.4, and 1.4 times the risk of any hospitalization (OR=1.2, 95% CI 1.1 – 1.3; 
OR=1.4, 95% CI 1.1 – 1.6; OR=1.4, 95% CI 1.01- 1.8) (Table 4.13).  These associations 
were also present in cardiovascular and heart failure hospitalizations, but at higher 
magnitudes.  Those with average copayments between $1 and $5, $6 and $10, and $11 plus 
had 1.6, 2.4, and 2.4 times the risk of cardiovascular hospitalizations (OR=1.6, 95% CI 1.3-
1.9; OR=2.4, 95% CI 1.9 – 3.2; OR=2.4, 95% CI 1.6 – 3.6) (Table 4.13); and 1.9, 3.3, and 
3.5 times the risk of heart failure specific hospitalizations (OR=1.9, 95% CI 1.6 – 2.3; 
OR=3.3, 95% CI 2.5 – 4.4; OR=3.5, 95% CI 2.2 – 5.4) (Table 4.13). 
 
 Table 4.11: Logistic regression models measuring odds of total hospitalizations, cardiovascular disease-specific hospitalizations, and 
heart-failure specific hospitalizations across annual average ACE inhibitor copayment levels (N=3,256 person-years) 
  Any Hospitalization Cardiovascular hospitalizations Heart Failure Hospitalizations 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Annual Refill Copayment Median1       
 $1 to $5 1.245 (0.680 - 2.279) 1.345 (0.515 - 3.515) 2.539 (0.629 - 10.244) 
 $6 to $10 0.958 (0.513 - 1.791) 1.155 (0.428 - 3.114) 1.691 (0.404 - 7.067) 
 $11 to $15 1 (0.525 - 1.906) 1.243 (0.442 - 3.498) 2.231 (0.503 - 9.899) 
 $16 to $20 0.928 (0.476 - 1.807) 1.315 (0.450 - 3.839) 3.341 (0.751 - 14.859) 
 $21 to $25 0.86 (0.428 - 1.729) 1.089 (0.360 - 3.290) 1.979 (0.419 - 9.340) 
 $26 to $30 1.051 (0.494 - 2.239) 0.736 (0.205 - 2.638) 1.467 (0.268 - 8.016) 
 $31 plus 0.979 (0.460 - 2.085) 0.625 (0.183 - 2.137) 1.504 (0.279 - 8.103) 
Non-compliance (MPR<0.80) 1.784* (1.383 - 2.300) 1.495** (1.013 - 2.206) 1.107 (0.667 - 1.838) 
Age 1.034* (1.020 - 1.049) 1.008 (0.987 - 1.029) 1.026+ (0.999 - 1.054) 
Female 1 (0.832 - 1.201) 1.112 (0.830 - 1.489) 1.285 (0.894 - 1.847) 
Census2       
 South 1.376 (0.775 - 2.445) 0.638 (0.181 - 2.256) 0.865 (0.154 - 4.849) 
 Midwest 1.089 (0.699 - 1.698) 0.813 (0.363 - 1.819) 1.045 (0.391 - 2.795) 
 West 0.419** (0.203 - 0.864) 0.378+ (0.139 - 1.030) 0.664 (0.181 - 2.434) 
 National Mix 1.600* (1.262 - 2.028) 1.106 (0.759 - 1.613) 1.281 (0.799 - 2.054) 
Health Plan Level 13       
 Medicaid 0.994 (0.325 - 3.040) 0.943 (0.168 - 5.281) 1.241 (0.110 - 13.954) 
 Medicare 1.261 (0.915 - 1.738) 1.747** (1.006 - 3.033) 1.973+ (0.939 - 4.146) 
Health Plan Level 24       
 Independent 0.852 (0.609 - 1.192) 1.304 (0.739 - 2.301) 1.21 (0.579 - 2.528) 
 PPO 1.185 (0.896 - 1.567) 1.709** (1.056 - 2.765) 1.723+ (0.907 - 3.273) 
 POS and other 1.488 (0.900 - 2.459) 2.156+ (0.875 - 5.313) 1.879 (0.510 - 6.924) 
Charlson Comorbidity index5       
 1 1.601** (1.092 - 2.347) 1.343 (0.722 - 2.500) 1.95 (0.802 - 4.738) 
 2 1.616** (1.098 - 2.378) 1.585 (0.851 - 2.952) 1.805 (0.735 - 4.433) 
 3 1.847* (1.211 - 2.817) 1.902+ (0.985 - 3.673) 2.117 (0.817 - 5.482) 
 4 plus 1.898* (1.241 - 2.904) 1.759 (0.881 - 3.513) 2.647** (1.005 - 6.969) 
Number of hospitalizations in previous year 1.293* (1.163 - 1.437) 1.324* (1.159 - 1.514) 1.413* (1.249 - 1.599) 
(continued)
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 Table 4.11: Logistic regression models measuring odds of total hospitalizations, cardiovascular disease-specific hospitalizations, and 
heart-failure specific hospitalizations across annual average ACE inhibitor copayment levels (N=3,256 person-years) (continued) 
 
 Any Hospitalization Cardiovascular hospitalizations Heart Failure Hospitalizations 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Average ACE inhibitor MPR in  
previous year 
1.039 (0.941 - 1.147) 1.043 (0.921 - 1.180) 1.023 (0.855 - 1.223) 
Any concomitant drug utilization       
 Beta blockers 1.13 (0.942 - 1.356) 1.814* (1.318 - 2.498) 1.815* (1.198 - 2.752) 
 Diuretics 1.285** (1.028 - 1.607) 2.446* (1.541 - 3.884) 9.061* (2.447 - 33.548) 
 Aldosterone antagonists 1.373** (1.046 - 1.802) 1.777* (1.224 - 2.581) 2.154* (1.392 - 3.331) 
Average monthly unique drug utilization 1.131* (1.079 - 1.187) 1.106* (1.029 - 1.189) 1.116** (1.024 - 1.217) 
Average monthly OOP Rx ($) 1.001 (0.999 - 1.004) 1.001 (0.997 - 1.005) 1.001 (0.995 - 1.006) 
Number of follow-up months 1 (1.000 - 1.001) 1.000+ (1.000 - 1.001) 1.001** (1.000 - 1.001) 
Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Ref groups: 1: $0 - $1; 2: Northeast/Atlantic; 3: commercial; 4: HMO; 5: 0 
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 Table 4.12: Logistic regression models measuring probability of total hospitalizations, cardiovascular disease-specific hospitalizations, 
and heart-failure specific hospitalizations across annual average beta blocker copayment levels (N=7,690 person-years) 
  Any Hospitalization Cardiovascular hospitalizations Heart Failure Hospitalizations 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Annual Refill Copayment Median1       
 $1 to $5 0.851+ (0.707 - 1.025) 0.95 (0.704 - 1.283) 0.94 (0.646 - 1.367) 
 $6 to $10 0.941 (0.756 - 1.170) 1.14 (0.802 - 1.620) 1.267 (0.816 - 1.969) 
 $11 to $15 0.887 (0.698 - 1.128) 1.283 (0.876 - 1.879) 1.540+ (0.960 - 2.471) 
 $16 to $20 0.728** (0.543 - 0.975) 0.958 (0.605 - 1.517) 1.064 (0.602 - 1.880) 
 $21 to $25 0.747+ (0.533 - 1.048) 1.187 (0.733 - 1.923) 1.488 (0.824 - 2.688) 
 $26 plus 0.986 (0.664 - 1.465) 1.131 (0.639 - 2.001) 1.401 (0.663 - 2.958) 
Non-compliance (MPR<0.80) 1.402* (1.210 - 1.625) 1.315** (1.041 - 1.661) 1.152 (0.847 - 1.567) 
Age 1.025* (1.017 - 1.034) 1.011 (0.998 - 1.024) 1.023* (1.006 - 1.040) 
Female 0.896+ (0.794 - 1.012) 0.686* (0.558 - 0.842) 0.819 (0.638 - 1.049) 
Census2       
 South 1.094 (0.814 - 1.471) 1.231 (0.711 - 2.130) 1.178 (0.635 - 2.185) 
 Midwest 1.431+ (0.998 - 2.052) 1.680+ (0.983 - 2.870) 1.58 (0.816 - 3.057) 
 West 0.522* (0.338 - 0.805) 0.537 (0.246 - 1.172) 0.454 (0.175 - 1.180) 
 National Mix 1.680* (1.463 - 1.928) 1.623* (1.308 - 2.015) 1.758* (1.331 - 2.322) 
Health Plan Level 13       
 Medicaid 0.538+ (0.269 - 1.074) 0.688 (0.146 - 3.230) 0.791 (0.138 - 4.544) 
 Medicare 1.264** (1.030 - 1.551) 1.370+ (0.993 - 1.891) 1.184 (0.773 - 1.812) 
Health Plan Level 24       
 Independent 1.492* (1.215 - 1.834) 1.17 (0.845 - 1.620) 1.052 (0.705 - 1.568) 
 PPO 1.151 (0.953 - 1.390) 1.052 (0.792 - 1.396) 0.919 (0.633 - 1.332) 
 POS and other 1.345** (1.028 - 1.760) 1.431 (0.914 - 2.240) 1.278 (0.725 - 2.253) 
Charlson Comorbidity index5       
 1 1.019 (0.815 - 1.275) 1.119 (0.742 - 1.687) 1.379 (0.786 - 2.419) 
 2 1.122 (0.894 - 1.408) 1.582** (1.056 - 2.368) 1.799** (1.034 - 3.127) 
 3 1.21 (0.941 - 1.556) 1.747** (1.139 - 2.680) 1.757+ (0.962 - 3.209) 
 4 plus 1.301** (1.024 - 1.654) 1.833* (1.209 - 2.779) 2.332* (1.327 - 4.098) 
Number of hospitalizations in previous year 1.265* (1.189 - 1.345) 1.218* (1.139 - 1.301) 1.239* (1.141 - 1.346) 
(continued) 
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 Table 4.12: Logistic regression models measuring probability of total hospitalizations, cardiovascular disease-specific hospitalizations, 
and heart-failure specific hospitalizations across annual average beta blocker copayment levels (N=7,360 person-years) (continued) 
 
 Any Hospitalization Cardiovascular hospitalizations Heart Failure Hospitalizations 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Average beta blocker MPR in previous year 1.033 (0.974 - 1.095) 0.981 (0.865 - 1.113) 0.959 (0.788 - 1.167) 
Any concomitant drug utilization       
 ACE Inhibitors 1.109+ (0.988 - 1.245) 1.416* (1.189 - 1.686) 1.345* (1.081 - 1.673) 
 Diuretics 1.363* (1.191 - 1.560) 2.250* (1.757 - 2.882) 4.260* (2.828 - 6.419) 
 Aldosterone antagonists 1.209** (1.028 - 1.421) 1.476* (1.181 - 1.844) 1.778* (1.359 - 2.326) 
Average monthly unique drug utilization 1.156* (1.121 - 1.192) 1.108* (1.059 - 1.160) 1.107* (1.047 - 1.171) 
Average monthly OOP Rx ($) 1.002 (1.000 - 1.003) 1 (0.997 - 1.002) 0.998 (0.995 - 1.001) 
Number of follow-up months 1 (1.000 - 1.000) 1.000* (1.000 - 1.001) 1.000** (1.000 - 1.001) 
Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Ref groups: 1: $0 - $1; 2: Northeast/Atlantic; 3: commercial; 4: HMO; 5: 0 
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 Table 4.13: Logistic regression models measuring probability of total hospitalizations, cardiovascular disease-specific hospitalizations, 
and heart-failure specific hospitalizations across annual average diuretic copayment levels (N=9,305 person-years) 
  Any Hospitalization Cardiovascular hospitalizations Heart Failure Hospitalizations 
  OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Annual Refill Copayment Median1       
 $1 to $5 1.198* (1.069 - 1.343) 1.601* (1.344 - 1.908) 1.932* (1.573 - 2.373) 
 $6 to $10 1.346* (1.124 - 1.612) 2.416* (1.876 - 3.112) 3.283* (2.471 - 4.363) 
 $11 plus 1.405** (1.059 - 1.865) 2.537* (1.713 - 3.759) 3.789* (2.459 - 5.839) 
Non-compliance (MPR<0.80) 1.159** (1.019 - 1.320) 0.916 (0.754 - 1.112) 0.904 (0.726 - 1.127) 
Age 1.031* (1.023 - 1.039) 1.017* (1.005 - 1.029) 1.026* (1.012 - 1.041) 
Female 0.941 (0.849 - 1.043) 0.93 (0.793 - 1.091) 1.005 (0.835 - 1.209) 
Census2       
 South 1.138 (0.820 - 1.580) 1.074 (0.637 - 1.811) 0.923 (0.511 - 1.670) 
 Midwest 1.18 (0.872 - 1.596) 0.801 (0.484 - 1.325) 0.7 (0.367 - 1.335) 
 West 0.669** (0.455 - 0.984) 0.79 (0.446 - 1.400) 0.659 (0.354 - 1.230) 
 National Mix 1.542* (1.360 - 1.747) 1.186+ (0.991 - 1.419) 1.141 (0.921 - 1.414) 
Health Plan Level 13       
 Medicaid 1.195 (0.638 - 2.237) 0.778 (0.360 - 1.679) 1.156 (0.495 - 2.702) 
 Medicare 1.216** (1.018 - 1.454) 1.517* (1.168 - 1.970) 1.454** (1.063 - 1.987) 
Health Plan Level 24       
 Independent 1.102 (0.915 - 1.327) 1.035 (0.792 - 1.353) 1.066 (0.775 - 1.468) 
 PPO 1.06 (0.890 - 1.263) 1.133 (0.868 - 1.477) 1.156 (0.836 - 1.600) 
 POS and other 1.054 (0.799 - 1.390) 1.315 (0.882 - 1.960) 1.267 (0.780 - 2.058) 
Charlson Comorbidity index5       
 1 1.119 (0.857 - 1.460) 1.489+ (0.959 - 2.313) 1.319 (0.813 - 2.141) 
 2 1.242 (0.951 - 1.622) 1.634** (1.051 - 2.542) 1.272 (0.784 - 2.064) 
 3 1.613* (1.225 - 2.125) 2.193* (1.392 - 3.456) 1.786** (1.081 - 2.950) 
 4 plus 1.509* (1.149 - 1.983) 1.866* (1.194 - 2.916) 1.563+ (0.959 - 2.547) 
Number of hospitalizations in previous year 1.303* (1.239 - 1.371) 1.292* (1.226 - 1.362) 1.329* (1.256 - 1.407) 
(continued)
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 Table 4.13: Logistic regression models measuring probability of total hospitalizations, cardiovascular disease-specific hospitalizations, 
and heart-failure specific hospitalizations across annual average diuretic copayment levels (N=9,305 person-years) (continued) 
 
 
 Any Hospitalization Cardiovascular hospitalizations Heart Failure Hospitalizations 
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Average diuretic MPR in previous year 1.019 (0.983 - 1.055) 1.043** (1.003 - 1.085) 1.066* (1.024 - 1.110) 
Any concomitant drug utilization       
 ACE Inhibitors 1.148* (1.037 - 1.273) 1.589* (1.375 - 1.838) 1.581* (1.335 - 1.873) 
 Beta Blockers 1.378* (1.245 - 1.526) 2.163* (1.854 - 2.524) 1.876* (1.570 - 2.242) 
 Aldosterone antagonists 1.315* (1.148 - 1.507) 1.702* (1.433 - 2.020) 1.993* (1.638 - 2.425) 
Average monthly unique drug utilization 1.174* (1.143 - 1.206) 1.149* (1.108 - 1.191) 1.157* (1.108 - 1.208) 
Average monthly OOP Rx ($) 0.998** (0.997 - 1.000) 0.995* (0.993 - 0.997) 0.993* (0.991 - 0.996) 
Number of follow-up months 1.000+ (1.000 - 1.000) 1.000** (1.000 - 1.000) 1.000** (1.000 - 1.001) 
Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Ref groups: 1: $0 - $1; 2: Northeast/Atlantic; 3: commercial; 4: HMO; 5: 0 
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MEDIATION MODELS 
 
Mediation models used logistic regression to estimate the a) probability of non-
compliance conditional upon copayment levels (Path A); b) the probability of hospitalization 
conditional upon non-compliance (Path B); c) the probability of hospitalization conditional 
upon copayment level controlling for non-compliance (Path C)(direct effect); d) the 
probability of hospitalization conditional upon copayment level omitting non-compliance 
(Path D)(total effect).  Indirect effects were computed by multiplying the coefficients from 
Path A and Path B, and using the Sobel test in order to test the presence of mediation. 
 
Figure 4.12: Mediation Model Pathway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A prerequisite for non-compliance to be a mediator of hospitalization requires a total 
effect between the copayment and hospitalizations; otherwise there is no pathway upon 
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which the proposed mediator, non-compliance, can act.  Since increased copayment levels 
were not significantly associated with increased risk of hospitalization in ACE inhibitor or 
beta blocker cohorts, testing the mediating properties of medication non-compliance for these 
cohorts became irrelevant.  In contrast, the significant associations found between diuretic 
copayment levels and hospitalizations provided an opportunity to test the indirect effect. 
In the diuretic models, indirect effects were not statistically significant at any 
copayment level, in comparison to the reference group, according to the Sobel test (Table 
4.14).  This suggests that factors besides non-compliance contribute to the relationship 
between diuretic copayment levels and risk of hospitalizations. 
Table 4.14: Sobel test calculations of the indirect effects of non-compliance on copayment 
and hospitalizations 
 Total Hospitalizations 
 Path A (β) Path B (β) Path AB (β) S(AB)1 Crit2 
Refill Copayment Level      
 $1 to $5 0.22 0.14 0.03 0.02 1.55 
 $6 to $10 0.75 0.14 0.10 0.06 1.88 
 $11 to $15 0.48 0.14 0.09 0.06 1.66 
 
 Cardiovascular Hospitalizations 
 Path A (β) Path B (β) Path AB (β) S(AB)1 Crit2 
Refill Copayment Level      
 $1 to $5 0.22 -0.09 -0.02 0.09 -0.79 
 $6 to $10 0.75 -0.09 -0.07 0.13 -0.86 
 $11 to $15 0.48 -0.09 -0.06 0.17 -0.82 
 
 Heart Failure Hospitalizations 
 Path A (β) Path B (β) Path AB (β) S(AB)1 Crit2 
Refill Copayment Level      
 $1 to $5 0.22 -0.10 -0.02 0.10 -0.82 
 $6 to $10 0.75 -0.10 -0.08 0.14 -0.90 
 $11 to $15 0.48 -0.10 -0.07 0.18 -0.85 
1: Sobel Test Sab=√ [(B2 * sa2+A2* sb2+ sa2*sb2)] 
2:Critical value calculation: Path AB (β)/ Sab; compare to normal distribution as a z-score 
 
PATHWAY A: COPAYMENT AND NON-COMPLIANCE 
 
Deconstructing the indirect effect into the separate pathways provided additional 
insight into the relationship between copayment level and compliance; and compliance and 
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hospitalizations.  Unlike the linear models that measured compliance as a continuous 
variable, the mediation models measured it as a dichotomous outcome (MPR<0.80).   
Compared to beta blocker users with annual average copayment levels between $0 and $1, 
those with average annual copayments levels of $20 to $25 and $26 upwards had 1.6 and 2.5 
times the risk, respectively, of medication non-compliance (OR=1.6, 95% CI 1.12 - 2.42; 
OR=2.5, 95% CI 1.6 – 4.0) (Table 4.10).  Similarly, compared to diuretic users with annual 
copayments averaging $0 to $1, those with annual copayment levels $1 to $5, $6 to $10, and 
$11 upwards had 1.3, 2.1, and 1.9 times the risk, respectively, of medication non-medication 
(OR=1.3, 95% CI 1.1 – 1.5; OR=2.1, 95%CI 1.7 – 2.6; OR=1.3 – 2.9) (Table 4.10). 
PATHWAY B: COMPLIANCE AND HOSPITALIZATION 
 
Additional associations found between compliance and hospitalizations corroborate 
past studies demonstrating that medication non-compliance increases the risk of 
hospitalizations.  Compared to compliant ACE inhibitor users with an annual MPR above 
0.8, non-compliant ACE inhibitor users had 1.8 and 1.5 times the risk of any hospitalization 
and any CAD-specific hospitalization, respectively (OR=1.79, 95% CI (1.38 – 2.3);OR=1.50, 
95% CI (1.01 – 2.21)(Table 4.11).  Similarly, non-compliance beta blocker users had 1.4, and 
1.3 times the risk of any hospitalization or cardiovascular specific hospitalization (OR=1.40, 
95% CI (1.21 – 1.63); OR=1.31, 95% CI (1.04 – 1.66) (Table 4.12), and non-compliance 
diuretic users had 1.2 times the risk of any hospitalization (OR=1.16, 95% CI (1.02 – 1.32) 
(Table 4.13). 
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SUMMARY 
 
In summary, compared to refills in the lowest copayment category, refills in the 
higher copayment categories were associated with decreased medication supply levels for 
beta blockers and diuretics.  These associations remained in the person-year level 
regressions, finding higher annual copayment levels associated with decreased annual 
medication supply levels. 
Of all three drug classes, diuretics were the only category which showed significant 
associations between copayment levels and hospitalizations.  Compared to individuals taking 
the lowest copayment level diuretic, those with higher copayment levels had increasingly 
more risk of all hospitalization outcomes examined, a statistically significant total effect 
which according to the Sobel statistic was not mediated by non-compliance.  Consistent with 
past studies examining associations of medication non-compliance on hospitalizations, ACE 
inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic non-compliance was associated with increased risk of 
hospitalizations.
 CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
OVERVIEW 
 
This dissertation’s objectives were to a) estimate the effects of copayment levels on 
ACE inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic compliance; b) estimate the probability of all-cause, 
cardiovascular-specific, and heart-failure specific hospitalizations conditional upon ACE 
inhibitor, beta blocker, and diuretic copayment levels; and c) explore the mediation 
properties of medication non-compliance to assess the causal pathway between copayments, 
compliance and hospitalizations, all within a sample of commercially insured heart failure 
patients. 
First, it was hypothesized that increased copayment levels would be associated with 
decreased compliance across all medication classes.  Fixed-effects models found no 
association between ACE inhibitor copayments levels and MPR (Table 4.2, 4.7) with the 
exception of copayment levels ($26 to $30) that exhibited an unexpected positive correlation 
with MPR in the refill-level analysis (Table 4.2).  In contrast, both refill-level and person-
year models found higher beta blocker or diuretic copayment levels to be significantly 
associated with decreased MPR (Table 4.3, 4.4, 4.8, 4.9) with the exception of annual 
diuretic copayments ($11 and up) that exhibited unexpected positive correlations in the 
person-year analysis (Table 4.9). 
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Second, it was hypothesized that increased copayment levels would be associated 
with increased risk of all-cause, cardiovascular, and heart failure specific hospitalizations 
across all medication classes.  Logistic regressions showed increased copayment levels 
associated with increased risk of hospitalizations in the diuretic cohort (Table 4.13), with the 
exception of the beta blocker cohort showing average annual copayments between ($16 and 
20) significantly associated with decreased risk of hospitalization (Table 4.12). 
Third, it was hypothesized that medication non-compliance would mediate the 
association between copayments and hospitalizations.  Diuretic non-compliance did not 
mediate the significant associations found between average annual diuretic copayments and 
hospitalizations (Table 4.14). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Significant associations between beta blocker and diuretic copayment levels and the 
MPR suggest that higher copayments cause decreased compliance to beta blockers or 
diuretics in privately insured heart failure patients.  Although the study design did not include 
a control group or estimate the effect of copayment changes, the dose-response relationship 
suggests a causal relationship (Figure 4.8; 4.9).  The inverse associations found are also 
consistent with retrospective claims studies demonstrating that increased copayment levels 
are associated with either decreased medication utilization (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; 
Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; Johnson, Goodman et al. 1997; Joyce, Escarce et al. 2002; 
Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003; Goldman, Joyce et al. 2004) or compliance (Coombs, Cornish 
et al. 2002; Dor and Encinosa 2004; Ellis, Erickson et al. 2004). 
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The validity of these estimates was strengthened by the use of either fixed-effect 
estimators that captured individual-level time-invariant sources of heterogeneity, or random 
effects estimators that accounted for clustering of refills within individuals.  Conducting 
specification tests to compare OLS, RE and FE estimators provided insight into how 
unobserved heterogeneity or clustering may bias the results if not accounted for in the 
analyses.  For example, the Bruesch-Pagan test, favoring the RE over the OLS, demonstrated 
the likely presence of clustering, which gone unaccounted for, would result in inflated 
standard errors and consequently less efficient estimators.  Additionally, the Hausman test, 
favoring the FE over the RE, demonstrated the likely presence of individual level time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity that would have caused biased parameter estimates in 
either the RE or OLS models.  The use of more sophisticated estimators in this analysis 
therefore accounted for sources of bias that standard OLS models would be unable to detect. 
In contrast to the significant associations found in the beta blocker and diuretic 
cohorts, null associations found between ACE inhibitor copayments and MPR suggest that 
ACE inhibitor compliance is unaffected by copayment level.  These results are consistent 
with a study finding no associations between copayment change and ACE inhibitor use 
(Pilote, Beck et al. 2002).  Pilote et al. speculated that individuals with a severe condition 
may be insensitive to copayment changes given the essential nature of the medication (Pilote, 
Beck et al. 2002).  If so, heart failure patients may perceive that ACE inhibitors as more 
essential compared to beta blockers or diuretics, causing them to remain relatively price 
insensitive. 
Although the significant associations found between diuretic copayment levels and 
hospitalization risk suggest that higher diuretic copayments increase the risk of all-cause, 
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cardiovascular, or heart-failure specific hospitalizations, the absence of a control group 
makes it difficult to infer causality.  Furthermore, since these person-year level models did 
not control for drug-product heterogeneity, associations could be due to drug product effects.  
For example, physicians may be prescribing higher cost diuretics to more severe patients 
already at higher risk of hospitalization, causing a positive correlation between copayment 
level and hospitalization risk.  One scenario could be the case of Zaroxolyn, a higher cost 
diuretic indicated for heart failure patients with renal failure (Wolters-Kluwer Health, 2006).  
Given that almost 50% of the diuretics in the $11 plus category prescribed were Zaroxolyn 
(Table 5.1), the increased risk of hospitalization associated with ($11 plus) diuretics may be 
attributed to physicians prescribing more Zaroxolyn to severe patients versus non-severe 
patients, creating a positive correlation between copayment level and hospitalization (Table 
4.13). 
 
Table 5.1: Frequency of diuretic product brands by copayment category 
 
Diuretic Brand $0 (%) $1 to $5(%) $6 to $10 (%) $11 plus (%) 
Furosemide 93.17 89.82 56.66 5.76 
hydrochlorothiazide 4.56 2.76 0.61 0 
Zaroxolyn® 0.72 1.14 11.39 47.49 
Bumetanide 0.65 2.89 12.45 3.82 
Lasix® 0.29 1.95 6.77 9.63 
Demadex® 0.28 0.49 2.86 21.59 
Bumex® 0.19 0.18 0.69 4.19 
Torsemide 0.1 0.66 6.89 1.73 
Aldactone® 0.04 0.1 1.3 4.89 
Aldactazide® 0 0 0.37 0.76 
Microzide® 0 0 0 0.16 
 
Furthermore, if this select group of patients taking diuretics averaging $11 and above 
is on average more compliant to Zaroxolyn due to a perceived need to be extra compliant, 
this could explain the positive association found between copayment level and compliance in 
the person-year diuretic models (Figure 4.16).  These unobserved factors motivate the need 
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to examine the causal mechanism existing between higher diuretic copayments and increased 
hospitalization risk more closely, providing rationale for the use of mediation models to 
explore causal pathways among copayments, compliance, and hospitalizations. 
Although it was hypothesized that copayments cause increase hospitalizations due to 
medication non-compliance, the null indirect effects found using mediation models suggest 
that the effect of increased copayments on hospitalizations is not caused by non-compliance.  
This suggests that other unobserved mediators may be part of the causal pathway.  Future 
studies therefore need to further explore the causal mechanism underlying the associations 
between diuretic copayment levels and hospitalizations. 
LIMITATIONS 
The absence of more detailed clinical information prevented classifying heart failure 
patients into alternative heart failure regimens.  Since this analysis assumed that all 
individuals diagnosed with heart failure need to be compliant to ACE inhibitors, beta 
blockers, and diuretics, it did not account for the possibility of individuals switching to 
clinically appropriate alternatives such as ACE inhibitors to angiotensin receptor blockers 
(ARBs).  Consequently, if individuals appropriately switch from ACE to ARBs, they would 
be misclassified as being non-compliant to ACE inhibitors.  As a result, these results are 
most generalizable to heart failure patients who are chronic long term users of ACE 
inhibitors, beta blockers, or diuretics, and less so to heart failure patients who switch to 2nd 
line therapy classes not captured in this analysis. 
One of the consequences of restricting this analysis to long-term utilizers is that it did 
not have the ability to test the marginal effects of copayment on compliance for extreme non-
compliers.  More specifically, because the existence of a pharmaceutical claim was required 
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in order to measure copayment levels, the existence of an observed copayment level 
depended upon the utilization level of the individual.  Ideally, if the dataset had plan-level 
formulary benefit descriptions attributed to each individual, copayment exposures could have 
been assigned to individuals based upon the policy change dates instead of the copayment 
level associated with each of the observed refills.  Consequently, the existence of the 
copayment measure was dependent upon a minimum amount of pharmaceutical claims, 
inevitably resulting in selection bias.  As a result, the analysis excluded low compliers and 
focused primarily on patients with regular use of ACE inhibitors, beta blockers, or diuretics, 
respectively, over a three year period.  Although this restricts the external validity to a select 
group of heart failure patients, it was the best solution in the absence of plan-level copayment 
information.  Omitting less compliant heart failure patients from the sample may have 
attenuated the estimates, especially if the extreme non-compliers were more sensitive to 
higher copayment levels compared to chronic long term utilizers. 
If plan-level indicator variables containing formulary benefit descriptions and change 
dates were present in the data, assigning copayment levels and change dates would have been 
possible even to the least compliant individuals.  In addition, this information would have 
facilitated matching control groups to those individuals having copayment changes.  
Although significant associations were found between copayments, compliance, and 
hospitalizations, the absence of a control group makes it difficult to infer causality from the 
study results.  Despite these limitations, the multiple copayment levels present in the claims 
data created an opportunity to estimate effects of multiple copayment levels on compliance, 
as opposed to the effects of just one policy shift, the latter being most common in quasi-
experimental designs. 
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Even with the ability to construct a control group, this would not have prevented bias 
resulting from the endogenous relationship between copayment and health outcomes.  For 
example, while increased diuretic copayments may increase the risk of hospitalizations, 
current models cannot account for the degree of bias resulting from physicians selectively 
prescribing diuretics in certain copayment levels due to the health status of an individual.  In 
this example, the presence of reverse causality, one form of endogeneity, results in biased 
estimates.  The bias created from endogeneity may be attenuated by using instrumental 
variables in conjunction with two stage least squares estimates (Wooldridge 2003).  This 
requires choosing a variable as an instrument that is highly correlated with the predictor 
(copayment), yet orthogonal to the outcome (hospitalizations, or compliance).  Since 
employers are a large influence in setting copayment levels when contracting with managed 
care organizations, some type of employer characteristic that is correlated with prescription 
copayments and unrelated to individual-level outcomes might have potential as an 
instrument.  Assuming prescription copayment is endogenous, future studies might therefore 
employ instrumental variables to measure copayment effects on health outcomes. 
Beyond the design, this study contained limitations universal to retrospective studies 
using administrative claims data.  For example, information was missing from administrative 
claims on educational level, income, and racial background.   
If these factors are systematically associated with copayment levels, as well as medication 
compliance or health status, biased estimates may have occurred.  In a study examining low 
income cohorts of elderly respondents from the Aging and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) 
study, Moran et al. found significant inverse correlations between income level and 
prescription drug use (Moran and Simon December 2004).  These results imply that lower 
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income heart failure patients may also take fewer medications, and failing to account for 
income level could bias the associations between copayment level and probability of 
hospitalizations.  Yet, since all of these factors are arguably time-invariant, including income 
if individuals are retirees on fixed income, the use of individual fixed effects models 
accounts for these unobserved sources of heterogeneity. 
In contrast to demographic characteristics which may be time-invariant, 
cardiovascular risk factors such as smoking status, BMI, or exercise levels may vary over 
time.  These potentially omitted variables may have biased the estimates, especially if they 
are correlated with copayment levels.  For example, if there were reason to believe that 
physicians would prescribe a higher costing beta blocker to a smoker versus a non-smoker, or 
to an avid exerciser versus a less active adult, failing to account for these factors may result 
in biased copayment estimates on hospitalizations.  In addition to risk factor information, the 
lack of clinical information regarding heart failure severity levels also compromised the 
accuracy of risk adjustment.  For example, classifying individuals into NYHA severity levels 
I, II, III, and IV would have improved the risk adjustment compared to the proxy 
measurement of total hospitalizations at baseline. 
Finally, although claims-based adherence metrics such as the MPR have been cited as 
valid and reliable estimates of actual medication taking behavior (Steiner, Koepsell et al. 
1988), it technically still reflects medication supply levels (Stroupe, Teal et al. 2004).  
Despite this, the MPR in certain cases may greatly diverge from actual medication taking 
behavior.  For example, heart failure patients being titrated for diuretics may end up having a 
series of early refills, which mostly likely reflects dose switches as opposed to over-
consumption.  Given that early refills often manifest themselves as large MPR values in the 
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claims data (Grymonpre, Didur et al. 1998), the current analysis eliminated individual refills 
with outlier MPRs arguably because the refills associated with these MPR values were a 
reflection of early refills as opposed to true medication taking behavior of a stable regimen.  
Despite the limitations associated with MPR as a proxy of actual compliance, proxies with 
measurement error tend to bias estimates toward the null (Greene 2003), implying that this 
proxy would at worst underestimate the effect of copayments on compliance. 
STRENGTHS 
 
This study contributes to the literature by being the first to simultaneously measure 
drug-class specific associations among copayment levels, medication compliance, and 
clinical outcomes within a commercially insured heart failure population.  Although prior 
studies established inverse correlations between prescription copayments and utilization, few 
studies have focused on medication compliance.  Furthermore, although studies have 
examined drug class specific copayment effects, none have focused on ACE inhibitors, beta 
blockers, or diuretics in privately insured heart failure patients. 
The main strengths of this analysis include the large number of claims, the diversity 
of the included plan types, the longitudinal nature of the data, and the use of mediation 
models to explore the causal pathway among copayments, non-compliance, and 
hospitalizations.  The large number of claims facilitated the ability to conduct class-specific 
analyses within a subgroup of heart failure patients, a relatively rare but costly condition 
especially in healthier, privately insured beneficiaries.  The diversity of plan type enrollees 
also increase the external validity of the results to a larger cross section of commercially 
insured populations in the United States.  In contrast, many past studies measuring 
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copayment change effects on utilization or compliance have focused only in one type of 
managed care organization (Harris, Stergachis et al. 1990; Motheral and Fairman 2001; 
Huskamp, Deverka et al. 2003). 
In addition to the large sample size and diverse source population, the panel data 
structure facilitated the use of fixed effects and random effects models.  The use of 
specification tests to compare OLS, FE, and RE models demonstrates how pharmaceutical 
claims data is prone to serial correlation and unobserved heterogeneity, sometimes 
correctable using these more advanced error component models.  Finally, simultaneous 
measurement of copayment levels, medication compliance, and hospitalizations enabled the 
use of mediation models to explore causal pathways among them.  Although this mediation 
modeling is prevalent in the psychology and sociology literature, no current studies have 
used this method to explore the effects of copayments on compliance or hospitalization. 
POLICY AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
If increased beta blocker or diuretic copayments are associated with decreased 
compliance, this creates a challenge for policy makers whose goal is to contain system level 
costs concurrently with maintaining the health of health plan enrollees.  For example, should 
managed care organizations or hospitals provide free diuretics for heart failure patients to 
encourage optimal compliance?  Under this scenario, health plan administers would have to 
demonstrate that the cost of providing free diuretics would be less than or equal to the costs 
associated with diuretic non-compliance-related hospitalizations. 
The current formulary decision process involves gathering information on safety, 
efficacy, and cost.  The decision process made by hospitals and health plans often relies upon 
pharmacy and therapeutic (P&T) committees to gather information from case reports in the 
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literature, randomized clinical trials and anecdotes from clinicians to help guide their 
decisions.  While the formulary decision process is not currently standardized across health 
care organizations, it is more recently becoming transparent after the introduction of the 
Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP) Format for Formulary Submission in 2000, 
which urges committees to request formalized dossiers from pharmaceutical companies that 
include the drug’s safety, efficacy, and cost data in addition to unpublished studies, off label 
indications, and disease management strategies (Neumann 2004).  As more managed care 
organizations outsource to pharmacy benefit management companies (PBMs) to design and 
administer pharmacy benefits to their enrollee population, the PBMs have also evolved as 
important decision-makers in the formulary process (Grabowski and Mullins 1997).  In 
addition to being influenced by P&T committees’ expert opinions on safety, efficacy, and 
cost, PBMs are also influenced by the rebates offered by pharmaceutical companies to 
classify drugs as preferred products (Grabowski and Mullins 1997). 
In summary, the medication’s safety, efficacy, and cost profile in addition to volume 
discounts offered to MCOs or PBMs by pharmaceutical companies influence the assignment 
of a drug to a particular copayment level.  Currently absent in this decision process is the 
consideration of patient compliance based upon medication copayment level.  Incorporating 
class-specific effects of medication copayment levels on compliance into the formulary 
decision process could improve the ability of P&T committees and PBMs to design 
formularies sensitive to the medication-taking habits of chronically ill patients.  Results from 
this study are therefore helpful to pharmacy benefit managers or prescription policy designers 
interested in assessing the effects of their formulary design on utilization of heart failure 
medications in privately insured heart failure patients.  Furthermore, given the trend of 
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pharmacy benefit management companies (PBMs) investing more in disease management, 
and their growing interest in outcomes research (Grabowski and Mullins 1997), they would 
have incentive to design unique disease-specific formularies based upon medication 
compliance levels in order to contain long-term system-level expenditures. 
While cost-related medication adherence may be modified at the formulary level, 
communication between physicians and patients regarding drug costs could increase patient 
awareness of equivalent, cheaper therapies.  In a nationwide study surveying over 600 adults 
reporting medication underutilization due to cost, approximately two-thirds of the 
respondents did not tell a clinician in advance that they planned to underutilize the 
medication because of cost (Piette, Heisler et al. 2004).  In terms of physician 
communication, the same survey found that only 28% of respondents reported that their 
doctor or nurse asked whether they could afford the medication, only 69% reported the 
physician changing more expensive medications to cheaper alternatives, and 59% reported 
that physicians talked to them about which medications they should not skip (Piette, Heisler 
et al. 2004).  Results from these studies imply a significant gap between patients and 
providers in terms of communication about medication cost issues.  Furthermore, if 
physicians do not address the patients about medication non-compliance due to cost, the 
medications which should not be skipped, generic alternatives, physicians’ own prescribing 
patterns could contribute to suboptimal medication compliance of heart failure medications.  
Clinicians therefore need to increase their awareness of medication cost and how medication 
cost barriers result in suboptimal mediation compliance to heart failure medications 
especially in the most vulnerable populations with multiple comorbidities and lower 
socioeconomic status. 
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FUTURE INVESTIGATIONS 
The significant associations found between diuretic copayment levels and 
hospitalizations needs to be further investigated in order to elucidate the causal nature of 
these associations.  More rigorous methods such as quasi-experimental designs or 
instrumental variables could help account for the role of selection bias or endogeneity.  Using 
data with copayment policy change dates would facilitate assigning a control group, as well 
as measuring the effects of a change in copayments with changes in compliance and clinical 
outcomes.  The use of instrumental variables could help account for whether copayments are 
causing decreased health status, or whether physicians are selectively prescribing 
medications with higher copayments to higher-risk patients. 
Finally, future studies should account for unobserved heterogeneity due to specific 
drug products as well as different managed care firms.  Although the present research did 
account for drug brand in the refill-level analyses, high drug switching rates made it difficult 
to assign drug brands at the person-year level.  Although the presence research did account 
for health plan payer and physician reimbursement type, using MCO firm fixed effects could 
have better controlled for some of the unobserved firm-level differences such as quality of 
care and incentives affecting prescribing patterns. 
Due to the increasing prevalence and economic burden of heart failure in the United 
States in conjunction with an aging population enrolling into managed care plans for the new 
Medicare drug benefit, the effects of copayments on compliance and hospitalizations need 
further study.  The ever increasing economic burden of heart disease in the United States 
provides an impetus to continue studying the effects of copayment policies on medication 
adherence and hospitalizations, especially given the significant associations found in diuretic 
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users.  Direct costs of treating heart failure have been estimated at $20 billion, or 1.5% of the 
total United States health care expenditures for hospitalization, outpatient visits, nursing 
home care and pharmaceuticals (Berry, Murdoch et al. 2001).  More importantly, given this 
disease is most prevalent in individuals 65 and above, more Medicare funds are spent toward 
heart failure treatment than in any other diagnosis. For example, compared to all cancer 
treatments, Medicare spent twice as much for heart failure hospitalizations (Lee, Chavez et 
al. 2004).  Since decreased medication compliance to clinically recommended heart failure 
medications increase the risk of hospitalizations (Stroupe, Teal et al. 2004), cost-sharing 
polices which potentially discourage optimal compliance to heart failure medications should 
be critically examined.  Creating formularies which encourage optimal use of essential 
medications continues to be important, especially if these policies decrease the economic 
burden of heart failure. 
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